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WHY WE NEED A STRONG PATENT SYSTEM 
AND WHEN: FILLING THE VOID LEFT BY THE 
BILSKI CASE 
Richard S. Gruner† 
If we could first know where we are, and whither we are tending, we 
could better judge what to do, and how to do it.
1
 
Abraham Lincoln 
 
The patent system . . . added the fuel of interest to the fire of genius in 
the discovery and production of new and useful things.
2
 
Abraham Lincoln 
 
Anything that won’t sell, I don’t want to invent. Its sale is proof of 
utility, and utility is success.
3
 
Thomas Edison 
 
Abstract 
Patent law is presently under-theorized. Patents are granted to 
serve as rewards for certain types of inventive successes,
4
 but the 
 
 †  Professor of Law, John Marshall Law School, Chicago (Ph.D., University of 
California, Irvine, 2008; L.L.M., Columbia University School of Law, 1982; J.D., U.S.C. Law 
School, 1978; B.S., California Institute of Technology, 1975). 
 1. President Abraham Lincoln, Speech Before the Republican State Convention: House 
Divided (June 16, 1858) in I COMPLETE WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 1 (John G. Nicolay & 
John Hay eds., 1894). 
 2. President Abraham Lincoln, Second Lecture on Discoveries and Inventions (Feb. 
1859) in I COMPLETE WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 113 (John G. Nicolay & John Hay eds., 
1894). 
 3. Thomas Edison, quoted in Farha Abdol Chapar, The Future of Innovation is Inspired 
by the Intellectual Property System, in THE FUTURE OF INNOVATION 454 (Bettina von Stamm & 
Anna Trifilova eds., 2009). 
 4. The reward logic and technology enhancement goals of the patent system are 
embedded in the Constitutional provision that forms the basis for the United States patent 
system. The Constitution provides that Congress may establish a patent system “[t]o promote 
the Progress of . . . useful Arts” by granting inventors exclusive control over their discoveries 
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nature of the successes to be rewarded, the circumstances that should 
trigger rewards, and the size of the rewards that will best serve the 
public remain in substantial dispute. One of the primary reasons for 
these uncertainties is the incompleteness of underlying theories 
explaining why patented inventions deserve special treatment and 
rewards. The lack of good understanding of the theoretical 
justifications for patent rewards (and the limitations of those 
justifications) means that patent law standards are being 
reconsidered and revised without a clear sense of patent law goals. If 
we do not know where we are trying to go in setting patent standards, 
how can we know how to proceed? 
This article seeks to overcome these limitations on present 
analyses of patent policies and standards. The article attempts to 
better define the innovation reward goals of patent laws and to set 
directions for future thinking about a variety of patent law standards. 
It describes a model of patent rewards based on Harold Demsetz’s 
analyses of property controls limiting access to public goods. The 
article argues that patented invention designs should be limited to 
excludable designs for which workable access controls and access 
payment systems are feasible. Access to these sorts of inventions—as 
with other types of excludable public goods—should be regulated and 
controlled by patent rights to attract resources to the production of 
patentable inventions and to ensure that these inventions are 
produced at socially desirable levels. 
The article considers the merit of providing patent rewards 
conforming to this model. It also considers at what points the model 
breaks down and under what circumstances patent rights should be 
withheld accordingly. By considering both the justifications for strong 
patent rewards and the limitations of those justifications, the contours 
of desirable patent standards in several areas of patent law become 
clearer. The concluding section of this article offers preliminary 
thoughts on how the model developed here can be used to shape 
several important patent law standards. 
 
for a limited time. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8. This provision envisions grants of exclusive 
rights in discoveries as means to reward discoverers and to thereby promote more discoveries 
and the expansion of knowledge about useful advances. Through this greater knowledge, the 
patent system was expected to achieve progress in the accumulation and use of specialized 
knowledge in the “useful arts.” 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. The Post-Bilski Void in Patentable Subject Matter Standards 
Over the past two decades, federal courts have struggled to 
define the boundaries of the patent system.
5
 The struggle has focused 
on attempts to define generally applicable standards for identifying 
patentable subject matter.
6
 Such standards specify the types of 
advances that can qualify for patents if other patent law tests are met. 
Since an advance that is not patentable subject matter can never 
qualify for a patent no matter what other features the invention may 
have,
7
 this standard places outer boundaries on the patent system. It 
specifies ranges of useful advances for which patents will never issue 
and for which patent incentives and rewards will never be factors.
8
 
Because patentable subject matter criteria limit the outer boundaries 
of the patent system and its effects in this way, these criteria are 
among our most important patent law standards.
9
 
The clarity of patentable subject matter standards is a critically 
important feature of the patent system since these standards signal 
when potential innovators can look to patent rewards as incentives. 
Doubts about whether the patent system will apply reduce and 
weaken the incentives for innovation that the system provides. If a 
potential innovator is uncertain about whether a given type of advance 
will qualify for a patent, she will discount the importance of patent 
rewards below the levels that the innovator would perceive if she 
thought that the issuance of a patent was more certain. Hence, 
uncertainty regarding the range of patentable subject matters risks 
undercutting the incentives and impacts of the patent system in the 
areas of uncertainty. The judicial struggle over patentable subject 
matter standards—and the highly unresolved state of this struggle at 
present—have impaired the operation of the patent system and 
 
 5. The particular standards adopted and rejected by courts in these struggles are 
recounted in detail at a later point in this article. See infra text accompanying notes 57-94. 
 6. See infra text accompanying notes 57-94. 
 7. See infra text accompanying notes 57-94. 
 8. See infra text accompanying notes 57-94. 
 9. Subject matter standards for determining the range of items and processes that are 
governed by property rights are among the bedrock standards of any property system. See 
generally Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, A Theory of Property, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 
531, 575-76 (2005) (arguing that any property law must address four interlocking fundamental 
questions: “(1) what things property law protects; (2) vis-à-vis whom; (3) with what rights; and 
(4) by what enforcement mechanism”). 
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potentially curtailed the development of valuable technologies by 
creating doubts about the applicability and scope of patent rewards for 
many socially valuable advances. 
The Supreme Court’s brief and largely superficial opinion in 
Bilski v. Kappos
10
 has brought the need for greater analytic 
underpinnings and definition in patentable subject matter standards to 
the fore. In Bilski, the Court rejected a generally applicable subject 
matter test previously articulated by the Federal Circuit court, while 
refusing to provide a substitute of its own.
11
 The Supreme Court’s 
analysis of the invention before it (a method of managing risk in 
commodities transactions) involved pointing out that patentable 
inventions must not be just “abstract” ideas (as distinguished from 
more practical inventions) and then finding that the invention before it 
was too abstract.
12
 The Court did not indicate why it thought that 
abstract ideas were not properly subject to patent rewards, nor did it 
describe what makes a design too abstract for patenting.
13
 The Court’s 
analysis seemed to reflect no underlying theory of patentable subject 
matter, which precluded a reasoned explanation of why the 
abstractness of an advance was important. Nor did the Court indicate 
what features of a useful advance would bear upon whether the 
advance constitutes patentable subject matter as distinct from an 
abstract idea.
14
 
The lack of a viable standard articulated in Bilski—or even a 
viable approach to stating or implying such a standard—leaves future 
determinations of patentable subject matter largely unstructured and 
susceptible to wide variation. Lower federal courts will need to define 
new approaches to determining patentable subject matter that are 
general enough (and forward looking enough) to provide meaningful 
answers regarding the applicability of the patent system to 
technologies with characteristics that we cannot even imagine today. 
Ideally, in order for the incentives of the patent system to encourage 
and regulate the production of new advances, potential inventors of 
new technologies should have confidence that their advances will 
probably be inside or outside the patent system when they 
contemplate the development of their advances. Such confidence will 
 
 10. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010). 
 11. Id. at 3225-29. 
 12. Id. at 3229-31. 
 13. See id. 
 14. See id. 
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clarify the rewards they can expect for successful development 
efforts. Absent some predictability that the patent system and 
associated patent rights and rewards will probably apply to a given 
type of advance, it is hard to see how the patent system can encourage 
and regulate the production of that type of advance. Hence, there is a 
particularly strong need for clearly articulated principles determining 
patent system scope and specifying (in a predictable manner) the 
outcomes of patentable subject matter analyses. 
B. In Search of Theoretical Underpinnings 
The Supreme Court’s lack of a clear approach in defining the 
outer boundaries of the patent system stems from the Court’s 
incomplete specification of the goals of the system. If it had a clearer 
picture of the incentive functions Congress intended to be served by 
the patent system, the Court would have had an easier time in Bilski in 
specifying criteria for determining when the system should apply. 
Without these theoretical underpinnings, the Court was at a loss to 
articulate generally applicable tests or principles for assessing 
whether patentable subject matter was present, and was instead 
reduced to repeatedly uttering the largely unhelpful notion that 
patentable advances must not be too “abstract.”15 
Had the Court considered the goals of the patent system in its 
analyses, it would probably have concluded that these goals remain 
poorly defined in both prior cases and academic literature. While 
there is some general sentiment—stated in both cases and articles—
that the patent system is aimed at rewarding inventors for their work, 
there is little detail on how this reward system is to work and when.
16
 
Hence, the incomplete understanding of the reward logic of the patent 
system has curtailed the use of reward objectives as criteria for 
evaluating the patent system and for constructing and interpreting 
vague patent law standards, such as patentable subject matter tests. 
This article aims to improve this situation by providing a greater 
understanding of how and when the patent system may provide 
socially desirable rewards to inventors, creating incentives that both 
 
 15. See id. at 3223-25. The court also noted that there are two other well recognized 
grounds for excluding useful items from patentable subject matter. These involve advances that 
are laws of nature or physical phenomena. Id. Neither of these grounds for exclusion was 
addressed in the Supreme Court’s analysis of the invention at issue in Bilski. Id. 
 16. See, e.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 307 (1980); Kewanee Oil Co. v. 
Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480 (1974); Donald F. Turner, The Patent System and Competitive 
Policy, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 450, 450-51 (1969). 
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encourage and regulate the production of valuable inventions. 
Academic commentators have described a number of theories 
addressing the impacts of patent rights and patent enforcement.
17
 This 
subsection summarizes these descriptions of patent impacts and 
assesses how these descriptions relate to the production of new 
advances by inventors. Overall, these patent theories provide a 
remarkably incomplete picture of how patents can beneficially 
influence the production of new advances and the allocation of scarce 
resources to such production. 
C. A Brief Overview of Patent Law Theories 
Theories describing the impacts of patents fall into three broad 
categories: 1) theories describing the impact of patents on the 
production of patent-eligible advances, 2) theories describing the 
impact of patents on the disclosure and use of advances after they are 
invented, and 3) theories describing the role of patents in dividing up 
and organizing activities surrounding the production of new advances. 
This subsection summarizes these theories and their relation to 
the production of new innovations. 
1. Reward Theory: Describing Patent Influences on 
Invention Production 
Reward theory provides the oldest descriptions of the intended 
impacts of patents on inventions. This type of theory treats patents as 
means to influence the production of new advances.
18
 The special 
rewards of patent rights are attached to non-obvious advances that are 
intellectual outliers in their respective technical fields in order to 
encourage more such advances and to diversify the technological 
approaches used in various fields.
19
 Under this view, patents are 
 
 17. The discussion here focuses on instrumentalist theories of patents, derived from 
similar instrumentalist theories of property rights more generally. Instrumentalist theories of 
property justify property rights as means to serve some valuable end, with differences in the 
specific theories focusing mostly on the different end that can be served by various property 
rights. See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 9, at 534-35. Instrumentalist theories stand in 
contrast with formalistic theories, which hold that property rights are natural rights gained 
through some relationship of persons or their actions to specific items of property. Id. at 534-36. 
Under this view, the recognition of property interests is part of the law’s efforts to maintain 
moral order. Id. at 541-42. In recent years, most property analyses have moved away from 
formalism and almost all property theories are based on some version of instrumentalism. Id. at 
546-57. 
 18. See, e.g., Turner, supra note 16, at 450-51. 
 19.  
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instrumental means to promote greater numbers of patent-eligible 
inventions.
20
 Not just every type of invention is encouraged, however. 
Only the narrow category of non-obvious advances that are beyond 
the commonly held knowledge and skill in a particular field are 
specially promoted by the promise of patent rewards.
21
 
Under this view, patents are utilitarian tools employed via 
government action to enlist potential inventors in serving societal 
needs.
22
 Patent rights are recognized, according to reward theory, as 
means to induce increased attention to inventive efforts that address 
societal needs and desires.
23
 Professor Donald F. Turner summarized 
these patent law ends and means as follows: 
The basic rationale of the patent system can be simply put. The 
economic case rests upon two propositions: first, that we should 
have more invention and innovation than our economic system 
would provide in the absence of special inducement; and second, 
that the granting of a statutory monopoly to inventors for a period 
of years is the best method of providing such special inducement.
24
 
Using exclusive control over patented advances (via patent rights 
and enforcement) to generate economic rewards to inventors has 
several advantages over alternative means of encouraging inventive 
efforts. 
First, the size of patent-influenced rewards for inventions is 
scaled to the value that the new inventions provide to invention users. 
Users will tend to pay amounts for access to new inventions up to (but 
not more than) the new value that they receive from using the 
inventions;
25
 hence, the payments and gains that inventors can expect 
to realize from patent controls over access to inventions are scaled to 
the value that users perceive in the inventions. As noted by John 
 
The authority of Congress is exercised [in enacting patent laws] in the hope that 
“[t]he productive effort thereby fostered will have a positive effect on society 
through the introduction of new products and processes of manufacture into the 
economy, and the emanations by way of increased employment and better lives 
for our citizens.” 
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 307 (quoting Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 480). 
 20. See id. 
 21. See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2006). 
 22. See, e.g., Turner, supra note 16, at 450-51. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. See JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 451-52 (Prometheus 
Books 2004) (1900). 
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Stuart Mill, the grant of an “exclusive privilege” to control an 
invention under a patent tends to provide a reward to the inventor of 
an advance that is proportionate to the “usefulness” of the advance.26 
Second, patent-induced rewards to inventors have the added 
advantage that the rewards are paid by the specific users of 
inventions. These rewards are paid via patent-elevated prices charged 
for patented goods and services or via royalties paid for licensed 
technologies.
27
 These sorts of payments place the costs of invention 
incentives administered through patent rights upon invention users, 
the parties who benefit from the inventive efforts being fostered. This 
matching of burdens to the benefited parties was recognized by 
Jeremy Bentham in his early descriptions of patent system dynamics. 
He saw patent-influenced payments to inventors as the equivalents of 
bonuses paid by invention users to successful inventors who have 
aided the users’ activities. The bonuses are paid out of the public 
gains and benefits achieved by the discoveries. Because exclusive 
patent rights produce incentives to inventors from the gains the 
inventors achieve, Bentham saw grants of exclusive patent privileges 
as “the best proportioned, the most natural, and the least burdensome 
[means of] produc[ing] an infinite effect and cost[ing] nothing.”28 
Third, rewards to inventors paid through patent-influenced 
purchase prices or licensing royalties have the added advantage of 
providing self-executing mechanisms for paying rewards to inventors. 
These rewards flow directly from the demand for new inventions 
coupled with patent rights, which ensure that patent rights holders are 
the sole parties capable of providing certain technological solutions to 
societal needs (by providing products or services based on a patented 
advance).
29
 The rewards system is implemented through private 
market processes and does not depend on government reward-
implementing actions or the discretion of government officials as 
would be the case in a system rewarding inventors though 
governmental bonuses or payments for the creation of useful 
inventions.
30
 
 Reward theory contemplates impacts of future patent rights on 
 
 26. Id. 
 27. 3 JEREMY BENTHAM, A Manual of Political Economy, in THE WORKS OF JEREMY 
BENTHAM 31, 71 (1962). 
 28. Id. 
 29. MILL, supra note 25, at 451-52. 
 30. Id. 
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inventors before inventions are made, with the promise of patent 
rights and rewards attracting potential inventors to work on new, 
inventive projects. However, the details of how this should occur—
and the extent of invention production that should be encouraged—
are not specified by the basic forms of reward theory that have been 
articulated to date. 
The enhanced reward theory described in this article explains 
patent rights and their impacts in terms of invention production 
decision making. Patent rights are treated here as means for 
reconciling invention production with user demands for new 
inventions and for allocating scarce resources to invention projects 
rather than to other competing uses of the same resources. The ways 
that patent rights should be shaped to achieve these ends are 
addressed in Part III of this article. 
2. Theories Describing the Influence of Patents on 
Completed Inventions 
Other patent law theories seek to describe the influence of 
patents on actions regarding inventions after the inventions are 
already in existence. As such, they are not concerned with rates of 
production of inventions, but rather with seeing that society receives 
the maximum gains from already realized inventions. Disclosure 
theory sees patent rights as sources of rewards encouraging parties 
who have already made useful inventions to disclose those inventions 
rather than only using the inventions on a narrow scale for personal 
advantage or under secrecy constraints.
31
 Rent dissipation theory 
treats patents as means to discourage duplicative inventive efforts 
once one party has completed the discovery of an invention.
32
 
Prospect theory views patents as means to encourage patent holders to 
maximize their efforts to find applications for inventions and to 
thereby extend the societal uses of the inventions.
33
 
Commercialization theory sees patents as means to encourage patent 
holders to engage in commercially effective product design, 
manufacturing, and marketing efforts that spread the use of products 
and services incorporating patented advances.
34
 
 
 31. See infra Part I.C.2.a. 
 32. See infra Part I.C.2.b. 
 33. See infra Part I.C.2.c. 
 34. See infra Part I.C.2.d. 
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a. Disclosure Theory 
Disclosure theory views patent law as a tool for encouraging 
disclosures of useful inventions by successful inventors who would, at 
least in many cases, otherwise keep their inventions secret.
35
 A 
successful inventor might, in the absence of patent rewards, keep an 
invention secret for a number of reasons, including personal 
disinterest in the useful applications of the invention (for example, 
because the inventor is simply not in the type of business where the 
invention would be useful and sees no benefit in efforts to disclose 
and popularize the invention), a desire to withhold the invention from 
competitors while using it in secret to the inventor’s personal 
advantage, or a goal of spreading the use of the invention under 
secrecy constraints (perhaps implemented through trade secret 
controls) and commercializing the advance by charging for access in 
this way without granting complete public access to the invention. 
Disclosure theory sees patent rights as part of a bargain aimed at 
overcoming these considerations and encouraging full public 
disclosures about such advances.
36
 An inventor is required, in order to 
obtain a patent, to describe not only the functional features of his 
invention, but also how to make and use the invention.
37
 These 
features must be included in a patent application and will be disclosed 
to the public either when the application is published or when a patent 
issues. In exchange for these public disclosures the inventor is granted 
valuable patent rights. In essence, the inventor is paid through these 
rights for giving up the advantages of secrecy about his invention.
38
 
The increased disclosures that result from this type of patent-
influenced bargain are several fold. First, information disclosed in a 
patent application or issued patent may enhance subsequent research 
and innovation.
39
 Understanding the workings of the patented 
invention may provide insights into how to approach other 
innovations that do not incorporate the patented design and that 
therefore may be used immediately without infringing the patent on 
 
 35. See Kevin Emerson Collins, Propertizing Thought, 60 SMU L. REV. 317, 357-58 
(2007). 
 36. See id. 
 37. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006). 
 38. See Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 63-64 (1998); Bonito Boats, Inc. v. 
Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 150-51 (1989). 
 39. See 3 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS: A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF 
PATENTABILITY, VALIDITY AND INFRINGEMENT § 7.01 (2010). 
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that design. Second, disclosures of a patented design may provide the 
starting point for further research to improve the patented design 
(although commercialization of these improvements will require a 
license from the patent holder). Third, upon expiration of the patent, 
free availability of the disclosed invention will allow widespread 
productive use of the advance involved, as well as free incorporation 
of this advance in further research and additional inventions. 
Disclosure theory treats patent rights as a means to overcome 
secrecy barriers to the use of inventions without asserting that patent 
rights have any influence over the numbers of inventions created. It is 
doubtlessly true that the public generally will gain from widespread 
information about new advances and (at least eventually) the free 
availability for use of those advances. Hence, the disclosures about 
completed advances that patent law promotes are undoubtedly 
important. 
b. Rent Dissipation Theory 
Rent dissipation theory describes the impact of patents in helping 
to discourage duplicative efforts to develop similar inventions.
40
 
When a new advance is developed, society frequently gains increased 
utility (through the use of the advance) over and above the cost of 
developing the invention.
41
 This net gain from an invention is 
sometimes referred to as the “monopoly rent” associated with the 
invention.
42
 Society gains most where this net gain is maximized—
that is, where the gain realized from an invention exceeds the costs of 
developing the invention by as much as possible.
43
 Where several 
parties work on the same invention (or similarly functional 
inventions) in parallel, resulting in only one commercially successful, 
widely used invention, monopoly rents (that is, net societal gains from 
an invention) can be squandered or “dissipated” because the costs of 
the multiple inventive efforts only result in one socially valuable 
invention. 
Rent dissipation theory views patent rights as creating incentives 
to promote early disclosures of inventions and to discourage 
competing inventors from continuing duplicative efforts at the earliest 
 
 40. See Mark F. Grady & Jay I. Alexander, Patent Law and Rent Dissipation, 78 VA. L. 
REV. 305, 308 (1992). 
 41. See id. 
 42. See id. 
 43. See id. 
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possible point.
44
 Patents minimize the dissipation of monopoly rents 
(and the squandering of net societal gains from inventions) because 
patent rights tend to cut off the efforts of additional inventors once 
they realize that one party has “won” the race to develop a successful 
invention and has gained a patent on the invention. By disclosing the 
features of a particular invention in a patent and gaining exclusive 
control over the invention through patent rights, a patent holder 
signals to other potential inventors that continuing their competing 
efforts to develop the same type of invention will be wasteful because 
the patent holder will be able to control who can make, use, or sell the 
patented invention for the life of the patent and will be able to bar 
competing inventors from using the fruits of their own efforts. An 
issued patent becomes a means to discourage competing inventive 
efforts and, thereby, to reduce total invention production costs. 
Reduction of these costs minimizes monopoly rent dissipation. 
Society’s net benefits from an invention are increased to the extent 
that duplicative efforts of multiple inventors are minimized. 
c. Prospect Theory 
Prospect theory focuses on the potential role of patents in 
encouraging patent holders to explore or “prospect” for applications 
of an invention once at least one rudimentary version of the invention 
has been produced.
45
 By giving an inventor control over subsequent 
uses of a patented invention and an interest in the commercial success 
of later uses, the patent holder is encouraged to prospect for additional 
uses of the invention much as a miner is encouraged to prospect for 
ore in a particular plot of ground by being given exclusive control 
over a mining claim. Patent rights encourage patent holders to 
prospect for the full range of socially valuable applications of their 
patented inventions so as to maximize their own commercial stake in 
the inventions. To the extent that this prospecting for additional 
applications is successful, the rights holders will expand the use and 
social value of the patented inventions. 
Prospect theory treats the discovery of a patented invention as 
the starting point for a product development process and patent rights 
as means to encourage a patent holder to invest additional resources 
in the efficient and effective development of a raw invention into 
 
 44. See id. at 316-17; Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 
20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 278 (1977). 
 45. Kitch, supra note 44, at 274-80. 
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useful products across as many socially valuable applications of the 
invention as possible.
46
 A patent holder will also be able to prevent 
duplicative efforts by multiple parties to prospect for new applications 
of patented advances, thereby preventing rent dissipation in the 
prospecting phase of realizing social value from a patented advance. 
d. Commercialization Theory 
Commercialization theory is similar to prospect theory in that it 
focuses on encouraging patent holders to take actions after an 
invention is made that tend to increase the societal use and utility of 
the invention.
47
 While prospect theory sees patents as inducements for 
patent holders to prospect for additional applications of patented 
advances,
48
 commercialization theory treats patents as inducements 
for patent holders to take other commercial actions to produce 
products based on patented designs and to bring the products to 
market, thereby putting the patented designs into use by more parties 
and increasing the total societal gain from the advances.
49
 Patents, as 
seen by commercialization theory, ensure that inventors (or their 
successors in interest in patent ownership) are encouraged to follow 
through on inventions with effective commercial efforts that 
popularize products and services based on the inventions.
50
 
3. Specialization Theory: Describing the Influence of 
Patents on the Organization of Innovative Efforts 
At least one additional theory sees patents as means to aid parties 
in dividing and organizing engineering and business activities 
surrounding patented advances and related products. Specialization 
theory argues that patents help parties to organize the work of 
multiple specialists in bringing innovative products and services to 
the public.
51
 This sort of division and specialization of work on 
patent-eligible advances can produce improvements in innovation 
processes by realizing specialization gains at various stages of 
 
 46. Id. 
 47. See F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing 
Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697, 732-36 (2001). 
 48. See Kitch, supra note 44, at 278. 
 49. See Kieff, supra note 47, at 732-36. 
 50. Id. 
 51. See generally Jonathan M. Barnett, Intellectual Property as a Law of Organization 
(USC Center in Law, Economics and Organization Research Paper No. C10-10 2010), available 
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1623565. 
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innovation and commercialization processes.
52
 
Specialization theory treats patents as aids in allocating work on 
patented advances among specialists, while giving each specialist a 
stake in the success of the overall engineering and commercialization 
efforts regarding the advances.
53
 A patent gives its holder a stake in 
the ultimate usefulness and commercial value of products based on 
the patented innovation even if the party holding the patent will not be 
the party to sell related products to the public.
54
 Patents can facilitate 
the separation and specialization of work in discovering, developing, 
and commercializing new inventions and in allocating components of 
this work to businesses that are efficient in scope and effective in 
operation, thereby maximizing the benefits of specialization effects 
gained through work experience and research.
55
 
Patents aid parties in separating work on different aspects of 
patented advances by providing means to transfer ownership interests 
in the commercial success of patented advances and to thereby 
encourage each of several specialized parties to apply their particular 
capabilities towards advancing the overall practical success and social 
propagation of new advances.
56
 By aiding the division and 
distribution of work among separate organizations (each with work 
content that best suits the skills of those parties involved in a project 
and the potential specialization economies that are available in a 
particular invention development setting), patent rights facilitate 
diverse choices about organizational groupings of work on patentable 
advances. Patent rights allow parties to pass on the fruits of 
specialized work in early phases of the development of patented 
advances to other parties who will work on later phases. At each 
phase, the ownership of patent rights in an invention gives a party 
taking specialized actions concerning the invention a direct self-
interest in doing that party’s best work to promote the eventual 
commercial success of the invention. In this way, patent rights 
facilitate the separation of work into efficient work units and 
organizational contexts where size efficiencies and specialization 
effects can be used advantageously, while still ensuring that persons 
working on discovering inventions and on post-invention 
 
 52. See generally id. 
 53. See generally id. 
 54. See generally id. 
 55. See id. 
 56. See generally id. 
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commercialization activities are encouraged to do their best work in 
accomplishing partial steps towards the full commercialization and 
broad public use of patented advances. 
The benefits that patent rights bring to the organization and 
specialization of work on patentable advances have been summarized 
by Jonathan Barnett, as follows: 
Patents enable innovators to make efficient selections of firm 
scope by transacting with least-cost suppliers of commercialization 
inputs. These expanded transactional opportunities reduce the 
minimum size of the market into which any innovator—or the 
supplier of any other technological or production input—can 
attempt entry. Disaggregation of the innovation and 
commercialization process then induces the formation of 
secondary markets in disembodied technology inputs. These 
organizational effects over transactional, firm and market structure 
generate specialization economies that minimize innovation and 
commercialization costs, which in turn exerts incentive effects 
consistent with the standard thesis and market growth effects that 
extend beyond it.
57
 
4. Reconciling the Multiple Theoretic Approaches: The 
Fundamental Importance of Reward Theory 
The theories of patent rights summarized here differ significantly 
in their approach to invention production. Only reward theory and 
specialization theory contemplate and seek to explain potential 
impacts of patents on numbers and types of inventions. All of the 
other theories assume that inventions are produced largely outside of 
the influence of patents and seek to explain how patents can impact 
the further steps used to achieve societal advantages from the 
inventions. 
Patent theories other than reward theory generally take the 
presence of a patented advance as a given—that is, as a starting point 
in their accounts of patent influence—and then explain the possible 
impacts of patent rights on the subsequent implementation or use of 
the invention. The types of post-invention benefits purportedly 
achieved by patent rights are seen differently in the different theories. 
Disclosure theory assumes that some inventions (such as those 
potentially protected by trade secrets) may be commercialized by 
inventors in secret absent patent protections. The result of secret 
 
 57. See generally id. 
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commercialization (or no commercialization at all) will be that 
information about the advances will be bottled up with the inventors 
and will not enable broader uses and understanding of the inventions 
by all interested parties. In this theory, patent rights are the means to 
encourage disclosures of useful inventions, resulting in broader 
distribution of information about the inventions and enhanced 
availability of the inventions for use (at least after patent rights have 
expired). However, this account assumes that the relevant inventions 
for which disclosure is an issue already exist; it says nothing about 
producing more or different inventions under the influence of patent 
rights. 
Rent dissipation theory sees the merit of patents in preventing 
post-invention waste due to duplicative inventive efforts that will 
achieve no additional societal benefits over the results of the first 
successful effort to produce an invention. This theory treats the first to 
discover an advance as the “winner” of the race to make this 
discovery and then seeks to cut off duplicative efforts of other 
inventors to produce the same results a second time. The aim is to 
gain social efficiency by preventing these duplicative efforts. There is 
no aim in this theory to explain why the first inventor discovered his 
or her invention or to encourage more of these first discoveries. 
Prospect theory is aimed at describing how patents can 
encourage increased efforts to explore and design the full range of 
applications made possible by an already completed invention. The 
goal is to realize the full measure of societal gains made possible by a 
given invention by carrying forward the invention into the broadest 
possible set of applications and user gains. The aim is to ensure that 
the full societal potential of a new advance is realized, for the benefit 
of both the inventor and potential invention users. Prospect theory 
does not, however, purport to explain how the promise of a patent 
may produce more patent-eligible advances susceptible to 
prospecting. 
Commercialization theory likewise focuses on maximizing post-
invention use of new advances and on avoiding inefficiencies from 
failing to gain the greatest possible social advantages from already 
completed inventions. In commercialization theory, the focus is on 
the impact of patents on commercial efforts to create, manufacture, 
and market viable products. These efforts put patented advances into 
the hands of numerous consumers and thereby produce large-scale 
societal gains through widespread use of the patented advances. 
Commercialization theory contends that patents are important in 
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promoting effective commercialization of patented advances, in part 
because such commercialization may be particularly difficult and 
uncertain. Difficult commercial challenges concerning patented 
advances may stem from the new and sometimes very unusual 
features of these advances and the potential difficulties of new 
product design, manufacturing, and marketing that popularizing the 
patented advances may entail. Commercialization theory does not, 
however, purport to explain how patents affect the making of new 
advances and, hence, does not say anything about how patents 
influence the number or nature of new advances. This theory only 
seeks to describe how patents can improve commercial follow 
through on patent-eligible advances, to the gain of both patent holders 
and product users. 
Specialization theory is the one exception among the theories 
discussed here in that it describes some potential impacts of patent 
rights on the number and nature of patent-eligible advances. 
Specialization theory argues that patents aid firms in dividing and 
organizing work on the production and use of patent-eligible 
advances. Such a process of work division among firms (linked by 
patent rights giving each firm a stake in the commercial success of the 
project they are contributing to) can achieve specialization benefits 
that produce different results than if the same tasks were undertaken 
without the ability to organize work in this manner. Specialization 
theory describes a means whereby patents can change the number or 
nature of advances that are produced under the influence of patents. 
Inventions will change in number or nature if the specialization 
effects promoted by the availability of patent rights change inventive 
processes to produce different invention outputs than would prevail in 
the absence of patents and the specialization effects patents promote. 
Certain types of specialization effects enhanced by patents may 
produce more inventions or different types of inventions than 
inventive processes without these specialization effects. 
Specialization theory is not focused just on these invention 
production effects, however. Some work divisions and associated 
specialization effects that patents promote relate to commercialization 
steps after the creation of a new invention. These sorts of 
specialization effects will realize benefits in the post-invention 
phase—that is, in the exploration for applications of the invention or 
in the further steps needed to commercialize the invention. In these 
post-invention versions of specialization promoted by patents, the 
benefits described by specialization theory are more like those 
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associated with prospect and commercialization theories. In 
addressing these types of post-invention actions, specialization theory 
only explains how patents help us to be more efficient in our use of 
patent-eligible advances, not how to produce more such advances. 
Only reward theory focuses primarily on the production of more 
inventions and is, in this sense, a more fundamentally important type 
of patent theory than the others. Reward theory describes how patents 
can encourage more (or more useful) inventions. It explains how 
patents can produce more of the things—inventions—on which the 
other theories operate and, in this sense, is a root theory from which 
other theories build or improve. If aspects of patent law can produce 
more (or better) inventions, as reward theory posits, other aspects can 
(perhaps) go further and achieve the additional benefits posited by the 
other theories of patent law. However, if there are no inventions to 
operate on, the post-invention benefits described by the other theories 
of patent law are of little or no importance. These additional theories 
are, in this sense, supplemental to reward theory and the production of 
patent-eligible inventions. 
Because reward theory attempts to describe how the patent 
system can produce more inventions, it is in a sense a more 
fundamental theory of patent rights than these other theories which 
focus primarily on post-invention efficiency. If patents can, as reward 
theory suggests, produce more patent-eligible advances, then the 
further impacts of patents as described by the other theories can be 
obtained over a wider range of inventions. If an accurate account of 
how patents influence the production of more patent-eligible advances 
can be described and used to shape the patent system to this end, the 
result will be a bigger, more socially responsive, and beneficial set of 
patent-influenced inventions, towards which the additional 
advantages described by the other patent theories can also be pursued. 
Because reward theory and its impacts on invention production have 
this type of especially fundamental impact on the number and nature 
of patent-eligible inventions and the associated social benefits such 
inventions can realize, the reformulation and refinement of reward 
theory concepts of the sort attempted in this article are especially 
worth our attention. 
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II. PLACING PATENT REWARDS IN THE CONTEXT OF PROPERTY LAW 
THEORY 
A. Basic Property Law Goals: Long-Term Perspectives and 
Stable Ownership 
Property laws permit property owners to control the use of 
property, potentially for extended periods.
58
 Property rights generally 
achieve this by affording property owners the right to exclude parties 
from their property and to selectively allow access to the property in 
exchange for payments or other compensation.
59
 This right to exclude, 
coupled with the right to transfer property ownership and the right to 
exclude to other parties, gives an owner the reassurance that they will 
control the use of an item of property not only now, but also in the 
future. This long-term perspective is a key goal of property law.
60
 A 
property owner can take a long-term view of what is an advantageous 
present use of property, knowing that the owner (or transferees of the 
owner’s property interest) will benefit in the future from the good 
husbanding of property now, as well as from investments in changes 
and improvements to that property which will enhance its future 
value. The encouragement of property owners to adopt long-term 
perspectives regarding the use of property is a primary goal of 
property laws in general and, as discussed later in this section, of 
intellectual property laws in particular. 
1. Property Laws and Long-Term Use Perspectives 
Robert C. Ellickson has recognized the importance of the long-
term perspectives on asset use that property rights can instill. In 
discussing the implications of property rights in the context of real 
property ownership, Ellickson emphasized the following perspective-
setting impacts of property rights: 
Although the assertion may seem counterintuitive, the key to land 
conservation is to bestow upon living persons property rights that 
extend perpetually into the future. The current market value of a 
fee in Blackacre is the discounted present value of the eternal 
stream of rights and duties that attach to Blackacre. A rational and 
 
 58. See Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1369 (1993). 
 59. See id. at 1353. 
 60. See id. at 1368. 
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self-interested fee owner therefore adopts a[n] infinite planning 
horizon when considering how to use his parcel, and is spurred to 
install cost-justified permanent improvements and to avoid 
premature exploitation of resources. The fee simple in land 
cleverly harnesses human selfishness to the cause of altruism 
toward the unborn, a group not noted for its political clout or 
bargaining power.
61
 
The transferability of ownership interests concerning an item of 
property gives the owner a long-term perspective on how the property 
should best be used since optimizing this use will maximize the 
transfer value of the property, even if the present owner will not be 
the only one to use the property over the long term.
62
 
While his description does not separate the two, Ellickson’s 
account addresses the impacts of property rights on both the 
maximization of the value of property in its present state (referring to 
“land conservation” and “the avoidance of premature exploitation of 
resources”) and in encouraging improvements in property features 
(referring to the impact of property rights in “spurr[ing owners] to 
install cost-justified permanent improvements” to owner-controlled 
property). Property rights—and the long-term perspectives they 
encourage—have important impacts in both the present use and 
future-focused improvement of assets. 
2. Additional Advantages of Stable Ownership 
More recently, Abraham Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky have 
expanded on the importance of property laws in creating long-term 
owner control regarding the use and improvement of items of 
property. They argue that protecting stable ownership is the unifying 
theme of property law.
63
 In their view: 
[P]roperty law as a legal institution is organized around creating 
and defending the value inherent in stable ownership. Property law 
both recognizes and helps create stable relationships between 
persons and assets, allowing owners to extract utility that is 
otherwise unavailable. Adopting this focus enables us to recast 
many of the key insights of the extant property literature and 
demonstrate that these insights can form a coherent theory of 
 
 61. Id. at 1369. 
 62. See id. at 1368. 
 63. See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 9, at 531. 
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property.
64
 
Beyond just promoting the management of an asset so as to 
maximize the long-term value of the asset, Bell and Parchomovsky 
see several other advantages in property rights ensuring stable 
ownership of assets. These additional advantages of legal protections 
promoting stable ownership include: 
1) Facilitating more open and frequent uses of assets, as owners 
need not rely only on secrecy and physical possession as means 
to retain control over assets; 
2) Enabling the decoupling of ownership and possession (or 
use/operation), thereby increasing the use value of assets by 
making possible the temporary transfer of assets to higher-value 
users who cannot afford to purchase the assets (through actions 
like rentals or even informal arrangements like cab rides); 
3) Increasing value from asset use by encouraging learning about 
how best to use an asset during long-term association with the 
asset; and 
4) Encouraging parties to count on the availability of an asset over 
the long term and to assemble complementary assets that are 
productive in combination with the asset.
65
 
Patents have the potential to achieve parallel benefits in all four 
of these areas. The counterpart benefits from enforcing limitations on 
the making, using, and selling of patented inventions involve: 
1) Encouraging uses of patented advances in contexts that do not 
rely on secrecy or physical possession of items embodying 
patented designs as means to retain control over the designs and 
prevent free rider usage; 
2) Enabling the decoupling of invention ownership and various 
forms of invention use, thereby increasing the ways that 
subcomponents of rights to use patented inventions may be 
granted through coordinated and narrowly targeted licenses in 
economically desirable quanta that match the needs of narrowly 
focused invention users; 
3) Increasing value from invention use by encouraging patent 
holders to invest resources in learning about how best to use an 
 
 64. Id. at 538. 
 65. Id. at 556-58. 
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invention and how to produce, deliver, and market related 
products; and 
4) Encouraging parties to count on the exclusive 
commercialization of an invention over a long period (that is, 
the patent term) and to assemble complementary assets that are 
productive in combination with the patented invention. 
3. Reconciling Patent Law Goals with Property Law 
Goals Generally 
As the analyses of property law purposes by scholars like these 
demonstrate, rights to exclude parties from property are generally 
granted for one or both of two purposes. 
First, rights to control access to property ensure that the present 
use of the property can be managed to its greatest value by property 
owners, adopting the use with the greatest value and avoiding 
wasteful overuse or other value-decreasing uses.
66
 This purpose of 
property controls involves the efficient use of existing property. 
Second, rights to control access to property are also imposed to 
induce parties to create new property and to improve existing 
property.
67
 In this regard, the promise of controls once new property 
is constructed or improved provides a means to gain value from the 
newly created or improved property and to encourage the production 
of such property. As Ellickson noted, a rational owner will be 
encouraged by property rights controlling use of property to add cost-
justified improvements that enhance the value of the property.
68
 In 
this regard, property controls serve an asset production incentivizing 
function encouraging asset production. 
Patent law controls limiting access and use of patented 
inventions are unusual forms of property controls as they serve the 
second of these property law purposes, but not the first. Use of 
patented ideas is not rivalrous and, consequently, not in need of 
property controls to ensure the efficient use of patented ideas in their 
most valued ways. However, the production of new inventions is 
rivalrous in that it involves the use of scarce resources that are 
devoted to invention projects in rivalry with other potential uses of 
the same resources. This means that patent controls and rewards for 
 
 66. See Ellickson, supra note 58, at 1369. 
 67. See id. 
 68. Id. 
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inventions can serve valuable ends in regulating the allocation of 
scarce resources to the production of new property in the form of new 
inventions. Patents not only attract resources to socially valuable 
invention projects in socially desirable ways, they tend to encourage 
the production of patentable inventions at socially desirable levels. 
They are, in short, key regulators of the productions of inventions 
and, as such, serving a traditional property law role with respect to 
property production and resource usage. 
The remainder of this section summarizes why patent controls 
over the use of patented advances serve some, but not all, of the 
traditional functions of property law. 
B. Property Justifications for Controls to Ensure Efficient Use 
of Consumable Assets Do Not Apply to Patents 
Patents give their owners the ability to exclude other parties from 
the making, using, and selling of items or services incorporating 
patented inventions.
69
 These rights limit the use of patented 
inventions by unauthorized parties.
70
 Such restrictions on the use of 
invention ideas are not needed to avoid overconsumption or other 
inefficient use of the ideas since the use of such ideas by one party 
does not diminish the value of the ideas if used by another.
71
 Nor are 
restrictions on the use of design ideas needed to ensure that these 
ideas are used by the parties who value the ideas the most. Since 
design ideas can be used by multiple parties without limiting each 
other’s use, the parties who value the ideas most should be able to use 
them along with all other interested parties. 
This means that patent controls over access to patented 
designs—that is, patent controls for ideas about designs of useful 
items or processes—are not needed to ensure efficient use of the 
designs. Indeed, by elevating the cost of use for patented designs, 
 
 69. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006) (“[W]hoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, 
or sells any patented invention, within the United States or imports into the United States any 
patented invention during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent.”). 
 70. Id. 
 71. The use of an idea does not diminish its value to another because an idea is shared, 
not consumed. This is also true of the ideas in literary works. For example, Tom G. Palmer has 
observed that the literature is of value to numerous readers without any consumption or 
diminishment effect because “there is one Othello for all of us, rather than one Othello for each 
of us, or even one for each of our separate readings or viewings of the play.” Tom G. Palmer, 
Are Patents and Copyrights Morally Justified? The Philosophy of Property Rights and Ideal 
Objects, 13 HARV. J.L & PUB. POL’Y 817, 846 (1990). 
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patent controls may diminish the overall use of patented designs 
below levels that would be socially desirable in the absence of patent-
imposed costs. Hence, focusing on uses of designs for useful items 
and processes, property controls over patented designs would appear 
to be without justification and potentially harmful as undesirable 
burdens on valuable applications of useful designs. At least, patented 
ideas lack the beneficial impacts on efficient use of assets that provide 
key justifications for property controls in other property domains.
72
 
C. Property Justifications for Controls to Ensure Asset 
Improvements Do Apply to Patents 
However, control over use of patented designs may be justified 
as means to encourage the production of new and improved designs 
and to attract the allocation of scarce resources to this type of design 
production. In this respect, the production-enhancing ends served by 
property controls in the patent field are similar to the asset-enhancing 
benefits of property rights generally. The focus of property rights in 
promoting improvements to assets (in both the physical world of 
personal property and the intellectual world of patents) is on 
mediating the allocation of scarce resources to asset improvements. 
Many accounts of property rights (such as Professor Ellickson’s 
account quoted earlier in this article
73
) describe the potential impacts 
of patent rights in encouraging improvements to existing properties, 
such as the encouragement that real property ownership gives to 
property owners to consider and advance building projects on their 
land as means to improve the property characteristics and to 
maximize the long-term value of the property. However, in personal 
property and intellectual property settings, the promise of long-term 
property controls creates incentives to “improve” property by creating 
it. The production of new goods or patent-eligible advances is an act 
of property creation which is encouraged and mediated by the 
expectation that the party producing a new item will have long-term 
control over it and will be able to realize gains from use of the item 
over a substantial period or from the sale of the item to another who 
will make such long-term use. This promise of future controls 
 
 72. See Peter S. Menell, The Property Rights Movement’s Embrace of Intellectual 
Property: True Love or Doomed Relationship?, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 713, 726 (2007) (“Unlike 
tangible goods, knowledge and creative works are public goods in the sense that their use is 
nonrivalrous. One agent’s use does not limit another agent’s use.”). 
 73. See supra text accompanying note 61. 
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mediates the production of new goods and new patent-eligible 
advances, just as it mediates the construction of new improvements to 
parcels of real property. In all of these instances, the promise of future 
gains from the new property or improvements establish criteria for 
determining whether it is worth devoting scarce resources to the 
creation of the new property or improvements. 
Because scarce resources are significant in the production of 
both patented advances and other types of assets, property controls 
are important in promoting production in all of these areas. The 
purposes served by patent controls in this respect are much like the 
purposes served by property interests more generally. Some of our 
knowledge about how property interests serve to promote asset 
production in other settings can aid us in analyzing the impacts of 
patent policies on allocations of scarce resources and in proposing 
desirable patent law reforms. 
III. THE PRIVATE PRODUCTION OF PUBLIC GOODS: A DEMSETZIAN 
FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATING PATENT RIGHTS 
A. Property Controls to Attract Resources to Public Goods 
Production 
The analysis here builds on the work of Harold Demsetz 
regarding the private production of public goods and the potential role 
of property controls over access to public goods as means to 
encourage such production. Demsetz’s conclusions about the 
desirability of property controls for public goods (including public 
goods like patented ideas) incorporate three key insights: 
1) previously defined economic principles for analyzing the 
production of joint supply goods (that is, goods for which there are at 
least two purposes and two different types of consumer demands) also 
provide valuable tools for analyzing the production of public goods, 
2) the production of public goods through private means (including 
the production of ideas defining patent-eligible inventions) can be 
promoted by restricting access to public goods and precluding non-
purchasers from using the goods, and 3) such a system of exclusion 
and charging for access can create a form of market for the production 
of public goods that both attracts scarce inputs to the production of 
public goods and helps to ensure that pubic goods are produced in 
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socially optimal amounts.
74
 These conclusions were all described in 
Demsetz’s landmark article “The Private Production of Public 
Goods,”75 first published in 1970, but now somewhat neglected, 
particularly in intellectual property studies.
76
 
This section describes the major tenets of Demsetz’s analysis in 
this area. The next section shows how these views about public goods 
production can be extended to define an improved patent reward 
theory—that is, a theory describing how patent rights incentivize and 
regulate the private production of public goods in the form of 
additional patent-eligible advances. 
1. Constructs for Evaluating Joint Supply Goods 
Production 
Demsetz’s first insight is stated clearly at the outset of his 
analysis: “The allocation of resources to the production of public 
goods can be understood with the aid of the model formulated long 
ago by Alfred Marshall for the analysis of joint supply.”77 A joint 
supply good is one for which there are two or more uses (usually of 
different parts or features) and, hence, two or more demands.
78
 
 
 74. See Harold Demsetz, The Private Production of Public Goods, 13 J.L. & ECON. 293 
(1970). 
 75. Id. 
 76. A Westlaw search showed only 107 articles in the JLR database (addressing all areas 
of law, not just patent law or intellectual property) that have cited Demsetz’s article in the 40 
years that it was written. One key exception to the general neglect of Demsetz’s views on public 
goods production among intellectual property scholars is the work of Brett M. Frischmann, who 
has analyzed (and criticized) Demsetz’s views in the context of copyright law. See Brett M. 
Frischmann, Evaluating the Demsetzian Trend in Copyright Law, 3 REV. L. & ECON. 649 
(2007). See also Harold Demsetz, Frischmann’s View of “Toward a Theory of Property 
Rights”, 4 REV. L. & ECON. 127 (2008) (responding to Frischmann’s criticisms). 
 77. Demsetz, supra note 74, at 293. The insights of Alfred Marshall referred to by 
Demsetz were described in Marshall’s book, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS. I ALFRED MARSHALL, 
PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 436 (1890). Demsetz recognized that he was not the only analyst to 
see the relationship between the analysis of joint supply goods production and the analysis of 
public goods production. He notes that some earlier analysts had mentioned the similarity of 
these types of production in passing, but had not explored the implications of this equivalency 
for public goods production to the degree that Demsetz pursued in his work described in this 
article. See Demsetz, supra note 74, at 293 n.1 (describing the work of other analysts who had, 
as of 1970, recognized the similarities between joint supply goods production and public goods 
production). 
 78. See Demsetz, supra note 74, at 293-94. The separately desired components or 
features of a joint supply good or item are typically produced simultaneously in one act of 
production. For example, the construction of a dam creating a reservoir—a single production 
process creating a joint supply item—can satisfy separate demands for irrigation water, 
hydropower, flood control benefits, and recreation. See A. ALLAN SCHMID, PROPERTY, POWER, 
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Marshall’s insights were that these two demands would operate 
somewhat independently in sales of components of a joint supply 
good, but would combine to produce a hybrid demand function 
affecting and incentivizing the upstream production of the joint 
supply good.
79
 
A simple example used by Demsetz in his analysis illustrates 
Marshall’s earlier ideas about the production of joint supply goods. 
Steers are produced with the expectation that a particular steer will 
ultimately be used to supply both meat and a hide.
80
 The production 
of steers for slaughter is therefore influenced by the demand for both 
meat and hides.
81
 Under competitive conditions, the rate at which 
steers are raised and slaughtered is determined by an aggregate 
demand function (and associated marginal returns for slaughtering 
one more steer) which reflects the sum of the demands and returns for 
meat and hides.
82
 
 
Figure 1. 
 
In standard format, the supply and demand characteristics for 
consumption of meat and hides and the supply of steers are as shown 
in Figure 1.
83
 The x-axis in this figure reflects the quantity of items 
 
AND PUBLIC CHOICE: AN INQUIRY INTO LAW AND ECONOMICS 85 (2d ed. 1987). 
 79. See INGRID RIMA, DEVELOPMENT OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 335 (7th ed. 2009). 
 80. See Demsetz, supra note 74, at 293-94. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. This figure is a reproduction of a graph from Demsetz’s article The Private 
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and the y-axis reflects the price per unit quantity. The curve d reflects 
the demand for hides and the curve D is the sum of the demands for 
hides and meat (the demand curve for meat alone is not shown, but 
would equal D-d at every quantity Q). Curve S reflects the number of 
steers that suppliers are willing to produce at various price points. The 
equilibrium price-quantity combination is determined by both the 
aggregate demand (reflecting the component demands for both hides 
and meat) and the marginal costs of producing additional steers. The 
equilibrium point is represented by the intersection of the S and D 
curves at price P and quantity Q. 
In general, this analysis reflects standard (and fairly basic) 
economic analysis of supply and demand under circumstances of 
competition. The one key addition that is special to joint supply goods 
is that the separate market demands for components of the joint 
supply good can be translated into a single demand function 
influencing production and supply of the joint supply good. 
Competition in these circumstances maximizes the sum of welfare for 
users of the component parts (although it may not provide optimal 
levels of hides or meat looking at either of these alone). 
Another way to look at this is that the compensative system 
economizes on opportunity costs. A competitive system of the sort 
shown in Figure 1 ensures that net societal costs (taking into account 
opportunity costs) are minimized in the production of steers as joint 
supply goods. If production is at levels below the P-Q point, the 
aggregate opportunity costs to hide and meat consumers of forgoing 
one more unit of hides and meat will be greater than the marginal cost 
of producing one more steer and avoiding these opportunity costs. 
Where this is the case, competitive processes will tend to ensure that 
the opportunity costs will be avoided because an additional steer will 
tend to be produced to fill this demand at a price that is on the S curve 
and acceptable to steer producers. In this manner, the aggregate 
demand for a joint supply good tends to discourage undersupply of 
that good, with the optimal supply level determined by the 
minimization of total opportunity costs to users of the components of 
the joint supply goods. 
Competitive processes can ensure against oversupply of joint 
supply goods in a similar fashion. The equilibrium reached at P-Q is 
one where the missed opportunity value of having one more hide and 
 
Production of Public Goods, but is reinterpreted here in terms of its implications for the 
production of patented advances. Id. at 294. 
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meat unit (taken together) is less to hide and meat users than the 
marginal costs of producing that additional steer. A socially 
advantageous equilibrium is achieved because the opportunity costs 
of forgoing additional production are less than the marginal costs of 
proceeding with additional production. 
2. Extension of the Joint Supply Model to Public Goods 
Production 
a. Promoting Public Goods Production Through 
Access Charges 
Demsetz saw the production of public goods as having key 
similarities to the production of joint supply goods.
84
 Provided that 
potential users of public goods can be excluded from use unless they 
pay for access to the public goods, a system of use payments (or use-
related payments) can establish demand functions for the supply of 
public goods.
85
 These demands will aggregate across multiple users of 
the goods to produce an overall combined demand for the goods.
86
 
The combined demand (reflecting the willingness of all interested 
parties to pay for access to the goods) will encourage and incentivize 
the production of public goods at optimal levels, much as the 
aggregate demand for joint supply goods encourages the production 
of joint supply goods at socially optimal levels.
87
 
A word on nomenclature is in order here. The term “public 
goods” is sometimes used in two different senses. Some analysts 
(including Demsetz) use the term to refer to non-rivalrous items 
(which are not diminished in value with additional use) without 
regard to whether the goods are also excludable (in that non-
purchasers or other unauthorized parties can be excluded from use).
88
 
In this usage, the term “public goods” refers to goods that are non-
rivalrous, but possibly excludable. To other analysts, the term “public 
goods” is used in a stricter sense to refer only to goods that are both 
non-rivalrous (meaning that they can be used by additional parties 
 
 84. The key similarity is that both public goods and joint supply goods have multiple and 
different uses by different parties that produce multiple demands for the same item. See id. at 
294-95. 
 85. Id. at 295. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 293-95. 
 88. Id. at 295. 
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without additional costs) and non-excludable (meaning that persons 
cannot be excluded from using the items).
89
 To Demsetz, a public 
good that satisfies the additional condition of non-excludability is 
better treated as a distinct type of good, which he terms a “collective 
good.”90 
This article adopts Demsetz’s nomenclature and refers to designs 
of patent-eligible advances as excludable public goods.
91
 Patent-
eligible inventions are public goods because they are non-rivalrous. 
There are no marginal costs associated with additional use of these 
advances, meaning that their use by multiple parties is non-rivalrous. 
However, these same advances are excludable (at least to a degree) 
because limits on access to the advances can be imposed, usually by 
limiting access to items or processes that implement the advances. 
The potential for effective access controls over implementations 
of patent-eligible advances creates opportunities to charge for access 
to the advances. This in turn provides the basis for payment schemes 
that reward and incentivize producers of the advances. The key point 
for our purposes is that patented designs are non-rivalrous in use, but 
are subject to access controls imposed through the patent system (with 
some imperfections in access controls that are discussed at a later 
point in this article). Persons who do not reach an arrangement with a 
patent holder and pay that party for access (or pay someone else who 
has already paid for and gained access to the patented invention) can 
be excluded from access to the invention through injunctions and 
other relief. These limitations on access are not costless, but are 
recognized under patent laws to establish an access payment and 
reward scheme that is designed to encourage production of patentable 
inventions and to regulate the allocation of resources to such 
production. 
b. Parallels in Joint Supply Goods and Public Goods 
Production 
The parallels between the dynamics of the production of joint 
supply goods and public goods lead to parallels in the equilibriums 
between supply and demand that tend to define optimal production of 
both types of goods. These parallels in production equilibriums are 
 
 89. See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 9, at 578 n.250. 
 90. Demsetz, supra note 74, at 295. 
 91. If one wishes to adopt a nomenclature other than the term “public goods” for 
nonrivalrous, but excludable items, the analysis in this article is the same. 
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apparent if we reconsider the supply and demand functions in Figure 
1 as descriptions of public goods production relationships, rather than 
as plots of relationships for joint supply goods production. Assume 
now that we are interested in the production of an excludable public 
good, say television shows to be made available through cable 
television systems.
92
 This type of intellectual product is an excludable 
public good. Television program are public goods in that one party’s 
viewing of a program does not interfere with or diminish the 
experience of viewing by an additional party. However, in systems 
like cable television, access to these programs is excludable and a 
system of charging for access can be implemented. 
The advantage of analyzing the production of this sort of public 
good in relation to the same factors as the production of joint supply 
goods can be seen by interpreting the relationships shown in Figure 1 
in terms of public goods production.
93
 For simplicity, consider a two 
consumer world in which the demand for television programs 
depends on just two parties seeking these programs, Mr. H and Ms. 
M. The transmission over a cable channel of a program can satisfy the 
demand of both H and M, just as the slaughtering of a single steer can 
satisfy the demand for both meat and hides. By taking the different 
demand functions of H and M into account and combining them to 
form a single demand function, the analysis of public goods 
production dynamics tracks the production of joint supply goods as 
previously discussed in this article. 
Reinterpreted in terms of public goods production, Figure 1 
presents a summary of the supply and demand relationships 
influencing public goods production. The curve d represents the 
demand of H for more of the public good, in this case more access to 
television programs. The curve D represents the aggregate demand of 
H and M (that is, D represents the sum of the individual demands of 
H and M). The curve S represents the willingness of a maker of 
programs to supply more programs at various per program access 
prices. Overall, this represents a system in which program viewers 
(the consumers in this system) are willing to pay for access at any 
point on line D, where as providers of access are willing to supply 
 
 92. This example is one proposed by Demsetz, who focused on the demand for two 
parties for access to televised showings of taped programs. I have updated this example to 
specify the means of controlling access to the programs as being a cable television system that is 
capable of limiting access to particular shows and charging to provide access (on either a 
subscription or per-viewing basis). See Demsetz, supra note 74, at 294-95. 
 93. See id. at 294. 
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access at any point on line S. 
The production of more programs will tend to reach an 
equilibrium at the point P-Q. At this price/volume point, the 
production of additional programs is efficient in the sense that net 
costs (taking into account opportunity costs of the program viewers) 
are minimized. Any less production would leave the viewers (H or M 
or both) with unsatisfied demand for which they would have paid 
more to satisfy than the supplier would have charged to satisfy it. 
Provided that the supplier was aware of this demand, sales of access 
to more programs would increase in number to meet the demand until 
the volume represented by P-Q was reached. Thus, underproduction 
(in relation to viewers’ desires and willingness to pay) is corrected by 
increases in production and access up to the point where prices 
charged and willingness to pay are matched at point P-Q. In a similar 
fashion, efforts to produce too many goods and to charge too much 
for access will be discouraged. A supplier that tries this will be met 
with an unwillingness of viewers to pay and will need to move its 
offerings to a lower point along the S curve. The result will again tend 
to be a matching of supply and demand at point P-Q. 
Demsetz described the general similarity of the factors governing 
the production of joint supply goods and public goods as follows: 
[J]ust as the number of goods which are supplied jointly (meat, 
hides, bones, etc.) is not limited to two except for expositional 
convenience, so the number of persons demanding a public good is 
not limited to two. With joint supply if the number of goods is 
increased or with a public good if the number of persons is 
increased, we will merely have complicated the geometry [of 
graphs such as Figure 1] without changing the analytical similarity 
of the two cases at all. 
What then is the difference between the two cases insofar as rate of 
output is concerned? There is no difference . . . , provided that 
[parties] can be excluded from consuming the public good if they 
fail to pay for it, which, of course, is implicitly assumed to be true 
in the joint supply problem.
94
 
3. Advantages of Restricting Public Goods Under Access 
Controls 
Controlling access to public goods and allowing private 
 
 94. Id. at 295. 
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originators of the goods to charge for access has two important 
advantages in mediating the private production of public goods. 
First, it encourages the private production of additional public 
goods up to, but not beyond, the levels that meet the public’s demand 
for more access. An access control system can thereby mediate the 
production of public goods at efficient output levels. 
Second, an access pricing system can also regulate inputs to the 
private production of public goods in desirable ways. Such a system 
effectively puts a price on additional units of public goods, which can 
in turn influence the allocation of scarce resources towards the private 
production of additional public goods. This pricing mechanism tends 
to attract resources to the production of additional public goods and 
additional access opportunities where this is the best use of the 
resources (as measured by the public’s value and willingness to pay 
for more access). An access control and payment system for public 
goods can therefore mediate the allocation of scarce resources to the 
private production of public goods in socially valuable ways. 
This section analyzes both these aspects of access controls for 
public goods, explaining how access controls and access pricing 
practices governing the public’s use of public goods can realize the 
types of societal benefits just described. The next section of this 
article describes how these same benefits can be realized through 
patent-based access controls and access pricing mechanisms for 
inventions. 
a. Regulating and Targeting Private Production of 
Public Goods 
A system controlling access to public goods and permitting the 
controlling party to charge a price for access achieves production 
incentivizing and regulating benefits by attaching a value to the 
production of additional quantities of public goods. By signaling to 
potential producers the willingness of public goods users to pay for 
more access to public goods, such a pricing system creates incentives 
for potential producers to create the types of public goods the public 
values and to expend production resources up to (but not beyond) the 
amounts that the public will pay for access to additional amounts of 
public goods. In this manner, the production of public goods is 
directed towards goods that the public values and is regulated to 
levels of production that match the limits of the public’s willingness 
to pay for more units of public goods. 
This type of system also signals the priorities of the public in its 
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demand for additional public goods. The willingness to pay for access 
to additional public goods indicates priorities in several dimensions, 
including the importance placed by the public on one version of a 
public good versus alternative versions of the same type of public 
good, on one type of public good versus another type of public good, 
and on public goods of various sorts relative to other types of goods 
and services. The willingness to pay for access to additional public 
goods signals the public’s aggregate level of demand for additional 
access to the goods. These signals can be used by potential producers 
of public goods to target and regulate the production of additional 
public goods and to create additional access opportunities. 
A system of pricing of public goods access in this manner is 
efficient in that it economizes on opportunity costs related to access to 
public goods. Where there is someone willing to pay for additional 
access to a public good at a particular price and there is some party 
willing to provide the additional access at a marginal cost less than 
that price, this type of pricing system will encourage the potential 
provider of the access to act and meet the demand of the other party 
seeking access. 
Equilibrium will eventually be reached where the marginal costs 
of production of additional access to the public goods matches the 
marginal price that parties are willing to pay for that access. Such 
equilibrium will minimize the joint opportunity costs of the producers 
and users of public goods. At lower levels of production of public 
goods, the potential users will suffer opportunity costs. These will 
stem from their missed chances to have greater access to the public 
goods at prices that are less than the benefits they expect to realize 
from greater access. The missed opportunities to realize net gains of 
this sort are opportunity costs to the unsatisfied users of the public 
good. In a reciprocal fashion, the overproduction of public goods will 
create opportunity costs to the producers of the goods as some 
amounts of available access are not utilized and the amounts 
expended to make those available are not fully compensated. The 
opportunity costs here are related to the chances to use these wasted 
production resources elsewhere to greater advantage. A public goods 
access system of the type described here will tend to drive pricing and 
production of public goods access to levels where the opportunity 
costs of both producers and users of the public goods are minimized, 
thereby achieving a socially optimal production level. 
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b. Attracting Scarce Resources to the Production of 
Public Goods 
Beyond regulating the private production of public goods to 
encourage the production of types and amounts of public goods that 
match public interests, a public goods access control system like the 
one described here can realize additional benefits by regulating the 
allocation of resources as inputs to the production of public goods. 
The pricing of opportunities to access public goods tends to ensure 
that scarce resources are allocated to the production of public goods 
where this is the most valued use of these resources, taking into 
account both their value in producing additional public goods and 
their value in other uses. 
This type of “input management” advantage of access controls 
and access pricing for public goods has benefits in both encouraging 
and discouraging the use of resources for the production of public 
goods. Where there is a strong need for more public goods—as 
evidenced by a willingness of numerous members of the public to pay 
substantial amounts for additional access opportunities—potential 
producers of the goods will be encouraged to bring scarce resources 
to the production of public goods and to forgo the other products and 
benefits that different uses of the same resources might have 
produced. However, where the value placed on additional access to 
public goods is small, then scarce resources will not be attracted to 
the production of more access opportunities and scarce resources will 
tend to be allocated to other, more attractive ends. 
The resource allocation decisions under consideration here are 
similar to those faced by a builder deciding whether to build a house 
on speculation (that is, not for himself, but rather to be sold to buyers 
upon completion). His projections of the ultimate sale price of the 
house will determine whether he initiates the house building project, 
as well as what type of house he will try to build and what materials 
he will use in constructing the house. Consider just one of the many 
resource allocations decisions he will make in assembling inputs to 
the building project. In evaluating the purchase of lumber for 
construction of the house, he will confront a market price for standard 
lumber (such as 2x4 boards and other standard components) that will 
be a key factor in determining whether and how he goes forward. If 
the costs of these and other construction components (plus the costs 
of the labor needed to complete the project) are less than the amount 
he projects he will be able to sell the house for, he will consider going 
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forward with the construction. Actually, a mere nominal profit (that 
is, a profit from a projected sale price that is just slightly greater than 
the projected costs of production) will probably not be enough to 
convince the builder to go forward. The projected net profits will need 
to be compelling in context—that is, the projected profits from 
building the house will need to be greater than the projected profits 
that the builder expects from the next best use of his time, efforts, and 
money. If the construction of the house (based on its projected price 
as influenced by future property controls over the house, if built) has 
a projected profit that trumps the other alternatives available to the 
builder, the builder will probably go forward with the construction 
and, by this action, divert and allocate a quantity of lumber to the 
purpose of building the house. 
This allocation of lumber is a reflection of its projected value in 
the construction project. If this builder values it sufficiently, the 
lumber in question will go to the construction of the house. If the 
potential builder values the lumber less, then the lumber might go to 
the construction of other houses or other commercial properties. If 
lumber is generally valued at low levels at a given time, then the 
production of lumber might diminish and some potential lumber 
might be kept in reserve as trees until a later time when lumber was 
needed again in greater quantity and more trees were processed to 
produce more lumber. In these ways, the decisions of those who 
produce useful items and who value production inputs (like lumber in 
a construction project) allocate scarce resources to serve as inputs to 
production where this is the most valued use of the resources in 
question. 
In so allocating scarce resources to the production of items, a 
product pricing system carries back upstream in the production 
process to affect decisions to produce scarce resources, the prices that 
are paid for them, and the degree to which these resources are devoted 
to various types of production in which they can play a role. By 
establishing access controls and access pricing for public goods, the 
production of public goods is brought into this resource allocation 
system. Projects for the private production of public goods compete 
with other projects (such as the private production of private goods or 
the construction of real estate properties) for the allocation of scarce 
resources that might be put to these other purposes. 
Absent a scheme for pricing access to public goods and the 
establishment of an associated reward and incentive system for 
producers of those goods, the private production of public goods is 
GRUNER 5/17/2012 10:10 AM 
2012] FILLING THE BILSKI VOID 535 
disadvantaged in the battle for scarce resources with other types of 
profitable production. Resources that are scarce and consequently 
costly to obtain will tend to be allocated by market systems to uses 
with clear payoffs. The production of public goods will proceed at 
less than publicly optimal rates and the allocation of scarce resources 
will be diverted away from public goods desired from the public. The 
result will be a misallocation of those scarce resources to ends less 
valued by the public, all as the consequence of the failure to translate 
the public’s demand for additional public goods into access controls 
and access prices that would influence production decisions and 
attract more scarce resources to the production of additional public 
goods. 
IV. PATENT RIGHTS: WHY WE NEED THEM 
This section explores the benefits of applying Demsetz’s analysis 
of public goods production to the private production of patent-eligible 
inventions. It argues that patent rights and rewards are best interpreted 
as means to implement invention access controls and pricing 
mechanisms that achieve an approximation of Demsetz’s ideal system 
for incentivizing and regulating the production of private goods, 
operating in the case of patents in the particular realm of the 
production of patent-eligible inventions. 
A. Patent Rights and Rewards as Means to Regulate Invention 
Production and Allocate Scarce Invention Inputs 
The view of patent rights and rewards described in this article 
explains how patent rights establish prices for access to new 
inventions and thereby encourage the production of new advances and 
the allocation of scarce resources to such production. This view is 
developed here in a theory of patent rewards that is both descriptive 
(in helping us understand how patent rights affect invention 
production and decisions about how to allocate scarce resources to 
such production) and normative (in specifying why the invention 
incentives and resource shifts resulting from the enforcement of 
patent rights achieve socially beneficial levels of invention production 
and thereby serve the public interest). 
The next portion of this section examines how Demsetz’s 
framework for evaluating the private production of public goods 
provides valuable insights when applied to patent rights and the 
production of patent-eligible advances. Demsetz’s views are used to 
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define a theory of patent rewards in which these rewards serve as 
efficient means to regulate the production of patentable advances. 
This theory is used descriptively to explain how strong controls over 
the making, use, and sale of patented advances (as enforced through 
patent rights) influence the types and amounts of new inventions 
targeted by potential inventors and further how impacts of patent 
rights on the valuation of new inventions has a derivative effect in 
attracting scarce resources to work on developing highly valuable 
new inventions. 
In the concluding portion of this section, the analysis shifts to a 
normative mode in which the theory developed here is used to 
evaluate the public benefits from a strong, predictable patent system 
in which the nature of probable patent rights and rewards can be 
anticipated by potential innovators and meaningfully influence their 
decisions about how to conduct inventive projects. The analysis will 
argue that strongly enforced patent rights are beneficial to the public 
in ensuring that invention production is encouraged and targeted in 
relation to the nature and strength of public desires for various types 
of new inventions. 
B. An Improved Patent Reward Theory for Regulating 
Invention Production 
Demsetz’s framework for analyzing the private production of 
public goods suggests an improved patent reward theory in which 
patents play central roles in pricing access to patented inventions. 
Patent rights serve as access controls regarding patented inventions.
95
 
These controls are imposed as means to implement a charging 
mechanism regarding invention access, with the resulting access fees 
serving as rewards for the production of patent-eligible inventions. 
This fee and reward system is imposed to encourage and regulate the 
private production of additional patent-eligible advances as public 
goods. 
In order for patent-influenced access fees to reflect the full scope 
of user demands for new inventions, the fees for access paid by each 
party gaining access to a new invention design should equal (as 
closely as possible) the incremental utility seen by this party in 
gaining access. This incremental utility will reflect the new levels of 
utility achieved by the user in using the new invention over the utility 
 
 95. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006). 
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experienced by the same party in using earlier (and usually non-
patented) substitutes that perform the same tasks as the patented item. 
In a system of costless information and transactions, full price 
discrimination between users would be possible and individuals 
would be required to pay for access to new inventions at individually 
determined prices. Each potential user of a new product embodying a 
new design would be willing to pay an amount for access to the 
product up to the amount of their new value gained from access to the 
product. Potential inventors of new products would consider 
expending resources up to the aggregate demand of these users in 
developing new inventions.
96
 
Seen this way, the full invention-pricing functions of patents and 
patent enforcement are apparent. Patent rights are not simply means 
to gain inventors some rewards for producing inventions. Patent rights 
are rather means to establish the value of inventions and to put the 
production of inventions into the larger picture of potentially valuable 
asset production. With a value attached to the production of additional 
inventions, efforts to produce new patent-eligible inventions can 
compete effectively for the attention of talented individuals and 
resource rich organizations amidst other potentially profitable and 
rewarding actions that might be chosen. At the same time, invention 
valuations enhanced by patent rights and invention access controls 
serve to attract scarce resources to the production of patent-eligible 
advances in efficient ways. Thus, interpreting patents as the linchpins 
of an invention access pricing system—the improved patent reward 
theory described in this article—provides new insights into the 
functioning of the patent system and the types of patent law reforms 
that may increase the public benefits from the patent system. 
 
 96. Ideally, again in a world of costless information gathering and pricing administration, 
price differentiation by product users would be possible and each would be charged for access to 
a new design in light of his or her personal willingness to pay for new utility. This type of price 
differentiation, were it possible, would maximize the total demand for new inventions, which 
would in turn increase the amounts that potential producers of the inventions would feel it wise 
to expend in producing the new inventions. A perfectly administrable system of access controls 
would make this type of particularly efficient price differentiation possible; as we shall see in 
later discussions, what the real patent system uses as a substitute is more in the nature of 
categorical price differentiation, where users of different embodiments of patent inventions are 
charged different patent-influenced prices that approximate their different demand and 
perceived invention utility characteristics, but do not achieve individualized price differentiation 
that would be even better if the costs of administering it were not prohibitive. 
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C. Descriptive Implications of the Improved Theory: How 
Patent Rights Regulate Invention Production 
The potential impacts of patents on both invention inputs and 
outputs can be seen by applying Demsetz’s framework for analyzing 
the impacts of property laws on the production of public goods to the 
particular case of the production of patent-eligible advances. This 
involves recasting his analysis into a patent context. The remainder of 
this subsection examines Demsetz’s conclusions as they apply to the 
particular case of restricting access to patented inventions and thereby 
influencing and beneficially regulating the private productions of 
patentable inventions. 
The aims of a patent-based invention reward or “pricing” system 
in this context are to summarize consumer demand and valuation 
assessments for inventions through patent-influenced prices for goods 
embodying inventions or through royalty payments to inventors for 
access to inventions. This type of patent-influenced reward system 
defines a set of demand and pricing characteristic for the production 
of additional inventions. The planning of potential inventors (and 
their backers, such as large corporations) will tend to respond to this 
demand with attempts to supply highly valued inventions. The result 
will be that choices about how many inventions to pursue, of what 
sort, and at what invention development cost will be resolved in 
research planning decisions in relation to the desires and demand 
characteristics of potential invention users.
97
 
An example will make this type of operation of the patent system 
and its regulation of invention production clearer. For simplicity sake, 
consider a two consumer world in which the demand for mousetraps 
 
 97. Of course, the ability of parties pursuing inventions to plan their efforts in light of 
these factors depends on the availability to them of information on these aspects of invention 
demands and rewards. Limitations on the availability of this type of information may make an 
invention reward system useless in mediating the production of potentially useful inventions. 
Where the needed information is lacking, this may justify withholding the application of the 
patent system entirely and saving the associated administrative costs that administering the 
patent system would otherwise have produced. The possibility that information gaps and 
transaction costs may justify a more limited system of patent rewards and rights than the ideal 
reward system discussed at this point is considered at a later point in this article. The aim here is 
to profile the ideal system assuming few information gathering costs and low transactional costs. 
Later discussions will address how we may wish to back away from this ideal to take into 
account the practical deficiencies of our information gathering and transactional abilities and to 
tailor our real patent system in light of these real world limitations. 
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depends on just two parties seeking these traps, Ms. H and Mr. M.
98
 
Ms. H runs a restaurant and thus values the elimination of mice (and a 
better mousetrap that will do this effectively) very highly. Mr. M is a 
homeowner and is interested in a more effective mousetrap, but less 
strongly interested than Ms. H. 
Returning to Figure 1, assume now that the demand curve d 
reflects the prices that Ms. H will pay for access to additional types of 
new mousetrap designs with increasing utility to her (with access 
charges implemented, for example, through patent-elevated prices 
imposed for buying traps with the new designs). The features of 
mousetrap designs that correspond to increased utility and value in the 
eyes of Ms. H are personal choices that do not matter in our analysis. 
She will, if she is a rational consumer, tend to be willing to pay more 
for access to designs that serve her better (in her own estimation of 
what is better), but the features of a design that make it better to her 
and how much she will pay for access to a new design are consumer-
specific choices assumed here to be summarized in her demand curve. 
Demand curve D in Figure 1 reflects in our current analysis the 
aggregate demand of Ms. H and Mr. M for access to new mousetrap 
designs (with the individual demand of Mr. M not shown, but 
mathematically ascertainable from the D and d curves shown and 
equal to D-d). Curve S reflects the willingness of a supplier who can 
control access to mousetraps with new designs to develop and supply 
new designs at various price levels, with volume reflecting the supply 
of more designs not more units of a single design. The socially 
optimal amount of production of the new mousetrap designs is 
encouraged by the combined demands of individual mousetrap users 
for new designs and the creation of market forces that encourage the 
development of new designs, but only up to the level of aggregate 
consumer demand. The resulting incentives should encourage the 
production of just enough new inventions as public goods—not too 
many (as to waste resources on inventions with less increased utility 
to invention users than the costs of developing the new inventions) 
and not too little (so as the leave invention users with unmet needs 
that could have been met through the cost-effective development of 
additional inventions at costs less than the utility gains the inventions 
 
 98. This example is derived from one proposed by Demsetz in which he focused on the 
demand for two parties for access to a televised showing of a taped program. I have translated 
his example from the world of copyrighted television programs into the world of patented 
inventions. See Demsetz, supra note 74, at 294-95. 
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would have produced). 
Obviously, a two consumer marketplace for new designs is a 
trivial case. In the real world, these two parties might just link forces 
and seek to contract directly with the persons who could supply new 
mousetrap designs. Such a contract-based system could provide 
efficient incentives for invention by setting contract payments for 
successful inventions at levels that encouraged efficient efforts to 
develop and supply those inventions. The result would be a contract-
implemented agency relationship in which the potential users of a 
new advance are the principals seeking efficient invention services 
from innovators serving as agents. Whether or not the work of the 
agent was efficiently encouraged or completed would depend on the 
accuracy with which the users could define their invention needs, the 
degree to which the agents could be incented to produce advances 
serving the users’ needs without wasted efforts on other designs and 
tasks, and whether the amounts spent in contract-defined rewards 
exceeded the gains that the users realized from the new designs and 
mousetraps that resulted from the work of the innovators.
99
 This sort 
of contract-based system could be implemented through direct 
contacts between innovators and invention users. It requires no patent 
system to link the interests of these parties. 
The patent system serves as a substitute for the type of contract-
based incentive system just described in situations where there are 
many potential users of a new invention and contractual mechanisms 
are too unwieldy to be used by a group of interested parties to band 
together and create innovation incentives on behalf of their group. 
Demsetz’s analysis describes a different means to link the interests of 
innovators and invention users through market processes, a 
mechanism which will play a much more central role than contracting 
in situations where potential invention users are numerous and 
dispersed widely such that effective contracting processes are not 
possible. The implications for the patent system of Demsetz’s insights 
 
 99. In addition to agency problems that might interfere with this type of innovation 
through private contract incentives, in the absence of patent rights limiting use of the designs, 
the parties might also be worried about free rider effects—that is, benefits to competitors of the 
contracting parties who did not contribute to the costs of development. These effects would be 
present if the advances that were the targets of the contracting scheme were freely available to 
others not paying a share of the development costs. This might occur because physical limits on 
access to the resulting designs (or trade secret protections limiting access) were not sufficient to 
prevent knowledge of the designs by competitors once products reflecting the designs were 
publicly sold. 
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about the desirability of access controls for public goods are apparent 
if Ms. H and Mr. M in the prior example are thought of as very 
different individuals, each with a different set of demand 
characteristics and a different demand curve. Demsetz recognized that 
a producer of a public good faces the whole market demand for that 
good,
100
 meaning that the public good can be supplied to all parties 
that seek it (and are willing to pay the access price demanded for use 
of the public good). The aggregate demand for new inventions of a 
particular type (such as a new mousetrap design) will reflect the sum 
of the incremental values that different types of invention users place 
on inventions and carry forward in their willingness to pay for access 
to the new advances. Hence, in the prior example, Ms. H and Mr. M 
can each be thought of as a representative of a group of similar 
invention users that will pay, as a group (aggregating the invention 
access payments of the similarly-situated group members), a certain 
amount for access to more inventions with a particular quality (with 
the nature of the quality of interest somewhat different by user group, 
just as the point of interest of consumers of hides and meat is 
somewhat different in the case of steer production). 
Seen this way, the combined demand function graphed in Figure 
1 summarizes the aggregate demand of different types of potential 
users for products based on new inventions. This demand reflects the 
interest and value to users of the new products in the functionality 
provided by the new products. The details of the functionality of 
interest (and the value that each category of invention user places on 
the functionality) will vary for different invention users, but an 
overall demand for new inventions can be projected from these 
component demands. From this overall demand, potential innovators 
can determine (at least roughly) what types of inventive projects will 
likely be met with favorable user reactions and at what sorts of 
payment levels. 
The role of patent law in this system is to enable the exclusion of 
parties from access to patented technologies without paying for that 
access. Patent infringement suits leading to injunctive relief help to 
ensure that users of patented advances (as well as makers and sellers) 
do not have access to the advances without paying for the access. 
These suits (and the threat of them) are means to direct consumers to 
gain access to the patented inventions through channels authorized by 
 
 100. Demsetz, supra note 74, at 296-99. 
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the patent owners and with payments to those owners (in either 
patent-elevated sales prices or license fees paid to patent owners). 
Suits leading to damage recoveries supply payments for past unpaid 
access to patented inventions, payments that substitute for privately 
negotiated access fees charged by the patent owner. The threat of 
these suits encourages the payment of access fees without litigation, 
thereby creating a feedback effect promoting private processes for 
pricing and paying for invention access. Overall, the patent system 
and its remedies tend to preclude unpaid access to patented advances 
and to provide a basis for the type of invention “pricing” system 
envisioned by Demsetz. As such, patent law plays a central role in 
regulating the production of excludable public goods such as patent-
eligible inventions. 
The enhanced patent reward theory described here has many 
potential uses in helping us to understand the impacts of patent law 
features in diverse areas of the law.
101
 Evaluating the range of 
inventions for which patent-based production incentives and 
regulation are particularly valuable can help us to define the proper 
scope of patentable subject matters and the corresponding scope of 
patent system influence. The desirability of limiting patent-based 
access controls to situations where the present utility of an invention 
is manifest and potential users can evaluate and price access to the 
inventions in terms of the incremental utility of the advances suggests 
that presently identifiable utility should be a minimum feature of 
advances constituting patentable subject matter. Furthermore, in order 
to aid in the operation of a system of access controls and pricing of 
the sort described here, a clear description of the present utility of an 
advance should be a minimum requirement of enabling invention 
disclosures in patent application documents. 
The types of circumstances where we are most concerned about 
misallocation of scarce resources and most in need of the type of 
resource allocation mechanism provided by the type of reward system 
described here may inform our laws on non-obviousness. The range 
of parties who should be expected to pay rewards to invention 
developers and thereby beneficially influence the decisions of 
potential inventors about the scope and targets of inventive projects 
may inform our laws about tests for patent infringement triggering 
infringement remedies. Finally, because they are clearly central to a 
 
 101. Many of these implications of patent reward theory for patent law standards are 
explored more completely in Part IV of this article. 
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system of invention access pricing and rewards, standards for the 
relief available for patent infringement may be directly shaped by 
consideration of the enhanced reward theory described here. 
Implementation of the type of invention production system described 
here will depend on patent infringement damage payments that are 
large enough to properly compensate patent holders for the increased 
utility provided to past users of patented inventions. Patent remedy 
standards must also provide for a range of injunctive relief that will 
ensure inventors have the needed confidence over invention access 
controls to project inventive project payoffs and to shape their 
projects in terms of payoffs from meeting the full range of user needs 
that they can satisfy through efficient private production of new 
patentable inventions as public goods. 
These, and other implications for patent law standards of the 
reward theory described here, are discussed at a later point in this 
article. 
D. Normative Implications of the New Theory: The Case for 
Strong Patent Rights 
An invention access pricing and reward system implemented 
through strong patent rights and access controls potentially can 
produce two key public benefits. Such a patent-based system of 
invention controls and access pricing can encourage the production of 
inventions in socially desirable forms and numbers. Such a system 
can also allocate scarce resources to the production of inventions in 
an efficient manner. This subsection considers these beneficial patent 
system impacts, thereby summarizing the normative case for strong 
patent rights. 
1. Features of a Strong Patent System 
A strong patent system is one where patent rights apply to 
particular inventions in a predictable manner and, if applicable, 
prevent unauthorized (and uncompensated) access to the inventions, 
also in a predictable manner. A patent system that is predictable in 
these two senses will provide inventors with means to protect rewards 
or “prices” for successful inventions and to make informed decisions 
about innovation projects and resource allocations. 
The aim of patent rights to exclude parties from unauthorized 
access to patented inventions is to activate bargaining and pricing 
processes that aid patent holders in charging for access to their 
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inventions. The resulting access fees, charged through patent-
influenced sales prices or through licensing fees paid by producers or 
users of patented advances, establish prices and values for various 
types of inventions. Exclusive rights and the injunctions that back 
them up are the starting points for privately-implemented invention 
pricing schemes. Patent holders are able to carry out these invention 
pricing schemes by selectively enforcing patent rights (where an 
access fee is not paid) and contracting for invention use (where an 
acceptable access price is agreed to be paid for use). 
In this framework, damage remedies for patent infringement are 
backstops to clean up after failed efforts to charge for access, with 
dollar payments to a patent holder serving as substitutes for the access 
fees the holder would probably have demanded had an access 
transaction been constructed through private means. Additional 
punitive damage awards for willful infringement tend to encourage 
attention to possible patent rights conflicts before parties act, thereby 
promoting contracting to gain access to inventions and the payment of 
access fees.
102
 In this sense, damage remedies regarding past 
infringement not only provide a substitute for privately negotiated 
invention access arrangements and pricing, these damage recoveries 
encourage care by potential infringers about the possibility of further 
infringement, thereby tending to bring these parties into the privately-
conducted access pricing system. 
These aspects of a strong patent system encouraging parties to 
establish private processes for implementing invention access pricing 
tend to ensure that means for charging for invention access are 
implemented in efficient ways. Patent holders have a direct stake in 
efficient charging mechanisms because inefficiencies will reduce 
what they take away from charging for invention access. These same 
incentives will encourage efficient frameworks for product 
differentiation and price discrimination in charging for invention 
access among different types of invention users. If patent holders 
have means for charging different prices for access to patented 
inventions by different subsets of invention users, the patent holders 
can charge different access fees for different users that reflect their 
different invention valuations and their different willingness to pay 
for access to the inventions. The costs of administering such a system 
of price discrimination will fall on the patent holders (in the sense that 
 
 102. Punitive damages of up to three times a patent holder’s compensatory damages may 
be awarded in cases involving willful patent infringement. See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006). 
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the costs will come out of the potential profits to patent holders from 
enforcing their patent rights). This means that choices about whether 
to charge different prices for access to inventions (perhaps by 
supplying different types of products incorporating the invention), as 
well as decisions about how to implement different prices and how to 
group similar users for purposes of charging different access prices, 
will tend to be made efficiently to minimize administrative costs that 
would reduce the gains to patent holders. 
2. Public Gains from a Strong Patent System 
Two important types of public policy benefits can flow from a 
strong patent system like the one just described. An invention access 
control system like this can 1) encourage publicly optimal levels of 
invention production and 2) attract scarce resources to this type of 
production at publicly optimal levels. However, even if a patent 
system operating in an ideal form would produce these public 
advantages, transaction costs or other detrimental aspects of 
administering the system may swamp the advantages of a strong 
patent system and produce no net public benefits from having such a 
system. These transaction and administrative costs place practical 
limits on the public benefits from the patent system. Both the 
potential benefits of the patent system and the limiting impacts of 
patent system costs are discussed briefly in this subsection. 
a. Encouraging Optimal Levels of Patent-Eligible 
Invention Production 
A system of strong patent rights and invention access pricing 
mediates invention production in desirable ways. It encourages 
production of patent-eligible inventions at socially optimal levels. It 
can help to ensure that there is no underproduction of such patent-
eligible inventions relative to the public’s willingness to pay for more. 
By controlling invention access through patent rights, patent law 
assists inventors in implementing an invention reward and pricing 
system that targets and funds invention production levels so as to 
match the supply of additional patent-eligible inventions with public 
interest and value associated with such additional inventions. 
In assessing the role of patents in regulating invention 
production, it is important to distinguish between the production of 
patent-eligible inventions and the production of other, more 
commonplace technical innovations. Patent-eligible advances are 
outliers among inventions, capable of production only by parties who 
GRUNER  5/17/2012 10:10 AM 
546 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. [Vol. 28 
have and apply design insights that are beyond the obvious reasoning 
of the bulk of scientists and engineers in the same field.
103
 These are 
simply a different inventive animal than the more straightforward 
innovations of the sort that are produced on a day-to-day basis by the 
great bulk of scientists and engineers working with standard design 
principles and obvious insights to extend earlier designs. 
The patent system is premised on the view that we have plenty of 
day-to-day innovations (through the workings of normal competitive 
processes), but that we lack optimal levels of the outlier innovations 
comprising patent-eligible advances and that we need special 
incentives to encourage the creation of more of these outlier 
inventions.
104
 Patent rewards are designed to give a special boost to 
the latter, on the ground that these are often important advances that 
shift technology progress in new directions and avoid stagnation in 
areas of well known technology and products.
105
 Not every patented 
advance is practically significant in that it is a major commercial 
success or put into widespread use; yet, each is intellectually 
significant in that it diverges significantly from prior engineering 
directions and has the potential to lead designers in its field in 
important new directions. 
The existence of the patent system is evidence that Congress 
views these sorts of patent-eligible inventions as special and the 
producers of these inventions as somewhat privileged. The privileged 
status is indicated by the monopoly control over invention use and 
implementation given by Congress to patent holders.
106
 Such 
monopoly control is a rare exception to the principles and laws 
 
 103. See 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006). See also Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 
(1966). 
 104. The distinction between day-to-day innovations (which can be made by a wide 
variety of parties having average or greater skills in a particular engineering or scientific 
discipline) and patentable advances (which are not obvious to persons with average skills and 
can only be made by persons with exceptional insights) is maintained by non-obviousness tests. 
These tests place day to day advances outside the patent system (and make them unrestricted by 
patent rights) and advances beyond the average practitioner inside the system (and potentially 
subject to patent-influenced rewards if other patent law requirements are met). See 35 U.S.C. § 
103(a) (2006). 
 105. Patents tend to increase technological diversity by increasing the incentives for 
parties to pursue, perfect, and disclose technological solutions to practical problems that are not 
already obvious to the bulk of engineers and scientists dealing with similar practical problems, 
thereby increasing the types of technological approaches that are known to engineers and 
scientists. See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2006). 
 106. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006) (giving the relevant patent holder control over parties 
who can make, use, or sell a patented invention during the term of a patent). 
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(primarily antitrust laws) encouraging active competition in most 
other spheres.
107
 This special status of patent-eligible advances 
indicated by Congress should be remembered when we consider the 
merit of various versions of the patent system. The goal of the patent 
system is not to encourage inventions in general.
108
 It is to encourage 
the special type of outlier inventions constituting patent-eligible 
advances.
109
 Whether or not the patent system is a success will depend 
primarily on its effects on the production of these special outlier 
inventions, not on the impacts of the patent system on all types of 
inventions. 
It may be argued that excessive patent rights regarding patent-
eligible advances will have a negative side effect on the production of 
additional non-patentable inventions. This might be the case where 
non-patentable inventions are made using patented advances as bases 
for improvements or as components of broader new products. If use 
of patented designs is either unavailable or curtailed due to prices 
charged for such use, the production of new advances derived from 
older patented advances might be limited. In this sense, it is argued, 
patent rights should be interpreted and restricted to encourage the best 
possible overall levels of innovations in total, with strong enough 
rights to encourage some exceptional, patent-eligible advances, but 
not granted to such a strong degree that downstream innovation is 
curtailed.
110
 
This is a false framework for analysis. Whether or not strong 
patent rights will encourage heightened levels of production of 
 
 107. See Thomas B. Leary, The Patent-Antitrust Interface, FED. TRADE COMM’N (May 3, 
2001), http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/leary/ipspeech.shtm (noting the view of some in the 
antitrust community that patent law was an “alien intrusion, which undercut much more exalted 
competition values and which should be given the narrowest possible application”). 
 108. Innovations that involve design methods or approaches that are obvious to persons of 
average skill in the relevant technology field are not patentable and, therefore, not encouraged 
by the patent system. See 35 U.S.C. § 103. 
 109. Patentable inventions—that is, inventions which are potentially encouraged by the 
promise of patent-influenced rewards—are outliers in innovation processes in that these 
advances are not ones that persons of average skill in the related fields could produce through 
obvious extensions of prior designs, but rather non-obvious advances over prior knowledge 
about designs. See id. 
 110. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF 
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 22 (2003), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf (explaining that “broad initial patents may 
raise significant problems for follow-on innovation. From this perspective, vesting the initial 
innovator with broad patent rights reduces the incentives of follow-on innovators and potentially 
impedes their access to upstream innovation inputs.” (citation omitted)). 
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inventions as a whole depends on whether they are granted 
exclusively (or at least mostly) for inventions that would otherwise 
not have been made. The strength of the patent rights granted does not 
matter, so long as these rights are limited to advances that would not 
have been produced absent the promise of patent rewards. What does 
matter is the specificity of the rights, not the magnitude of the 
remedies. If patent rights and rewards are granted only for advances 
that would not have been made but for the lure of these rewards, this 
reward mechanism will tend to produce more patent-eligible advances 
than would otherwise be the case.
111
 This will, in turn, provide more 
inventions that are potential platforms or components for later 
production of additional patented and non-patented advances. Even if 
patented advances are only available for use in later inventions after 
payment of patent-influenced access charges (or only available after 
the expiration of patent rights), the impact of the patent system in 
producing more patented advances will be to achieve a net social 
gain. The availability of some patent-restricted inventions is better for 
society than not having these innovations at all. 
By providing more technology designs as starting points for 
further innovation, patent rights adding to our store of patent-eligible 
inventions will tend to enhance later invention opportunities and, over 
time, will probably increase total numbers of subsequent inventions of 
all types (both patent-eligible advances and other more obvious 
advances). Conversely, if patent rights and associated access charges 
are added to inventions that would have been produced by normal 
competitive processes, these charges become just deadweight losses 
that impose costs on the later production of inventions which depend 
on the patent-eligible advances. The production of some advances 
derived from the patented advances will be unnecessarily curtailed or 
foregone if these costs must be paid. 
b. Encouraging Optimal Diversion of Scarce 
Invention Production Inputs 
A system of invention access controls and access pricing can 
serve a second valuable public function in allocating scarce resources 
 
 111. See David S. Olson, Taking the Utilitarian Basis for Patent Law Seriously: The Case 
for Restricting Patentable Subject Matter, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 181, 191-204 (2009) (arguing that 
patents and related use restrictions due to patent rights should be limited to inventions that 
would otherwise not have been produced without the added incentives of patent-related 
rewards). 
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as invention inputs. Invention rewards defined by such a system tend 
to attract and allocate scarce resources to the production of patent-
eligible advances in circumstances where such allocation is the 
highest, best use of these resources as measured by the interests and 
values of the public.
112
 The invention pricing process becomes an 
intermediary system whereby the use of scarce resources is prioritized 
and directed to projects involving the largest public needs and greatest 
public impacts. By tying public values of new inventions to the 
private values of potential inventors and the organizations that back 
them, the private interests and agendas of the inventors and 
organizations are made at least roughly congruent with the aggregate 
public interest in new advances. As the inventors go forward with 
resource planning concerning potential invention projects, their 
resource acquisition and allocation decisions are made with the public 
value of potential inventions in mind. Hence, these inventors and their 
organizations become agents of the public in acquiring resources for 
the private production of public goods in new inventions and in 
prioritizing and economizing on the use of scarce resources for this 
purpose. 
In this regard, the patent system supports market mechanisms for 
valuing potential inputs to the production of inventions, enabling 
markets to take this use of resources into account in additional to 
other potential uses for the same inventions. Where inventions are 
expected to be of high value by those who are capable of developing 
the inventions, resources (including the time of highly capable 
inventors and other resources needed to support the innovators’ 
efforts) will be drawn to innovation projects. Where inventions appear 
less valuable, the same resources will tend to be devoted to other 
purposes where the resources appear to have greater value. By 
mediating the allocation of scarce resources potentially serving 
innovation but also potentially serving other valuable ends, patent 
rights and the invention valuation and reward processes these rights 
support serve valuable public functions in promoting the efficient use 
of scare resources. 
 
 112. For a more complete analysis of the mechanisms whereby potential patent rewards 
attract scarce resources to invention projects, see Richard S. Gruner, Dispelling the Myth of 
Patents as Non-Rivalrous Property: Patents as Tools for Allocating Scarce Labor and 
Resources, 13 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 1 (2011). 
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3. The Offsetting Effects of Administrative Costs 
Public gains from the patent system of the sort described to this 
point may be offset and even eclipsed by the negative effects of 
various costs of administering the patent system and the enforcement 
of patent rights. Several types of costs may have this effect, including 
costs associated with reviewing patent applications, enforcing patent 
rights, and determining whether projected activities will conflict with 
patent rights. Additional costs include the lost value of activities not 
undertaken because they were mistakenly interpreted to be infringing, 
but which were actually legitimate in the face of patent rights. When 
costs such as these outweigh societal gains from the improved 
regulation of invention production under the influence of patent 
rights, the patent system produces a net loss to society rather than a 
net gain. Under these circumstances, it will be desirable to withhold 
the impacts of the patent system and exclude a corresponding realm 
of subject matters or activities from patent coverage. 
A complete exclusion of a particular technology or type of 
infringement from patent rights and rewards on grounds of 
administrative costs will rarely be justified, however. This will be 
warranted only where the costs of patent enforcement will always (or 
almost always, to an extent that it is not worth assessing the 
paramount size of system costs on a case by case basis) trump the 
advantages of patent influence on invention production in the area of 
technology or useful advance under consideration. 
In most technology settings, it is probably desirable to recognize 
the potential for projected patent rewards to draw out socially 
valuable innovation for the reasons described to this point and to 
leave it to particular inventors to determine whether the projected 
patent rewards for their anticipated work and projected inventions still 
provide net incentives for action after the costs of patent enforcement 
and net rewards these imply are taken into account. In short, an 
inclusive view on patent system scope and patentable subject matter 
will be mitigated by the case-specific factual assessments of particular 
potential inventors; if the costs of gaining patent rewards, when added 
to the costs of producing a successful invention, seem unlikely to 
produce net returns that trump the returns on similar investments of 
time and resources in other avenues of action, then the costs of 
administration in that setting (at least those felt by potential inventors 
who are contemplating the advantages of being patent holders) will 
put a practical limitation on the scope of the patent system in 
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particular cases. 
V. PATENT RIGHTS: WHEN WE NEED THEM 
Looking at the patent system as a means to promote the 
production of patent-eligible inventions as public goods, when do we 
need such a system? As a system that has many potential costs—in 
system administration expense, reductions in productive activities by 
persons who must pay elevated fees for access to patented advances, 
and in reduced competition to produce and sell patented advances—
the patent system must have considerable advantages before it will 
overcome these costs and create net public benefits. In short, the 
preliminary public case is slanted against the patent system because of 
its manifest costs. When will the advantages of the patent system be 
great enough to overcome these costs and to establish a positive 
public policy case supporting a strong patent system? 
An answer to this question is possible through extending the 
analysis of the patent system just described. The patent system is an 
artificial tool created by Congress to solve a problem: the potential 
underproduction of technical advances that are outliers in their 
technical fields. The patent system should be implemented where this 
problem is most acute. That is, the strongest public policy case for the 
patent system favors applying the system where the underproduction 
of technical advances has the most severe public consequences. If the 
patent system is a tool for matching the production of patent-eligible 
advances to public needs for such advances, then the patent system is 
most important where a mismatch between inventions and public 
needs is likely to have the greatest consequences. 
In considering the type of mismatch between invention 
production and public needs that is the province of the patent system, 
it is important to remember that patents do not promote all inventions, 
but rather just those outlier inventions constituting patent-eligible 
advances. Hence, the case for a patent system (if one exists) must turn 
on identifying when there will likely be an under-production of these 
special patent-eligible advances absent patent rewards and where such 
under-production will have serious societal consequences. 
An emphasis on the need for the patent system to overcome an 
invention production mismatch provides a guiding principle for 
assessing when we need the patent system. This principle leads us to 
three subsidiary questions: 1) When is the underproduction (in terms 
of unmet societal desires for inventions providing functional 
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improvements) of patent-eligible advances socially important? 2) 
When are normal competitive processes likely to encourage 
production of inventions at socially optimal levels such that the 
special boost of the patent system is not needed? 3) When are the 
costs of administering the patent system so great as to overwhelm the 
invention production advantages of the system, thereby justifying 
limits on the scope of the patent system? 
To fully justify taking on the manifest costs of the patent system, 
we should probably reserve such a system for circumstances where 
the answers to all three of these questions support the existence of 
patent rights. This indicates that we should limit the patent system to 
settings where the underproduction of inventions has serious social 
consequences, where there are reasons to believe that scarce resources 
will be under-allocated to the production of socially important 
inventions, and where there are not predictably high transaction costs 
of administering patent rights that will exceed and cancel out the 
societal benefits of producing more inventions. 
The remainder of this subsection addresses these questions in 
turn by way of providing an overall answer to the question: When do 
we need a strong patent system? 
A. When Invention Underproduction Matters 
If the patent system is primarily a means to encourage and 
regulate the private production of patent-eligible advances as public 
goods, then we most need the patent system where we are concerned 
about the underproduction of patent-eligible inventions. Put in 
functional terms, given that the patent system is a means toward the 
end of enhancing invention production, the patent system is most 
strongly justified where that end matters most strongly to us. Where 
invention underproduction is particularly important to society, using 
the patent system as a means to offset such underproduction may be 
correspondingly important. 
The underproduction of patent-eligible inventions may be a 
problem for several different reasons (with more than one of these 
problems potentially present in a given technical area). At least three 
types of reasons for underproduction of patent-eligible inventions 
may extend over a wide range of technologies: 1) the failure of 
contracting processes to produce proper levels of invention because of 
the large number of potential users of a product or service and the 
burdens of reaching these parties to charge for invention access 
through contracts; 2) the likelihood of strategic behaviors limiting 
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innovation because potential inventors are unwilling to benefit 
competitors who may gain as free riders on realized inventions; and 
3) the hesitancy of parties with specialized research capabilities to 
commit these to innovation with no practical means of realizing 
returns from product producers or users without encountering free 
rider problems. These potential reasons for invention underproduction 
(and the circumstances in which they may apply) are described in this 
subsection. 
1. Where Contractual Incentives Have Limited 
Effectiveness 
Where there are few potential users for particular types of 
innovations, contracting processes (in which rewards for successful 
inventions are set up as “bounties” for providing the inventions) can 
be structured so as to encourage parties to pursue inventions at 
optimal levels. A party (or manageable group of parties working 
together) can seek a particular type of invention by simply 
approaching a party capable of producing the needed advance and 
agreeing to contract terms providing for a specified payments to the 
potential producer upon delivery of an invention design meeting the 
user’s functional specifications.113 This sort of contract—essentially a 
specialized design services contract—would have the potential to 
create optimal incentives for the pursuit of cost-justified invention 
development efforts by the party agreeing to produce a design and for 
the devotion of resources to these efforts in an efficient manner. 
Where this sort of contracting process is likely to be effective, there 
seems to be little reason to also provide for patent rights. Indeed, 
given that the administration of the patent system would add costs to 
this situation, it would seem desirable to withhold patent rights in 
circumstances where contractually-implemented incentives for 
innovation seem capable of producing innovation efforts at socially 
 
 113. A similar set of contract based incentives might be framed through a bidding process 
in which the functional needs of one or more users were stated and multiple offerors were 
invited to submit bids to provide a completed device or device design. The resulting contract, 
now involving a self-identified design creator who identified a desirable design challenge in the 
bid specifications and who responded to the bidding, would have the same incentive 
characteristics as the contract described in the text. The main difference in the contracting 
process derived from bidding is that the potential design supplier will not have to be identified 
by the party seeking a new design, but will instead come forward to present their capabilities 
regarding the development of the desired new design and to convince the acquiring parties of the 
sufficiency of those capabilities to produce a successful result. 
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desirable levels.
114
 
However, contractual mechanisms will typically break down 
(and the patent system will have a greater potential role as a 
substitute) where contracting processes are ineffective or particularly 
costly to implement. In these settings, the patent system and the 
invention incentives that it creates can serve as a contract substitute to 
cause potential innovators to see the merit of various inventions (and 
focus on efficient resource allocations to create the indicated 
inventions) with the perspectives and value judgments of potential 
invention users in mind. The potential rewards of the patent system 
will provide potential inventors with this sense of perspective of 
invention users. These incentives can make potential inventors 
behavioral agents of invention users for purposes of pursuing 
inventive projects. As such, patent rights can serve as a substitute for 
equivalent agency contracts in settings where the latter are not 
possible or not cost-effective to implement. 
Why might innovation-inducing contracts be difficult or 
impossible to implement and the patent system be needed to provide 
substitutes? There may be many reasons, but at least two seem likely 
to be widespread and to provide broad justifications for reliance on 
the patent system across diverse technologies and fields. 
First, the number of potential users of an invention may be so 
large as to make it unwieldy to implement a contractual system for 
charging for access to inventions and creating corresponding rewards 
for invention creation. In these circumstances, only a subset of the 
potential user group could be banded together to form an 
administratively workable contracting group and could only be 
expected to pay a reward for successful invention designs that 
corresponded to their advantage from gaining access to a particular 
invention. This would create some incentives for invention, but not 
the same scope of incentives as if all the relevant and interested 
potential users of a successful invention could be expected to provide 
portions of the rewards for successfully producing an invention. Since 
contracting processes cannot be expected to include and reflect the 
user preferences and value placed on a particular invention by large 
groups of invention users, these processes will create suboptimal 
 
 114. I have previously argued that this is a desirable limit on the patent system and should 
be included as a component of standards for patentable subject matter. See Richard S. Gruner, 
Intangible Inventions: Patentable Subject Matter for an Information Age, 35 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 
355, 448-50 (2002). 
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levels of incentives (and suboptimal levels of invention) where the 
size of potential invention user groups is large. 
Second, where the identity of potential producers of a useful 
invention are unclear, it may be difficult or impossible for interested 
potential users of a particular type of advance to contact the relevant, 
capable innovators and to establish the needed invention incentives 
for the range of organizations or individuals who are capable of 
responding with a successful invention. Here the source of a possible 
gap in innovation incentives is not the number of potential invention 
users, but rather the lack of knowledge of the users about the 
capabilities and identities of potential innovators. Absent some 
targeting information about who might be a successful innovator, 
parties seeking to create contractual incentives for innovation will be 
impaired in efforts to contact one or more viable innovators and to 
implement invention-focused incentive contracts.
115
 For the sorts of 
non-obvious advances that patents can reward and potentially 
influence, only a small number of exceptional innovators in a field 
may have the domain-specific knowledge or analytic abilities needed 
to achieve unusual insights leading to non-obvious advances. The 
ability of contracting parties to find and conclude incentive contracts 
with these scarce innovators may be limited at best. Due to lack of 
knowledge about who is a viable innovator in the realm of non-
obvious advances, contracting processes aimed at promoting these 
sorts of advances at optimal levels may be difficult or impossible to 
target effectively. 
For these reasons (and perhaps others), contracting processes 
aimed at creating optimal incentives for the production of non-
obvious advances may be difficult or impossible to implement in 
many fields where there are numerous potential invention users or 
uncertain sources of innovation. Given that many fields (particularly 
those of widespread social importance) probably have one or both of 
these characteristics, the need for patent incentives as a substitute for 
contract-based incentives may be great across many innovation 
settings. 
 
 115. Even an open ended reward contract (in which the relevant parties agreed to pay the 
first party to submit a design with certain characteristics a particular reward) would have to be 
publicized to the potential innovators and administered to determine who had made a successful 
submission. 
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2. Where Free-Rider Effects Among Competitors are 
Substantial 
Invention underproduction may also be a problem because of 
strategic behaviors between competitors who might otherwise engage 
in innovation to stay ahead of each other in their competitive 
activities. In serving a potential set of customers, a particular type of 
business will tend to keep the future interests of the customer set in 
mind, including the interests of the customers in outlier innovations of 
the sort that the patent system is aimed at influencing. This type of 
motivation would tend to cause a business to act as an agent of its 
customer for purposes of innovation. It would, as part of this mission, 
tend to include some mix of work on outlier innovations (produced by 
itself or by contractors working for the business) to the extent that the 
projected success of work on such outlier innovations initially 
appeared cost effective in light of the probable commercial value of 
the projected results and the projected likelihood of project success. 
In short, businesses might serve as surrogates for consumers in 
producing inventions at optimal levels, in which case the special 
incentives of patents will not be necessary. Innovation risk taking on 
behalf of the public (as well as on behalf of the businesses 
themselves) may be undertaken as part of business risk taking more 
generally. 
Where there are two or more businesses competing for the same 
sales to customers, however, strategic behaviors among the businesses 
may cause each to hold back from efficient innovation, leading to a 
lack of optimal invention production. The problem that tends to limit 
optimal invention production in these circumstances stems from fear 
on the part of each potential innovator of free rider effects. Potential 
invention sources (both organizational and individual) who lack 
means to control inventions after they are produced will be loath to 
invest large sums and scarce personal resources in the discovery and 
development of new innovations, only to see competitors reap the 
main business benefits from the new innovations. This would be the 
case if a competitor could copy a new design, get an equivalent 
product into the marketplace, and gain the business benefits of that 
design nearly as well as the originator of the design, without paying 
any of the design costs. Fear that this will occur will cause each 
potential innovator to hold back from innovation, resulting in a less 
than optimal total production of new advances. 
This type of free rider problem will be most serious where the 
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ease of free riding is greatest and the likelihood that potential 
innovators will appreciate this and hold back from innovation 
accordingly is also greatest. This will be the case where the costs of 
innovation are high and the costs of copying and gaining from an 
advance as a free rider are low. This combination of circumstances 
will produce the greatest gains to free riders and the greatest injuries 
to the innovators who are victimized by the free riders. This will also 
create the greatest apparent threat from free riders and, 
correspondingly, the greatest deterrents to innovation that patents can 
offset to public benefit. 
3. Where Free-Rider Effects Limiting Specialized 
Research Activities are Substantial 
Free rider impacts may also significantly limit innovation where 
this type of work would otherwise best be undertaken by research 
specialists. Given the complexity of many types of modern scientific 
and engineering research, the research function is now often quite 
different from the function of producing and marketing goods and 
services to consumers.
116
 Effective and efficient research is conducted 
by parties with skills and resources that are divorced from those of 
production and marketing.
117
 In some large corporations, these 
specialized research functions are simply conducted in a different 
department or unit of the overall corporate enterprise.
118
 However, in 
an increasing number of contexts, the research functions leading to 
socially significant products and services are conducted in 
organizations that are primarily dedicated to research as their primary 
tasks. The two primary examples of these specialized research 
organizations are startup companies developing new technologies and 
university research labs producing new technological advances in 
conjunction with new scientific and engineering knowledge. 
These specialized research enterprises are conducted in sole or in 
 
 116. Research activities, like product production and marketing, have been targets of 
efforts to gain and apply specialized knowledge and techniques. As specialization has increased, 
many firms have either organized research departments to focus on specialized research tasks or 
have sought research results from outside concerns that have specialized in the research steps 
needed to produce new products. See Barnett, supra note 51, at 55-64 (describing disaggregation 
of research, design, and production functions in semiconductor industry to realize specialization 
benefits). 
 117. See id. 
 118. See Maximilian von Zedtwitz & Oliver Gassmann, Market Versus Technology Drive 
in R&D Internationalization: Four Different Patterns of Managing Research and Development, 
31 RES. POL’Y 569, 577 (2002). 
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part for commercial gains, although for some (primarily university 
organizations) this may be a secondary mission.
119
 In order to initiate 
large projects, the managers of these enterprises must be able to 
present a convincing case to parties controlling the necessary 
resources (which are often staggeringly large) that there will be means 
to produce commercial gains from successful completion of the 
research that is being considered.
120
 A plausible business objective is 
necessary, even though there is never a guarantee that a successful 
scientific or engineering result will be produced or that such a result, 
if achieved, will translate into a commercial success. Research results 
must have a foreseeable commercial value (even if this is contingent) 
if projects are to be funded (or at least aided) in light of their 
commercial potential. 
The difficulty of free rider effects in this context is that, if 
successful research results are not capable of being controlled by 
research organizations, they will have little if any means to gain a 
return on their research efforts and investments. Once successful 
results are made public, any party will be able to use them in the 
absence of patents and the research organization will have little if any 
means to gain a return on its valuable discovery. Concern about free 
riders will destroy any vision of future profit potential in 
commercially significant lines of research. The research organization 
will bear the costs; the free rider will reap the gains. There will be no 
means to link commercialization to research costs in a way that will 
produce research payoffs and cost recoveries. Absent such a manifest 
link, research enterprises will be loath to start out on costly projects 
and the production of innovations at optimal levels will be curtailed. 
As with the counterpart problem between competitors, this 
 
 119. In university settings, the primary research objective may be scientific knowledge 
enhancement, with the identification, dissemination, and commercialization of related practical 
advances as incidental secondary goals. See, e.g., HARVARD UNIV. OFFICE OF TECH. DEV., 
INVENTOR’S HANDBOOK: A FACULTY GUIDE TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND TECHNOLOGY 
DEVELOPMENT 4 (2009) (citing as goals underlying technology transfer practices at Harvard 
University as including “advanc[ing] the development of the Harvard faculty’s groundbreaking 
discoveries for the good of society,” as well as helping to “enhance intellectual exchange, foster 
the widest possible recognition for [faculty] efforts and attract financial sponsorship of [faculty] 
research”). 
 120. Parties seeking funding for support of technology research must typically compete 
with other parties seeking allocations of the same scarce resources for other projects (both other 
types of technology development and projects unrelated to technology development). In order to 
prevail in this competition for resources, the projected returns from technology development 
efforts must often be high. See Gruner, supra note 112, at 23-24. 
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version of free riding will be most serious–and the need for patents as 
counteracting forces will be greatest–where the costs of research and 
innovation production are largest and the costs of acting as a free rider 
are lowest. The nature of a new technology may suggest that it will be 
relatively easy to implement and replicate in products once uncertain 
design features of the new technology are worked out in research 
activities. This would suggest to research specialists who are potential 
innovators that their successful results will be easily reusable by free 
riders providing commercially valuable products to users and thereby 
precluding any effective means for charging for access to the research 
results. 
The presence of multiple companies that are already large and 
highly active in the relevant product and sales market—and that are, 
therefore, well-positioned to serve as effective free riders if there are 
no intellectual property controls over the use of commercially 
valuable research results—will signal to potential research specialists 
that there is a high likelihood of a free rider use of research results 
absent intellectual property controls. 
In these circumstances, research organizations will see that they 
have much to lose from the initiation of what will probably be 
uncompensated research and, correspondingly, potential free riders 
will be likely to capitalize on most or all opportunities to take up 
unprotected new advances and commercialize them in lieu of parties 
who have formal relationships (and compensation arrangements) with 
the research organizations that discovered the advances. In 
circumstances of high research costs and highly likely free riding 
which will cut off research compensation and return, research 
organizations are highly likely to be deterred from initiating costly 
research and the public will suffer from resulting suboptimal 
production of new innovations. 
B. When Resource Under-Allocation Matters 
Even where we are concerned about the underproduction of 
innovations (perhaps due to the probable weakness of contractual 
incentives or the disincentives of free-rider effects), competitive 
processes may be sufficient to alter resource allocations and bring 
competitive forces into play to increase invention production. Normal 
economic forces should, in the presence of sufficient resources for 
reallocation to new innovative tasks and opportunities, incent 
businesses to pursue innovative projects and adopt business practices 
that respond to unmet consumer demands for innovation and that 
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overcome problems like free-rider effects. Relying on these sorts of 
competitive processes to produce more innovation will probably be 
more effective than going to the more extreme and costly solution of 
invoking the patent system for increased incentives. The patent 
system will be needed (and its application through corresponding 
patentable subject matter standards most clearly justified) where there 
are reasons to believe that normal resource allocation processes will 
not bring adequate resources to support socially desired innovation 
and that resource under-allocation in this respect will be a problem. 
Under what circumstances, then, are normal competitive 
processes in commercial settings unlikely to be adequate and the 
special spur of patent rights likely to be needed to bring sufficient 
scarce resources to the production of patent-eligible advances? To 
answer this question, we need to focus on how normal competitive 
processes allocate resources to the production of various items in 
socially desirable quantities, and the reasons why these normal 
processes may break down in connection with the production of 
patent-eligible advances. Both of these topics are considered in this 
subsection. 
1. Allocating Resources to Invention Inputs Through 
Competitive Processes: The Disruptive Influence of 
Resource Scarcity 
Normal competitive processes—including labor markets 
allocating the employment of talented individuals and securities 
markets allocating investment resources to various companies with 
research agendas—will tend to bring key innovation resources to bear 
on projects of interest to the public where the sources of these 
resources are numerous and the means to reallocate the resources are 
active and well-informed.
121
 Where resources are scarcer, however, 
and the impacts of a few resource allocation decisions are critical 
 
 121. An active, well-informed market is generally an efficient and effective allocator of 
resources to the production of goods and services desired by the public. As noted by Robert 
Kuttner: 
At the very core of the market system is the price mechanism. Prices indicate 
what millions of individual goods and services are “worth” to willing sellers and 
willing buyers. Prices thereby function to apportion economic resources 
efficiently: they signal sellers what to produce; consumers how to buy; capitalists 
where to invest. . . . Markets, therefore, can claim to embody and express 
freedom of choice, as well as efficient allocation of scarce resources. 
ROBERT KUTTNER, EVERYTHING FOR SALE: THE VIRTUES AND LIMITS OF MARKETS 11 (1996). 
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(because there are only a few parties who control the relevant 
resources and their decisions fully control the relevant public impacts 
of those resources), resources may not be allocated in accordance 
with the public’s interest in useful advances and the consequences of 
resource misallocation in this respect may be severe.
122
 Patent 
incentives more clearly tying the advantages of certain resource 
allocation decisions concerning scarce resources to the public’s 
perception of innovation value will be advantageous in these settings 
to overcome otherwise present misallocations of scarce innovation 
inputs. 
Normal competitive business processes are likely to encourage 
the production of inventions at socially optimal levels, provided that 
there are numerous persons with the analytic talents and research 
resources needed to produce a particular type of invention. Where this 
is the case, the needed inputs for invention will be available from 
multiple sources, meaning that they should be both easy to find and 
easy (that is, minimally costly) to attract to innovation projects. One 
or more inventors will tend to put together the resources needed for 
effective innovation and to produce new inventions capable of 
meeting public demand for such inventions. 
Normal competitive processes should prove adequate in these 
circumstances to support socially optimal innovation production—
that is, innovation production at levels that meet the demand of the 
public for the type of advance in question and minimize opportunity 
costs for desired but unavailable innovations. Errors in resource 
allocation by a few innovators will not be significant in under-
producing socially desired advances because the large number of 
potential innovators (supported by the ease of assembling related 
invention inputs) will ensure that a substantial number of potential 
innovators will still make the needed resource allocation decisions 
and pursue the types of innovations that the public wants. The special 
added incentives of patent rewards implemented through controls on 
invention access will not be needed to boost invention production 
where there are many potential innovators and the resources to 
support their work. 
 
 122. Where there are few resource allocators—and few allocation decisions—the 
consequences of even one misallocation of resources to a project that is not the most highly 
valued by the public among the alternatives available may be particularly significant as there 
will not be other resource allocators who will support different allocations and better serve the 
public’s needs. 
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Where the inputs to the production of a particular type of 
advance are scarce—either because few persons have the relevant 
analytic abilities and research skills or because there are few 
organizations or other parties with sufficient resources to support 
effective innovation—regular competitive processes may break down 
in bringing needed resources to bear on the types of innovation valued 
by the public. Even a few misallocations of scarce resources may 
preclude the types of innovation projects desired by the public 
because there are no additional quantities of the resources in question 
to allocate to innovation. A tighter coupling of invention value and 
rewards to resource allocations is needed in these settings. Each 
resource allocation decision should be made with a strong influence 
of the public’s perception of invention value. 
Patent rewards are a means to achieve this. By permitting 
invention originators to charge the public for access to their advances, 
these originators are encouraged to more closely equate invention 
value (as seen by the public) with the outputs of a successful 
innovation project. Decisions about the allocation of scarce resources 
to projects aimed at producing patentable inventions are thereby more 
closely influenced by the public value of the inventions at stake. 
Patent rewards for innovations above and beyond normal commercial 
rewards may be needed to attract these sorts of scarce inputs to the 
production of inventions and to ensure that the needed resources are 
not put to other less socially valuable uses. 
2. Sources of Scarcity in Invention Inputs 
Outlier inventions (of the sort patents cover) have features that 
often depend on scarce resources. These are inventions that are, by 
definition, not within the design capabilities of persons having 
average skill and knowledge within the relevant design fields.
123
 This 
means that the outlier inventions that are the subjects of most patents 
are produced by only a few highly capable scientists and engineers 
(rather than by the great bulk of persons in the same fields who have 
average or less than average skills). The persons with the sorts of 
skills and knowledge needed to produce patented inventions are 
scarce resources. The special lure of patent rewards may be needed to 
attract these scarce innovators to the production of patentable 
advances, drawing them away from the other ends that such parties 
 
 123. See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2006). 
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with scarce knowledge or skills might pursue. 
As I have analyzed in more depth elsewhere, inventors capable 
of producing patentable advances (and the resources needed to 
support these inventors) may be scarce for a variety of reasons.
124
 
Knowledge in many science and engineering disciplines is now very 
complex and specialized, meaning that only a few persons may have 
mastered and be able to apply any particular body of knowledge to 
produce a related type of invention.
125
 Advanced training in 
universities tends to track this same pattern of specialization, 
producing only a few parties with advanced training in particular 
disciplines.
126
 Supporting resources needed for innovation in 
particular fields—including laboratory facilities, research staffs, 
administrative staffs, equipment, and supplies—are extensive and 
only possessed by a few corporations or universities.
127
 The scarcity 
of the innovators or supporting resources in these various types of 
situations imply that the lure of patent rewards may be needed to 
attract these resources to the production of patent-eligible advances 
rather than to other productive activities that the resources might 
support. 
3. Indicators That Invention Inputs are Not Scarce and 
That Normal Competition Will Probably Suffice to 
Produce Inventions 
Conversely, some features of invention production processes or 
contexts tend to ensure that there are many potential providers of 
particular types of inventions and that, accordingly, there are not the 
sorts of conditions of inventor scarcity that need the special incentives 
and resource allocations achieved by the patent system. Where the 
skills necessary to produce new advances are widespread and costs of 
producing inventions are small, neither the relevant researchers nor 
the supporting resources are scarce resources. The likelihood of many 
new advances—including, as part of the overall mix, a substantial 
component of outlier advances—is high. Under these conditions, 
there will not be a case for application of the patent system. 
Conditions of this sort are present, for example, in many 
business environments, where numerous parties may be capable of 
 
 124. See Gruner, supra note 112, at 17-23. 
 125. Id. at 19-21. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. at 23-24. 
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identifying and pursuing certain types of new business practices 
innovations and where the resources needed to try out new methods 
may be small. This combination of many potential innovators and 
sufficient supporting resources to produce and test advances suggests 
that business method patents may not be needed to spur advances in 
most business settings. 
However, even though business method patents are not needed in 
all business settings, they may still serve a valuable resource 
allocation purpose in narrow business domains. Business method 
patents may have strong justifications in specific business settings 
where the generally prevailing conditions of abundant potential 
innovators and low innovation costs are not met. 
For example, in some areas of highly rare business skills such as 
computer-enhanced financial methods, business innovators having 
both financial training and computer-based analysis skills and who 
are capable of working at the most advanced levels may be rare. The 
elite computer-savvy financial specialists capable of producing 
elaborate computer-based financial system advances are a scarce 
resource. Patent incentives may be valuable to encourage these rare 
parties to apply their skills and talents to the development of new 
financial services techniques. Assuming that the development of new 
financial methods is of substantial societal importance, then patent 
incentives can ensure that the rare skills (and associated computer 
resources) of high-level financial specialists are applied to the 
development of new financial methods rather than to other tasks of 
significant value to financial concerns and users of the services of 
those concerns. 
Thus, even in a domain such as business methods where there 
are sometimes many possible innovators, there may be subdomains 
where innovators are scarce and patents are more justified. This will 
be the case where innovation depends on very specialized knowledge 
or unusual resources and there are very few parties with both the 
needed knowledge and the necessary supporting resources to produce 
outlier innovations. 
This suggests the need for careful analysis of the merit of patents 
in subdomains of fields and that a categorical exclusion of all 
business methods from the patent system as non-patentable subject 
matters may not be wise. Rather, the appropriateness of patents for 
specific types of business methods should be screened through the 
context-specific knowledge and innovation technique standards of 
non-obviousness tests. By applying the latter to determine if a given 
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advance was one that only rare innovators could have produced 
(because the advance was beyond the knowledge and skill of persons 
with average or less than average abilities in the same field), business 
method patents and other patents in fields where patents are not 
generally needed to spur innovation can still be a force in exceptional 
subdomains where key analytic skills or innovation resources are rare. 
In these settings, the need for patent incentives to attract scarce 
innovators and scarce innovation resources to important tasks is 
particularly strong and the case for patent system inclusion is 
compelling. 
C. When Administrative Costs Trump Patent System 
Advantages 
Even where socially important inventions (with serious 
consequences if under produced) are present and there are reasons to 
believe that special incentives such as patent rewards are needed to 
attract scarce resources to the production of these important 
inventions, application of the patent system may still not be desirable 
where the costs of administering the system are large and these costs 
trump the apparent advantages of patent impacts under ideal 
conditions. If the administrative costs of granting and enforcing 
patents will overwhelm the social benefits of increasing the 
production of the important inventions in question, the patent system 
will not produce any net social gains and no patents should issue. 
Patent rewards should be recognized only where society realizes a net 
benefit in the increased production of patent-eligible advances even 
after patent system administrative costs are taken into account. 
This subsection considers some of the circumstances where the 
costs of administering the patent system are likely to be large and 
when patent rights should be withheld in light of these probable costs. 
1. Limits Based on Difficulties in Identifying 
Infringement and Triggering Rewards 
One potentially important source of transactional costs in 
administering the patent system lies in accurately identifying unpaid 
access to patented advances as triggers for providing patent holders 
with remedies for that unpaid access. In traditional patent law 
terminology, the costs in this category include costs in accurately 
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determining patent infringement.
128
 These may include costs of 
determining patent-specific standards for measuring infringement 
(including costs of claim construction as a preliminary to assessing 
infringement), costs in gathering and analyzing facts related to 
infringement determinations, costs incurred by defendants due to 
over-inclusive findings of infringement that force defendants to pay 
for access to patented technology where no access and advantage to 
the defendant has actually occurred, and costs related to under-
inclusive findings of patent infringement that are paid by plaintiffs 
who are forced to accept unpaid access to patented technology (and to 
bear uncompensated research costs) where such access has incurred, 
but defendants are not legally required to pay for the access. 
The costs of accurate determinations of infringement depend in 
part on the similarity of infringing and non-infringing items and the 
difficulty of telling them apart. Where distinguishing these (and 
providing remedies only for infringing items) is difficult, the tendency 
to mistarget and misapply patent remedies will be great. Hence, types 
of inventions that are little different from non-patented predecessors 
(or which are different only in ways that are difficult to detect) might 
be excluded from the patent system on the ground that the costs of 
accurate infringement findings and closely tailored patent rewards are 
too great to justify the invention production advantages of these 
findings. 
Where, for example, a patented technology incorporates only 
small, difficult to detect changes in a prior technology, such a 
technology might be excluded from patent protections on the grounds 
that accurately targeting access controls and patent rewards for such a 
technology will regularly take more resources than the societal gains 
that are likely to result from more production of the inventions. 
Indeed, no greater production of such inventions will be likely if 
potential innovators perceive that infringement claims will be hard to 
press (because infringement will be hard to prove) and that 
infringement remedies will be curtailed accordingly. The same sort of 
logic might justify excluding advances that are used in circumstances 
that are frequently difficult for patent holders (or parties working on 
their behalf) to scrutinize in indentifying when infringement is 
present. Certain business methods, for example, are used so 
 
 128. Harry Surden, Efficient Uncertainty in Patent Interpretation, 68 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 1737, 1754 (2011) (noting the potentially significant transaction costs involved in 
estimating and assessing whether particular actions entail patent infringement). 
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frequently in private, concealed business environments that 
infringement will rarely be possible without major expenditures. The 
difficulty of identifying infringing activities and seeking 
corresponding remedies and patent-influenced rewards will undercut 
the incentives that patents can create for such advances. 
Another source of difficulties and transaction costs in making 
infringement findings relates to the ability of potential defendants to 
disguise their products and activities so as to conceal infringing 
products and practices. The more defendants can misrepresent the 
nature of their products and practices in ways that utilize patented 
technologies while avoiding patent infringement remedies, the weaker 
that patent incentives become. Where defendants can disguise or 
conceal infringement, the costs of making accurate infringement 
findings go up (or the costs resulting from misapplied patent liability 
go up). At some point, the ease of disguising or otherwise concealing 
infringing items will be so great that infringement inquiries are not 
worthwhile and patent rights will also be a waste. This will be the 
case where the costs of accurate infringement findings overshadow 
the advantages of producing more patent-eligible advances in a 
particular area of technology. 
2. Limits Based on Difficulties in Determining Proper 
Reward Size (Damages) 
A patent-implemented invention access control system of the 
sort described in this article will only tie invention production 
incentives to invention access payments representing consumers’ full 
measures of invention value if patent remedies for infringing conduct 
provide meaningful substitutes for voluntary access payments. This 
means that, where a party gains the benefit of invention use without 
paying access fees (in the form of licensing fees or patent-elevated 
product sales prices), the relevant patent holder should be able to 
claim damages for the party’s infringing conduct that are roughly 
equal in amount to the gains the patent holder would have received 
from a voluntarily negotiated access fee. In this way, patent damages 
will provide a roughly accurate substitute for market-determined 
access fees and the rewards and incentives for invention production 
that those fees normally provide.
129
 
 
 129. Current standards for compensatory damages based on patent infringement provide 
for damages that are substitutes for privately determined invention access fees, thereby serving 
the function of patent damages described here. These damages are determined by reference to 
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Further, heightened damage awards—that is, punitive 
damages—may be needed to encourage parties with notice that they 
are about to engage in infringing conduct and a clear opportunity to 
gain access to an invention through payment of access fees to be 
penalized when they make the opposite choice and knowingly engage 
in infringement.
130
 Awards of punitive damages in these 
circumstances will, like awards of compensatory damages, also 
necessitate determinations of the value that invention users place on 
access to patented inventions since the aim of the punitive damages 
will be to not just equal and offset these gains to intention users, but 
to exceed these gains and thereby create a net deterrent to knowing 
choices to infringe. This sort of deterrent will discourage parties from 
ignoring the production system for pricing patented inventions that is 
implemented through the patent system. It will discourage parties 
from adopting a business strategy of ignoring normal commercial 
channels for accessing patented inventions, channels that have been 
authorized by the patent holder and that play a role in pricing and 
rewarding the production of patented inventions. The likelihood of 
these heightened remedies and penalties will discourage and deter the 
next round of potential intentional infringers from ignoring market 
processes for invention pricing and the invention production system 
that these pricing mechanisms support. 
A key problem and limitation in the administration of patent 
damages may be that the transaction costs of measuring the likely 
value and willingness to pay off infringers may be so large as to 
overwhelm the incremental advantages of more accurate estimates of 
user value and willingness to pay. Where greater accuracy in 
determining the willingness of defendants to pay consumes extensive 
resources in discovery or court processes, little, if any, advantage may 
 
private transactions for determining the amounts that parties would pay for access to patented 
inventions, thereby making patent damages roughly equal to and a substitute for market 
determined fees for access to patented inventions. Under prevailing patent damage standards, 
compensatory patent damages are to equal no less than the licensing fees that a patent holder 
and infringer would have been likely to have determined in an arms length negotiation to be 
reasonable compensation for the infringer’s use of a patented invention. See, e.g., ResQNet.com, 
Inc. v. Lansa, Inc., 594 F.3d 860, 868-69 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 130. Punitive damages are available under the Patent Act. See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006). 
These sorts of enhanced damages are awarded to respond to (and deter) willful infringement and 
other culpable conduct. See Beatrice Foods Co. v. New England Printing & Lithographing Co., 
923 F.2d 1576, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“Under our cases, enhanced damages may be awarded 
only as a penalty for an infringer’s increased culpability, namely willful infringement or bad 
faith.”). 
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be achieved in the better targeting of incentives for invention. Better 
invention production incentives will not be realized in these 
circumstances because the net rewards to patent holders will not be 
significantly different than they would have been without efforts to 
measure the damages more accurately. The greater awards that the 
plaintiffs might ideally have received with more information on 
invention users’ valuation of inventions and willingness to pay for 
access to the inventions will have been eaten up by discovery and 
court costs. The result will be that plaintiffs will be no better off than 
if less accurate determinations of defendant valuations of intention 
access were used in determining infringement damage awards. 
This type of transaction cost analysis suggests two possible 
limits on the patent system. First, litigants could simply be left to take 
these sorts of net recovery dynamics into account in decisions about 
when to terminate litigation by settlements. Where the costs of further 
discovery and court proceedings do not seem likely to enhance the 
recovery that will be obtained (taking the costs of further litigation 
steps into account), the litigants can simply reach a settlement and 
maximize the plaintiff’s net recovery as determined at that point in 
the development of the legal proceedings. There are at least two 
advantages to this approach. First, it allows the litigants to take into 
account diverse factors in assessing the strengths of a case on both 
sides and the likely litigation costs to come if a case is continued 
rather than settled. Second, it encourages the litigants themselves to 
formulate new valuation frameworks in considering case valuations 
and settlement terms. 
A second possible solution to the problem of transactional costs 
in particularizing damage measurements lies in assessing damages for 
broad categories of defendants without worrying about the further 
factual findings necessary to particularize the findings to individual 
defendants within the categories. Categorical damage assessments 
will avoid the costs of achieving more particularized assessments of 
how much each defendant in a class would be willing to pay for 
access to a given technology. So long as the damages assessed for a 
class of defendants approximates the average for the class including 
the defendant, the amounts recoverable by plaintiffs will approximate 
the rewards that they would achieve through more individualized 
remedies (although some defendants will end up paying more or less 
than they would be required to pay as damages in a system that made 
more particularized assessments of damages and enforced patent 
remedies and rewards accordingly). 
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3. Limits Based on Difficulties in Administering 
Remedies 
A further source of transaction costs that may justify some 
curtailment of the patent system relates to the costs of administering 
remedies when imposed. While damage remedies may be relatively 
easy to impose, injunctive relief may be particularly difficult to 
administer for several reasons. 
First, it may be difficult to ascertain the actual nature of a 
defendant’s past or future infringement and to tailor an appropriate 
injunction to prevent that infringement in the future. Where a given 
defendant has disguised the nature of its actual use of a patented 
technology, an injunction realized in litigation may restrict the 
apparent activity, but not the full scope of the defendant’s 
uncompensated use of the technology involved. Where defendants are 
particularly good at disguising or counterfeiting activities, many 
instances of infringement may be overlooked and left out of 
injunctions. If this is the case, the mistargeting of injunctions (and the 
related under-compensation of patent holders as the defendants make 
uncompensated use of patented technologies outside of the 
mistargeted injunctions) will be particularly severe. 
Second, even where an injunction is properly targeted to prevent 
improper use of a patented technology without compensation to the 
patent holder, policing adherence to the terms of the injunction may 
be difficult. Errors in such policing will either over or under 
compensate patent holders, with each type of error leading to social 
costs in over or under incentivizing inventions relative to socially 
optimal levels.
131
 
Over-enforcement of injunctions (like overly broad findings of 
liability) will tend to advance the production of patent-eligible 
advances over the level that is socially optimal. This will, in effect, 
divert the use of some resources to the production of these advances 
where the resources would be better applied to other tasks to achieve 
better overall satisfaction of societal demands for both inventions and 
other products potentially produced with the same resources. 
 
 131. Over payments of rewards to inventors will, of course, not affect the incentives 
related to the remedies as these inventions will already be complete when the remedies are 
granted. However, such over payments will be witnessed by other inventors and similar 
overpayments will be anticipated by these inventors in the future. The result will be a tendency 
towards over production of the types of inventions associated with overpayments. In a similar 
fashion, underpayments will tend to lessen invention production below socially optimal levels. 
GRUNER 5/17/2012 10:10 AM 
2012] FILLING THE BILSKI VOID 571 
The under-compensation of patent holders through the under-
enforcement of injunctions may also produce several adverse 
consequences. If deviations from injunction terms have no practical 
consequences, the injunctions will have little or no effect in stopping 
uncompensated access to patented technologies and will not 
encourage users to pay for access to patented technologies. The 
greater the “leakage” of patented technologies into the hands of users 
in violation of injunction terms, the greater the uncompensated 
weaknesses in the invention production system because the incentives 
for creating similar inventions in the future will be perceived as being 
likely to be affected by similar leakage. As a result, incentives for 
innovation will be less substantial than would be the case with full 
rights enforcement. In addition, the ability of some invention users to 
gain access to patented technologies without paying for such access 
will encourage others to do the same (either because they no longer 
perceive much deterrence in the threat of patent litigation leading to 
impotent remedies or because they are in competition with the users 
gaining free use of the patented technology and feel the need to act 
like those users to keep up in the competition). 
At some level of injunction enforcement costs, the costs of 
policing and seeking more accurate and defendant-specific judicial 
enforcement of injunctions will be greater than the incremental gains 
that the patent holders involved will realize. In these settings, 
withholding additional policing and enforcement will increase the net 
gains and incentives realized by patent holders and encourage 
invention production at greater levels than would be the case with 
more costly injunction enforcement. 
VI. GENERAL PRINCIPLES FOR RECOGNIZING PATENTABLE SUBJECT 
MATTER: RECONSTRUCTING STANDARDS IN THE POST-BILSKI 
ERA 
Patentable subject matter standards specify the range of practical 
discoveries that fall within the patent system and that are potentially 
subject to the types of production incentives and resource attractions 
that patent rights can provide.
132
 As described in this article, the 
patent system is a tool for encouraging and regulating the production 
of patent-eligible advances at production rates that match public 
 
 132. See 1 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS: A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF 
PATENTABILITY, VALIDITY AND INFRINGEMENT § 1.01, at 1-7 (2011). 
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demands.
133
 Where patents can serve this end, patentable subject 
matter should be recognized. Where achieving this end is 
impossible—because public demands for advances cannot be 
translated effectively into production incentives or because the costs 
of doing so overwhelm the public advantages of trying—the patent 
system should not be applied and advances should be found to be 
non-patentable subject matter. In this way, the purpose of the patent 
system in regulating invention production provides a guiding 
principle for the construction and interpretation of patentable subject 
matter standards. 
Patent law is peculiarly in need of such a guiding principle. 
Patentable subject matter standards are at once ill-defined in current 
case law, yet needed in a clear form by numerous parties with stakes 
in the patent system and its operation. Persons who are strongly 
interested in clear patentable subject matter standards include 
potential patentees, patent holders and others concerned about the 
validity of present patents, and potential infringers who are worried 
about the scope of patent infringement liability. All of these parties 
are greatly disserved by the uncertainty of present patentable subject 
matter standards; all would benefit from greater clarity in these 
standards to inform future behavior. 
This section describes the present lack of meaningful standards 
for patentable subject matter, assesses why past standards have been 
inadequate in light of the purposes of the patent system described in 
this article, and proposes a new patentable subject matter standard 
that will serve the purposes of the patent system more directly and 
completely. 
A. Past Standards Reevaluated 
This subsection provides a brief overview of past patentable 
subject matter standards that have each enjoyed brief acceptance, only 
to be rejected by reviewing courts that have found weaknesses in the 
standards upon full analysis and consideration. My object in this 
critique is to point out the deficiencies of these past standards in 
focusing the patent system and its incentives on the types of access 
controls and innovation production incentives described in this article. 
Following this critique, the next subsection proposes a new patentable 
subject matter standard tailoring the sweep of the patent system to 
 
 133. See supra Part IV. 
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advances that can be encouraged by the access controls and payment 
systems the patent system facilitates. 
1. Supreme Court Standards 
a. Benson Test 
Much of the current confusion in patentable subject matter 
standards stems from the Supreme Court’s cryptic analysis of such 
standards in the case of Gottschalk v. Benson.
134
 In Benson, the Court 
held that a computer-based information processing method—divorced 
from any particular implementation in a specific computer or other 
piece of hardware—did not constitute patentable subject matter.135 
The invention at issue was a method for converting information from 
one computer-readable format to another computer-readable 
format.
136
 The Court interpreted the claims of the disputed patent as 
covering all implementations of the method described in the patent, 
including implementations “not limited to any particular art or 
technology, to any particular apparatus or machinery, or to any 
particular end use.”137 
The Court’s reasons for finding this advance unpatentable were 
described in very convoluted terms. Different portions of the Court’s 
opinion in Benson seemed to focus on different reasons why the 
invention at stake was not patentable subject matter.
138
 However, the 
discussions were very unclear, both individually and in their 
relationships to each other.
139
 
One stated concern of the Court was that the information 
processing method at stake was no more than an unapplied idea.
140
 
The Court noted that just as “one may not patent an idea,” one could 
not patent the “formula for converting [binary coded decimal (BCD)] 
numerals to pure binary numerals . . . .”141 This discussion suggests 
 
 134. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972). 
 135. Id. at 71-72. 
 136. The patent at issue described the method sought to be patented as “a method for 
converting binary-coded decimal (BCD) numerals into pure binary numerals.” Id. at 64. 
 137. Id. 
 138. For a complete critique of the Benson decision (including extensive criticisms of the 
Court’s analyses), see Donald S. Chisum, The Patentability of Algorithms, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 
959, 971-91 (1986). 
 139. See id. 
 140. See Benson, 409 U.S. at 71. 
 141. Id. 
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that the Court was concerned with the lack of practical details in the 
patent claims regarding the implementation of the claimed invention 
and that a more concretely described and implemented computer-
processing sequence might have passed muster. 
The need for a complete description of a patentable advance 
remains an important consideration under the view of the patent 
system advocated in this article. To serve as the focus of access 
controls and user valuations of the sort described here, a patented 
invention must include sufficient practical details to distinguish the 
advance from other, similarly functioning items or processes. An 
advance lacking distinctive implementation characteristics would be 
hard to single out and control in an access system and hard for users 
to evaluate in order to determine how much they would pay for 
access. Ideally, to avoid limiting access to the wrong items or 
practices through the enforcement of patent rights, the description of 
an advance in a patent should be complete enough to distinguish the 
advance from other items and practices found in the same operative 
environments and potentially confused with the new advance. Hence, 
the Court’s analysis in the Benson case provides some support for the 
type of patent system advocated in this article. 
The problem with Benson is that the Court did not explain the 
basis for its concern over the lack of practical details in the invention 
at issue there. The Court’s opinion failed to address why the lack of 
practical details in the advance under scrutiny precluded patenting of 
the advance. It also failed to discuss the types of practical design 
features that would have transformed the unpatentable idea present in 
Benson into a patentable invention. It is unclear from the Court’s 
analysis whether a somewhat more concretely defined computer 
processing method (perhaps with additional concrete details on the 
computer software code needed to implement the method or the 
computer hardware equipment needed to implement the method) 
would have been sufficient to make the advance patentable subject 
matter. In short, the Benson decision indicates that inventors must go 
beyond mere ideas to create patentable subject matter, but provides 
little guidance in its discussion of unpatentable ideas about what 
distinguishes an unpatentable idea from a patentable implementation 
of the idea. 
Unfortunately, the Benson Court did not limit its criticism of the 
invention at issue to concerns over patenting an idea. The Court 
confused matters further by mentioning several additional but ill-
described grounds for finding the invention to be nonpatentable 
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subject matter.
142
 The Court shifted its perspective several times in its 
analyses and identified several other reasons why the advance under 
analysis was not patentable subject matter, without indicating which if 
any of these rationales were independent grounds for rejecting the 
patentability of the invention in question. 
143
 
Some portions of the Court’s opinion suggested that it was 
concerned the patent at issue might be interpreted to protect computer 
software per se. The Court noted that the invention at hand was 
described in terms of information processing steps (easily 
implemented in corresponding computer software code) without any 
further physical device details and that the Court was seeking to 
exclude such computer-implemented information processing methods 
from the patent system.
144
 These portions of the opinion were taken 
by some observers as an indication that the Court was trying to 
announce (somewhat cryptically) that computer software was 
unpatentable.
145
 
Yet another portion of the Court’s opinion indicated that the 
information processing algorithm underlying the advance at stake was 
unpatentable because the algorithm held great promise for application 
within the computer field and should remain available for use by later 
designers of computer processes or devices rather than being 
restricted under the control of one party through patent rights.
146
 The 
Court gave no indication of how to identify algorithms with this 
potential future importance, nor any explanation of why the 
development of such important algorithms should not be encouraged 
through the recognition of associated patent rights and incentives. The 
Court seemed to paradoxically note the importance of the method at 
hand, yet deny the application of patent rewards and incentives that 
would encourage the production of similarly important methods in the 
 
 142. See Benson, 409 U.S. at 72. 
 143. Chisum, supra note 138, at 971-92. 
 144. Benson, 409 U.S. at 71-72. 
 145. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Benson Revisited: The Case Against Patent Protection 
for Algorithms and Other Computer Program-Related Inventions, 39 EMORY L.J. 1025, 1030 
(1990). 
 146. The Court noted that: 
The mathematical formula involved here has no substantial practical application 
except in connection with a digital computer, which means that if the judgment 
below [finding the patent covering the advance to be enforceable] is affirmed, the 
patent would wholly pre-empt the mathematical formula and in practical effect 
would be a patent on the algorithm itself. 
Benson, 409 U.S. at 71-72. 
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future. 
The confusion created by this multiplicity of rationales given by 
the Court to explain its decision in Benson (without any indication as 
to which were particularly important), as well as the lack of 
underlying explanations for why the Court was emphasizing many of 
these factors, left the Benson decision as a source of confusion rather 
than clarity regarding patentable subject matter standards. Lower 
federal courts (and to a degree the Supreme Court itself) have 
struggled to interpret and apply the holding in Benson for many 
years.
147
 Not surprisingly, given the several rationales mentioned in 
Benson for rejecting the patentability of the method analyzed there, 
different parties have found support in Benson for many different 
patentable subject matter tests. Unfortunately, the rationales 
underlying the Court’s analyses are so limited and unexplained that 
the Benson decision provides little help in determining the scope of 
patentable subject matter in new technological contexts. The concern 
expressed in Benson over the need for a practical advance with 
defined features is laudable as far as it goes, but the case does not 
make clear why we are concerned about these features. Nor does it 
specify how we should determine if a given invention has sufficiently 
defined features to make the invention patentable subject matter. 
b. Chakrabarty Test 
Diamond v. Chakrabarty
148
 is generally understood and 
remembered as a case concerning biotechnology patenting and the 
importance of including living innovations within the patent system. 
The case is not limited to consideration of the patenting of items 
derived from nature, but rather offers some guidance regarding the 
minimum features of patentable subject matter generally. The 
discussion in Chakrabarty of the minimum features of patentable 
subject matter was embedded in the Court’s evaluation of the 
invention at issue—a bio-engineered bacteria for use in cleaning up 
oil spills.
149
 In its discussion of standards for identifying a new 
manufacture and how those standards would apply to the invention in 
dispute, the Court indicated that distinctiveness of an advance and 
identifiable new usefulness of an advance were the keys to 
 
 147. See discussion infra Part 2(a). 
 148. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980). 
 149. Id. at 308-10. 
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determining if the advance was patentable subject matter.
150
 
Regarding the patentability of the contested bacteria, the Court 
reasoned that the: “respondent’s micro-organism plainly qualifies as 
patentable subject matter. His claim is not to a hitherto unknown 
natural phenomenon, but to a nonnaturally occurring manufacture or 
composition of matter—a product of human ingenuity ‘having a 
distinctive name, character [and] use.’”151 
In the last portion of this passage, the Court seems to be applying 
a general standard for identifying patentable subject matter. The Court 
indicates that an item is patentable subject matter if the item is 1) 
man-made (that is, a nonnaturally occurring product of human 
ingenuity) with 2) a distinctive name, 3) a distinctive character, and 4) 
a distinctive use. Such a man-made, distinctive item would qualify for 
a patent if other patent law standards (such as novelty, utility and non-
obviousness of the item) were satisfied. 
This standard tracks well with the tests that would limit the 
patent system to an access control and invention reward system of the 
sort described in this article. In order to be distinctly controlled (to 
limit access) as well as to be effectively evaluated by users for value 
and possible access payments, an advance must have a distinctive 
character and description (for both identification and segregation in 
access controls) and a distinct use (for evaluation of the incremental 
value of the distinctive use as a precursor to the willingness to make 
access payments). An advance with these features will be a good 
candidate for the sort of access controls that the patent system can 
implement. 
There may still be concerns that this test will include too many 
technologies in the patent system because there may be few public 
benefits of extending patents to all distinctive, non-naturally 
occurring advances. If there are few public benefits from encouraging 
the production of more inventions of a particular distinctive type (or 
in encouraging more careful use of resources in the production of 
such inventions), these public benefits may not be worth the 
administrative costs and other transaction costs of implementing 
patent rights and rewards. These possible costs of broad patent system 
scope—and some of the means for reducing these costs—are 
addressed in the next subsection of this article describing a proposed 
patentable subject matter standard. 
 
 150. See id. at 310. 
 151. Id. at 309-10 (quoting Hartranft v. Wiegmann, 121 U.S. 609, 615 (1887)). 
GRUNER  5/17/2012 10:10 AM 
578 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. [Vol. 28 
c. Bilski Test 
In its 2010 analysis of patentable subject matter standards in 
Bilski v. Kappos,
152
 the Supreme Court once again emphasized that an 
advance that is at heart no more than an information processing 
scheme should be considered an abstract idea and unpatentable.
153
 In 
that case, the Court assessed the patentability of an invention 
involving a method of matching or “hedging” risks in investing in 
commodities.
154
 This was seen as merely an abstract idea because the 
risk matching arrangements at the heart of the advance involved 
information analysis and processing.
155
 The Court also emphasized 
that the addition of post-solution activity (that is, post-information 
processing actions) to record a result will not transform an 
information processing advance into patentable subject matter, nor 
will the limitation of use of an information processing advance to a 
specific industry or field of use produce patentable subject matter.
156
 
The Bilski Court rejected the notion (adopted previously in the 
case by the Federal Circuit) that the presence of a specific machine or 
physical transformation in a process was needed in order to make the 
process patentable subject matter.
157
 The Court found that the 
presence in a process of a machine or transformation was “an 
important and useful clue” as to whether the process constitutes 
patentable subject matter, but is not the sole test for such subject 
matter.
158
 Unfortunately, the Court offered no indication about why 
the presence of a machine or physical transformation was important, 
even as a clue. It also left unstated how this clue should be 
interpreted. Is the presence of a machine or transformation a sufficient 
indicator of patentable subject matter or could some advances having 
one or both of these features still fail to qualify for patentable subject 
matter? Where the clue is missing—that is, where an invention fails to 
include either a machine or transformation—what other factors might 
still indicate that patentable subject matter is present? What are the 
necessary and sufficient features of patentable subject matter as seen 
by the Supreme Court? All of these key considerations were left 
 
 152. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010). 
 153. Id. at 3228-31. 
 154. Id. at 3222. 
 155. Id. at 3231. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. at 3225-28. 
 158. Id. at 3226. 
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unresolved by the Court’s glib reference to the (somewhat) rejected 
machine and transformation test as a “clue” to patentability. 
The Court did adopt (without really defining) a general standard 
for patentability in Bilski. After rejecting the machine or 
transformation test as a sole test for patentable subject matter, the 
Court found the invention at issue in the case to not constitute 
patentable subject matter because claims to this invention “are 
attempts to patent abstract ideas.”159 Thus, the test the Court applied 
was to determine if an advance was a mere “abstract idea.” The 
Court’s earlier case law—most notably the Benson decision—had 
repeatedly held that abstract ideas, as opposed to applied ones, were 
not patentable.
160
 The Court in Bilski provided this approving 
description of its earlier analyses in Benson: 
In Benson, the Court considered whether a patent application for 
an algorithm to convert binary-coded decimal numerals into pure 
binary code was a “process” under § 101. The Court first explained 
that “‘[a] principle, in the abstract, is a fundamental truth; an 
original cause; a motive; these cannot be patented, as no one can 
claim in either of them an exclusive right.’” The Court then held 
the application at issue was not a “process,” but an unpatentable 
abstract idea. “It is conceded that one may not patent an idea. But 
in practical effect that would be the result if the formula for 
converting . . . numerals to pure binary numerals were patented in 
this case.” A contrary holding “would wholly pre-empt the 
mathematical formula and in practical effect would be a patent on 
the algorithm itself.”
161
 
The Court went on to explain its holding in Parker v. Flook
162
 as 
another example of a case where the Court rejected the patenting of 
an advance because the advance was, at bottom, a mere abstract 
idea.
163
 The invention at issue in Flook was an alarm system based on 
a novel use of a mathematical formula to analyze physical features of 
a chemical process and to activate an alarm when the process reached 
a particular state.
164
 The Bilski Court saw this as an abstract idea (the 
formula) supplemented by “post-solution activity” (i.e., the steps 
needed to activate the alarm) which did not figure in the patentability 
 
 159. Id. at 3230. 
 160. See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 64-67 (1972). 
 161. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3230 (quoting Benson, 409 U.S. at 64-67, 71, 72). 
 162. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978). 
 163. Id. at 585-86. 
 164. Id. at 594. 
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analysis.
165
 Hence, the invention, as pared down by the Court, was no 
more than a new formula applied in a particular context. Since a 
formula is an abstract idea, the advance put forth in Flook was seen as 
an abstract idea as well and was found to not constitute patentable 
subject matter. 
As with the advances at issue in Benson and Flook, the invention 
in dispute in Bilski was found not to constitute patentable subject 
matter because the invention was no more than an abstract idea. The 
Court’s brief analysis of the invention as possible patentable subject 
matter was as follows: 
The concept of hedging, described in claim 1 and reduced to a 
mathematical formula in claim 4, is an unpatentable abstract idea, 
just like the algorithms at issue in Benson and Flook. Allowing 
petitioners to patent risk hedging would pre-empt use of this 
approach in all fields, and would effectively grant a monopoly over 
an abstract idea.
166
 
The Court also noted that the portions of the patent at issue in 
Bilski which specified the context where hedging was to occur and 
which claimed control over hedging practices only in the 
commodities and energy markets did not change the outcome of the 
patentable subject matter analysis.
167
 These field-of-use limitations 
were not sufficient to change the abstract character of the claimed 
invention and even with these limitations the invention at issue was 
an unpatentable abstract idea.
168
 
The Bilski test, like that in Benson, reflected a valuable concern 
that inventions be applied and not purely abstract in order to be 
patentable. Under the view of the patent system described in this 
article, the limitation of patentable inventions to applied designs 
serves to ensure that access controls related to patent rights will be 
limited to applied items and contexts and that potential invention 
users will have practical features of patented inventions to look to in 
evaluating the value of the inventions and the amounts that they are 
willing to pay for access to the inventions. Unfortunately, the Court’s 
analysis in Bilski tells us little about what makes an invention an 
applied advance rather than an unpatentable abstract idea. The Court 
would have been more helpful and precise—and would probably have 
 
 165. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3230. 
 166. Id. at 3231. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
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come to the same result—had it indicated that an abstract, 
unpatentable advance is one with so few specified features and results 
that patent holders will be unable to control access to the advance as 
claimed by the inventor and potential users will be unable to evaluate 
its value and determine an access price they are willing to pay. 
Efforts to interpret and apply the Supreme Court’s Bilski test in 
lower courts are still in their early stages. The Federal Circuit 
provided more details on how the Bilski test might be applied to 
distinguish a patentable advance from an abstract idea in Research 
Corporation Technologies, Inc. v. Microsoft Corporation.
169
 The 
Federal Circuit’s analysis in Research Corporation represents a 
significant effort to refine and give workable meaning to the Bilski 
test. 
The inventions under consideration in Research Corporation 
were computer-based processes for rendering a halftone image on a 
computer screen.
170
 The court found that these advances were 
patentable subject matter because they fell within the Patent Act’s 
definition of a patentable process and because the advances did not 
fall within the judicially-recognized exception to patentability for 
abstract ideas.
171
 
The court in Research Corporation saw the Bilski test as 
requiring a two step analysis of patentable subject matter.
172
 First, an 
invention should be analyzed to determine if it falls within one of the 
statutory categories of generally patentable inventions—that is, to 
determine if the advance is a process, machine, item of manufacture, 
composition of matter, or an improvement of one of these.
173
 Second, 
if an advance falls within one of these categories, the advance should 
be assessed to determine if it is within any of the special exclusions 
from patentability recognized by the Supreme Court, including the 
exclusion for abstract ideas.
174
 
The Federal Circuit felt that an invention that falls within one of 
the statutory categories will normally constitute patentable subject 
matter unless there is clear evidence that the advance warrants special 
 
 169. Research Corp. Technologies, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 627 F.3d 859 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 170. Id. at 862-66. 
 171. Id. at 868-69. 
 172. Id. at 867-68. 
 173. Id. at 867. 
 174. Id. at 867-68. 
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exclusion from patentability.
175
 With respect to the exclusion of an 
advance from patentability on the ground of that the advance is no 
more than an abstract idea, the Federal Circuit noted in Research 
Corporation that: 
this disqualifying characteristic should exhibit itself so manifestly 
as to override the broad statutory categories of eligible subject 
matter and the statutory context that directs primary attention on 
the patentability criteria of the rest of the Patent Act.
176
 
In short, the court felt that most inventions that fall within the 
statutory invention categories addressed in the Patent Act should be 
deemed patentable subject matter and submitted for review under the 
other criteria for patenting (such as novelty, non-obviousness, and 
enablement tests) specified in the Patent Act. 
In determining whether the advance at issue in Research 
Corporation was patentable subject matter, the Federal Circuit 
considered it important that the advance presented “functional and 
palpable applications in the field of computer technology.”177 The 
advance addressed a distinct functional need in the field of the 
advance—that is, a need in the field of computer display controls for 
a method of rendering halftone images on computer displays.
178
 The 
advance included specifically described physical components, thereby 
distinguishing the advance from a mere abstract idea.
179
 Furthermore, 
the court noted that the advance was an improvement over previous 
methods already used commercially to achieve the same end and that 
“inventions with specific applications or improvements to 
technologies in the marketplace are not likely to be so abstract that 
they override the statutory language and framework of the Patent 
Act.”180 
Refined as described by the Federal Circuit in Research 
Corporation, the Bilski test confirms the status of an advance as 
patentable subject matter if the advance meets the criteria to fall 
within one of the statutory categories of patentable inventions and the 
advance is not abstract as indicated by: 
1) the functional ends served by the advance in its practical field; 
 
 175. Id. at 868. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. at 868-69. 
 179. Id. at 869. 
 180. Id. 
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2) the palpable components comprising the invention; 
3) the need in the relevant field for the functionality provided by 
the advance; and 
4) the likely commercial significance of the advance, as indicated 
by the existence in the marketplace of commercially successful 
items for which the advance is either a method of operation or 
an improvement.
181
 
This version (or extension) of the Bilski test offers great promise 
as a means to implement and contain a system of invention access 
controls of the sort that the patent system was intended to advance. 
The limitation of patent controls to advances with palpable 
components and identifiable functional ends will tend to restrict 
patent rights to inventions that are capable of access limitations 
(which can be implemented by restricting access to the distinct 
functional results achieved by the invention or to the palpable 
components of the invention or to both). 
The preexisting need in the field of the advance for a process 
with the functionality of the advance indicates that users are likely to 
value the advance and to be willing to pay an access charge to gain 
the use of the advance. The preexisting need suggests a user demand 
for inventions like the advance and a corresponding likelihood that 
users will pay rewards to inventors for satisfying the demand. 
Finally, the presence in the marketplace of a predecessor to the 
advance indicates that potential users of the advance will probably 
assign a value to the advance in the marketplace, just as they already 
assign a value to the predecessor that is already found in the 
marketplace. This provides further evidence that a willingness to pay 
access fees and to create invention rewards is likely to follow the 
entry of the new advance into the marketplace even if access to the 
advance is somewhat limited by patent rights. 
2. Federal Circuit Standards 
a. Freeman-Walter Test 
In a series of opinions in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the 
Court of Claims and Patent Appeals (as a predecessor to the Federal 
Circuit court) developed a test for patentable subject matter that 
 
 181. Id. at 868-69. 
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focused on whether an invention submitted for patenting involved an 
algorithm. The resulting standard was called the Freeman-Walter test 
in light of the two primary cases in which the test was set out.
182
 This 
standard was intended to provide a more useful clarification of the 
test used (but poorly described) by the Supreme Court in Benson.
183
 
The test evaluated the presence of patentable subject matter in light of 
the following: 
First, the claim is analyzed to determine whether a mathematical 
algorithm is directly or indirectly recited. Next, if a mathematical 
algorithm is found, the claim as a whole is further analyzed to 
determine whether the algorithm is “applied in any manner to 
physical elements or process steps,” and, if it is, it “passes muster 
[as patentable subject matter].”
184
 
This two part test sought to ensure that inventions which were 
little more than algorithms for processing disembodied information 
were excluded from patenting. Where information processing 
algorithms or relationships were used in situations divorced from a 
particular practical application, the combined effect of the first and 
second parts of the test was to exclude the unapplied advances from 
patentable subject matter. 
This type of exclusion was appropriate under the access control 
view of the patent system discussed in this article since an unapplied 
information processing algorithm lacks the sort of user utility that is 
the starting point for user evaluations of advances and a willingness to 
pay for access to the advances. Absent identifiable utility, users of an 
advance will not be interested in access and will not determine how 
much they are willing to pay for such access. An advance that lacked 
such a practical result and associated likelihood of user valuation is 
not amenable to the type of incentive system underlying the patent 
system. 
If unapplied advances were accepted for patenting, incentives for 
the production of such advances might be set either too high or too 
low. A party developing an information processing method might 
over or under estimate the range of ultimate uses and the value that 
users would place on the advance since the range of applications of 
the advance (and the value of the advances) would not yet be 
 
 182. In re Freeman, 573 F.2d 1237 (C.C.P.A. 1978), amended by In re Walter, 618 F.2d 
758, 766-68 (C.C.P.A. 1980). 
 183. See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 64-67 (1972). 
 184. In re Pardo, 684 F.2d 912, 915 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (quoting Walter, 618 F.2d at 767). 
GRUNER 5/17/2012 10:10 AM 
2012] FILLING THE BILSKI VOID 585 
determined. The developer of the advance might over or under 
estimate the practical ends to which the advance would be put. Absent 
an anchor for valuation in particular practical ends, the value of an 
unapplied advance (and the amount of resources that it would be cost 
effective to put into producing the advance) could not be determined 
with any accuracy. Absent at least some roughly accurate means to 
project the value of a targeted invention, the well-targeted yet 
regulated production of new advances through the type of patent-
implemented access pricing scheme described here would not be 
possible. 
Only once something more than just a pure, unapplied 
information processing method is developed (through linking the 
method to one or more practical results) can the value of an 
information processing advance be translated into consumer demand 
and patent rewards based on that demand captured through access 
controls and resulting reward payments to innovators. Hence, 
unapplied information processing algorithms or relationships lacking 
identified practical implementations were appropriately excluded 
from the patent system. 
The Freeman-Walter standard looked to the physical application 
of an information processing algorithm as an indicator that an 
advance was an applied design, not merely an abstract idea in the 
form of an unapplied algorithm.
185
 However, this test was both over- 
and under-inclusive of the advances that should have been included in 
the patent system. Some items involving physical applications of 
algorithms would not be susceptible to the type of access controls and 
valuation systems administered through the patent system. 
Conversely, some applications of algorithms would be amenable to 
access controls (through controls over the results of using the 
algorithms), valuations, and rewards to inventors of the sort that the 
patent system can implement. Hence, as noted by the Supreme Court 
in Bilski, physical elements serve as partial, but incomplete criteria for 
distinguishing between patentable subject matters (for which the 
patent system is a useful reward and production mediation tool) and 
unpatentable subject matters other useful advances (which are best 
produced without the access limitations and administrative costs of 
the patent system). 
 
 185. Id. 
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b. State Street Test 
Recognizing the weaknesses and incompleteness of the 
Freeman-Walter test, the Federal Circuit eventually tried again and 
reformulated its patentable subject matter standard. In a standard 
articulated by one of the great masters of patent law, Judge Giles 
Rich, the Federal Circuit announced and refined a new patentable 
subject matter standard in a series of decisions. The standard was first 
mentioned in passing in In re Alappat,
186
 discussed further in the 
context of a computer-based business method in State Street Bank & 
Trust Co. v. Signature Finance Group, Inc.,
187
 and discussed and 
explained more completely in connection with a pure information 
processing advance in AT&T Corp. v. Excel Communications, Inc.
188
 
While it was applied by the Federal Circuit across several types 
of inventions in these cases, the standard that emerged was most 
commonly associated with the State Street case because the standard 
was used there to uphold the patenting of a business method and this 
result received considerable notoriety.
189
 This standard—referred to 
here as the State Street test for convenience—was aimed at 
distinguishing abstract ideas from patentable applications. The 
standard specified that an advance was patentable subject matter if the 
 
 186. In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc). Alappat involved a computer 
system that controlled the display on a cathode ray tube screen. The system evaluated electronic 
signals and determined how to best control the screen to display a graphic image corresponding 
to the signals. The only new feature of the system relative to earlier cathode ray tube systems 
were the information processing steps implemented by the computer system. The Federal Circuit 
found that this invention constituted patentable subject matter because the invention was “a 
specific machine [that produces] a useful, concrete, and tangible result.” Id. at 1544. 
 187. State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 
1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1093 (1999). State Street involved a computer-based system 
implementing a particular financial investment management method. The invention in this case 
helped to administer a “hub and spoke” method for the central investment of funds from 
multiple financial institutions. The system provided for the collection of funds from multiple 
institutions (the “spokes”) for investment by a single central fund (the “hub”), with frequent 
status reports made to the contributing institutions. The Federal Circuit found this system to be 
patentable subject matter because the system met the standard announced in Alappat—that is, 
because the computer-based system was a specific item that produced a useful, concrete, and 
tangible result. Id. at 1373. 
 188. AT&T Corp. v. Excel Commc’ns, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 1999), cert. 
denied, 528 U.S. 946 (1999). The innovation in AT&T was a new electronic record keeping 
method for recording information on long distance calls. The method was held to be patentable 
subject matter because the method was a specific method producing a useful, concrete, and 
tangible result. Id. at 1357-58. 
 189. See e.g., Kevin Schubert, Should State Street be Overruled? Continuing Controversy 
over Business Method Patents, 90 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 461 (2008). 
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advance was 1) a specific machine, item of manufacture, composition, 
or process that, when used, produced a 2) useful, 3) concrete, and 4) 
tangible result.
190
 
The Federal Circuit explained its objectives in applying the State 
Street test as follows: 
In State Street, this court, following the Supreme Court’s guidance 
in Diehr, concluded that “[u]npatentable mathematical algorithms 
are identifiable by showing they are merely abstract ideas 
constituting disembodied concepts or truths that are not ‘useful.’ . . 
. [T]o be patentable an algorithm must be applied in a ‘useful’ 
way.” In that case, the claimed data processing system for 
implementing a financial management structure satisfied the § 101 
inquiry because it constituted a “practical application of a 
mathematical algorithm, . . . [by] produc[ing] ‘a useful, concrete 
and tangible result.’” 
The State Street formulation, that a mathematical algorithm may be 
an integral part of patentable subject matter such as a machine or 
process if the claimed invention as a whole is applied in a “useful” 
manner, follows the approach taken by this court en banc in In re 
Alappat. In Alappat, we set out our understanding of the Supreme 
Court’s limitations on the patentability of mathematical subject 
matter and concluded that: 
[The Court] never intended to create an overly broad, fourth 
category of [mathematical] subject matter excluded from § 
101. Rather, at the core of the Court’s analysis . . . lies an 
attempt by the Court to explain a rather straightforward 
concept, namely, that certain types of mathematical subject 
matter, standing alone, represent nothing more than abstract 
ideas until reduced to some type of practical application, and 
thus that subject matter is not, in and of itself, entitled to 
patent protection. 
Thus, the Alappat inquiry simply requires an examination of the 
contested claims to see if the claimed subject matter as a whole is a 
disembodied mathematical concept representing nothing more than 
a “law of nature” or an “abstract idea,” or if the mathematical 
concept has been reduced to some practical application rendering it 
“useful.” In Alappat, we held that more than an abstract idea was 
claimed because the claimed invention as a whole was directed 
toward forming a specific machine that produced the useful, 
 
 190. See AT&T, 172 F.3d at 1357-58. 
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concrete, and tangible result of a smooth waveform display.
191
 
While the Federal Circuit related its State Street standard in this 
way to concerns over not patenting abstract ideas, the court still did 
not explain why patenting abstract ideas was a problem or how its test 
for identifying a non-abstract and patentable idea was effective in 
achieving the goals of patent law. Without a sense of the objectives of 
the State Street standard, there was little way for subsequent courts or 
other analysts to determine the meaning of the components of this 
standard and to apply to standard in an effective, consistent way. 
Ultimately, the Federal Circuit rejected the State Street standard 
in its opinion in Bilski, in part because the court felt that the State 
Street standard was too inclusive and brought too many types of 
advances within the patent system.
192
 Yet the Federal Circuit speaking 
in Bilski did not articulate criteria for determining what constituted an 
excessively broad sweep of the patent system and why the State Street 
standard produced such a consequence. Indeed, while the Federal 
Circuit had purported to apply it for some years, the court rejected the 
State Street standard in its Bilski opinion with little analysis and 
explanation of the reasons for rejecting a well-established standard 
that had been frequently applied in lower courts and in patent 
analyses by private parties.
193
 
The only reasoning the Federal Circuit offered in its Bilski 
opinion to explain its rejection of the State Street test was to note that 
this test focused too much on the results achieved by an advance and 
not on the features of the advance itself.
194
 However, this may have 
been a criticism resulting from the Federal Circuit’s consideration of 
only part of the State Street standard. The Court mistakenly referred 
to the standard as requiring only that an advance produce a useful, 
concrete and tangible result in order to constitute patentable subject 
matter.
195
 The full State Street standard required such results plus that 
an advance constitute a specific machine, item of manufacture, 
composition, or process.
196
 This further required element—if 
interpreted to exclude advances lacking specific practical details from 
 
 191. Id. at 1357-58 (citations omitted) (alterations in original). 
 192. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 959-60 (Fed. Cir. 2008), aff’d, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010). 
 193. For an overview of the history of the application of the State Street standard and some 
of its implications, see Schubert, supra note 189. 
 194. Bilski, 545 F.3d at 959-60. 
 195. Id. at 959-60, 960 n.19. 
 196. AT&T, 172 F.3d at 1357-58. 
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patenting—might have allayed the concerns of the Federal Circuit 
that the State Street test was inadequate to prevent abstract ideas from 
receiving patents. 
While it was technically not before the Supreme Court in Bilski 
(having been rejected below by the Federal Circuit),
197
 the State Street 
standard was nonetheless disavowed (if not outright rejected) by all 
members of the Supreme Court in various opinions issued in the 
Bilski case.
198
 However, the precise reasons for the Court’s doubts 
regarding the State Street standard were not articulated, perhaps 
because the Court’s goals for a patentable subject matter standard 
were ill defined and, absent these goals, there was no clear reasoning 
that the Court could present as to why the State Street test did not 
serve patent law goals. 
Viewed from the perspective of this article, the State Street 
standard captured some of the criteria needed in a well-focused 
standard for patentable subject matter. The State Street standard 
limited patentable advances to specific inventions that were capable 
of producing useful, concrete and tangible results. Inventions meeting 
this test would tend to be ones that could be incorporated in workable 
access controls and valuation methods. 
The requirement in State Street of a specific device or process as 
a threshold feature of patentable subject matter suggests that 
patentable items must be sufficiently defined to be distinguished from 
other items, which is a necessary characteristic if access controls 
(based on patent rights) are to be imposed on the patented items but 
not on other like items. A sufficiently specific advance in this regard 
is one where the characteristics of the device or process are stated in 
patent claims with sufficient detail that courts, litigants, and potential 
actors can be sure when a patented item is present rather than just 
another item which is based on the same unpatentable abstract idea or 
information relationship. Had the somewhat ambiguously stated first 
prong of the State Street test been interpreted this way, it would have 
been an important feature of a test appropriately limiting patentable 
subject matter to advances where access controls and the types of 
rewards furthered by the patent system are administratively possible. 
Likewise, the requirements under State Street that a patentable 
 
 197. See Bilski, 545 F.3d at 959-60. 
 198. See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3231 (2010); id. at 3232 n.1 (Stevens, 
Ginsberg, Breyer, and Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 3259 (Breyer and Scalia, J., 
concurring). 
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advance produce a useful, concrete, and tangible result also seem 
likely to further the invention production goals of the patent system if 
these requirements are properly interpreted. Clearly, a useful result is 
necessary if invention users are to see value in access to an advance 
and to be willing to pay a price for such access. A concrete result—in 
the sense that the result is not uncertain, but rather regularly produced 
by use of the advance and manifest in a well-defined, concrete way—
is needed for invention users to be willing to assess value from initial 
uses of an advance, to project that they will gain similar advantages 
from similar uses in the future, and to be willing to pay for future 
access to gain the same advantages in the future. The requirement that 
the result of an advance be tangible—having a useful impact in 
interpreting or working with objects in the tangible world—ensures 
that patent rights and associated access controls are restricted to either 
physical devices and processes or results that are important in 
measuring or managing physical circumstances (with results tied to 
those circumstances, which will distinguish them from pure 
intellectual thoughts or information analyses). This last requirement 
of tangible results—that is, results affecting or relating to the tangible 
world—could, if interpreted to restrict patents to advances where the 
results are trackable and access to them controllable—serve to limit 
patent rights and controls to advances that are amenable to the types 
of access controls and production incentives that can be administered 
through the patent system. Hence, while it was very ambiguous in its 
initially articulated form, the State Street test had the rudiments of 
criteria for desirable bounds on the patent system. Some clarifying 
and narrowing interpretations, keeping in mind the goal of ensuring 
workable invention access controls and access payment mechanisms, 
might have saved the State Street test as an administrable and 
desirable patentable subject matter test. 
c. Machine-or-Transformation Test 
In the Federal Circuit’s Bilski decision, the court sitting en banc 
rejected the State Street standard as too ill defined and too broadly 
inclusive of patentable subject matter.
199
 Instead, the court substituted 
a “machine-or-transformation test” that it felt was dictated by earlier 
Supreme Court precedents.
200
 Although the Supreme Court later held 
the machine or transformation test was not the sole criteria for 
 
 199. See Bilski, 545 F.3d at 959-60 nn.18 & 19. 
 200. See id. at 961-63. 
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determining the scope of patentable subject matter,
201
 it did find some 
value in the test as a “clue” to patentability.202 The Federal Circuit’s 
analysis in Bilski was as follows: 
A claimed process is surely patent-eligible under § 101 if: (1) it is 
tied to a particular machine or apparatus, or (2) it transforms a 
particular article into a different state or thing. . . . [This “machine-
or-transformation test” is] the governing test for determining patent 
eligibility of a process under §101.
203
 
This machine-or-transformation test was rejected by the 
Supreme Court as the sole patentable subject matter test on the 
ground that it improperly barred patents for some advances that were 
intended by Congress to fall within the range of the patent system.
204
 
However, the Supreme Court gave little indication of how it saw the 
purposes of the patent system envisioned by Congress or why the 
machine-or-transformation test failed to serve these purposes. 
As with the emphasis on physical elements or steps in the 
Federal Circuit’s Freeman-Walter test for patentable subject matter, 
the emphasis on physical elements or impacts of a process in the 
machine-or-transformation test was a partial step towards a desirable 
patentable subject matter standard, but only if these sorts of physical 
features are interpreted and analyzed in the context of an invention 
access control system. Physical features of an advance may be 
important in assessing whether an advance should be seen as 
patentable subject matter if those elements (or their absence) indicate 
that uses of the advance will be easy to limit and that, therefore, an 
access limiting system for such an advance will be reasonable to 
administer through patent rights. Physical elements will frequently aid 
in ensuring that related invention embodiments or the results that they 
achieve can be controlled and access given to those embodiments 
only for persons who pay for such access. However, such physical 
elements may not necessarily be co-extensive with the presence of an 
excludable advance that can be subject to meaningful access controls. 
The ultimate standard should be workability of access controls. 
Absent an overarching criteria such as this for assessing the 
character of useful advances and dividing them into patent-eligible 
and non-eligible subsets, focusing on relevant types of elements such 
 
 201. See Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3225-27. 
 202. See id. at 3226-27. 
 203. Bilski, 545 F.3d at 954, 956. 
 204. See Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3225-27. 
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as physical elements or effects will be meaningless. The presence or 
absence of these elements will lead to over- and under-inclusive 
decisions on patentability. Some inventions with physical elements 
may not lend themselves to easy exclusion from use and, therefore, 
should probably be omitted from the patent system by finding them to 
be non-patentable subject matter. In contrast, some intangible 
advances may be sufficiently tied to physical circumstances, physical 
implementations, or other physical use features to provide means for 
excluding users from the processes or from the results of those 
processes and to thereby provide viable access controls and access 
payment mechanisms. Such excludable advances (even without 
substantial physical instantiation) should be treated as incorporating 
patentable subject matter. 
B. Summarizing Decades of Confusion in Patentable Subject 
Matter Tests 
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Bilski did little more than refer 
backwards to the Court’s own prior case law on patentable subject 
matter—case law that that had spurred great confusion in lower courts 
for decades as to what criteria to use for analyzing patentable subject 
matter. The Court’s analysis did not provide any meaningful new 
guidance and has left the analysis of patentable subject matter in an 
even more uncertain state than before the Supreme Court’s Bilski 
decision. Widespread uncertainty and confusion in patentable subject 
matter analyses began for courts, the USPTO, and practitioners with 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Benson in 1972.205 Since then, we 
have seen the rise and later rejection of the Freeman-Walters, State 
Street, and machine or transformation tests, all viewed in their time 
by the Federal Circuit as needed clarifications of the uncertain 
standards left behind by the Supreme Court’s case law. 
With the Supreme Court’s refusal to add any new guidance 
regarding standards in Bilski, we once again return to this uncertain 
Supreme Court case law for its very limited guidance on how to 
conduct patentable subject matter standards. Patentable subject matter 
analyses—one of the most important types of evaluations in patent 
law, governing the range of the patent system itself—rest on 
underpinnings that have been widely recognized as weak and ill 
defined for over thirty years. The incentive goals of the patent system 
 
 205. See Chisum, supra note 138, at 992. 
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and the interests of those who rely on this system for certainty about 
the system’s probable rewards and restrictions deserve far more 
clarity in patent law standards than the efforts of the Supreme Court 
and the Federal Circuit have produced. 
The primary reason why judicial efforts to define criteria for 
patentable subject matter in recent years have failed is that these 
efforts have not been grounded in the objectives of the patent system. 
Since patentable subject matter standards effectively set the 
boundaries of the patent system and its impacts, patentable subject 
matter scope should conform to the objectives of the patent system to 
set the proper boundaries for the system through the articulation of 
patentable subject matter standards. If we do not pay attention to the 
goals of the system, how can we assess what technologies are 
valuably included or excluded from the system? 
The notion that Congress intended to include a wide range of 
useful advances within the incentives of the patent system suggests 
the proper framework for defining patentable subject matter 
standards. Congress implemented the patent system as a means to 
raise incentives for the creation of useful items and processes that are 
outliers in their fields, with the incentives achieved through the sorts 
of access controls and payment systems described in this article. 
Given this incentive purpose (and the lack of any explicit technical 
boundaries on the achievement of this purpose detailed in the Patent 
Act), Congress’s apparent aim was that the patent system should be 
coextensive with the system’s purpose—that is, that the patent system 
should serve a technology-enhancing function wherever the system is 
capable of doing so. Accordingly, Congress’s intention was for the 
patent system to apply to all types of useful advances that can be 
encouraged through the sorts of access controls the patent system can 
implement (but also that no other technologies be included). 
This purpose provides a guiding principle for the construction of 
patentable subject matter standards. Such a technology-neutral 
principle offers a means to construct patentable subject matter 
standards that focus on the practical features of advances which will 
fall within the patent system without knowing in advance what the 
advances will entail or how they will operate (e.g., whether they are 
tangible or not) and without arbitrarily tying the patent system only to 
types of technologies that resemble industrial or technical discoveries 
of the past. Such neutral criteria should—given the forward looking 
goals of the patent system to promote the production of new advances 
that are non-obvious departures from our current knowledge—help to 
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keep the patent system as a force for the encouragement of presently 
unforeseen technologies as “times change” and fundamentally new 
fields of useful advances are possible.
206
 
C. Towards a Revised Patentable Subject Matter Standard 
This subsection uses the neutral principle of the suitability of 
advances for access controls and access payments as a criterion for 
the construction of new patentable subject matter standards. It is 
hoped that these proposed standards will fill the void left behind by 
Supreme Court precedent to date and will be extendable as needed 
based on interpretations and modifications made in light of new 
technologies and social practices. With such forward-looking, yet 
well-defined features, patentable subject matter standards can tailor 
the scope of the patent system to advances for which the system can 
serve the incentive function envisioned by Congress and the drafters 
of the Constitution. 
1. Goals of a Revised Patentable Subject Matter Standard 
The standard proposed here is a reflection of the view explained 
in this article that the patent system exists to encourage and regulate 
the production of patent-eligible advances. The proposed standard 
includes practical advances within the range of patentable subject 
matter if the production of advances can be effectively included in 
access controls and access payment practices that will incentivize the 
production of patent-eligible advances as public goods at production 
rates that match public demands. Where an advance is capable of 
access controls that lend themselves to such a payment and 
production modulating system, the advance should be considered 
patentable subject matter. Conversely, where advances or their uses 
 
 206. The need to keep the patent system forward looking and to ensure that it will provide 
incentives for as yet undiscovered types of advances was recognized by a plurality of the Court 
in Bilski which notes: 
[T]imes change. Technology and other innovations progress in unexpected ways. 
For example, it was once forcefully argued that until recent times, “well-
established principles of patent law probably would have prevented the issuance 
of a valid patent on almost any conceivable computer program.” But this fact 
does not mean that unforeseen innovations such as computer programs are 
always unpatentable. Section 101 is a “dynamic provision designed to encompass 
new and unforeseen inventions.” A categorical rule denying patent protection for 
“inventions in areas not contemplated by Congress . . . would frustrate the 
purposes of the patent law.” 
Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3227 (alteration in original) (citations omitted). 
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are such that this type of access limitation and production 
incentivizing cannot be realized effectively—because demands of the 
public for advances cannot be translated into production incentives or 
because the costs of doing so generally overwhelm the corresponding 
advantages—then the patent system should not be applied and the 
advances should be determined to constitute unpatentable subject 
matter. In short, the feasibility of access controls (and related access 
payment systems) should govern the overall scope of the patent 
system and the range of patentable subject matters. 
A system of invention production incentives of the sort described 
in this article will need to include 1) a means for potential users to 
recognize an advance as a distinct item from other similar items 
performing similar functions, 2) sufficient present utility (and 
projectable future utility) for the users to evaluate the merit of the new 
advance (relative to the merit of other items that perform the same 
function) and to determine an amount that they are willing to pay for 
access to the new advance and its new incremental utility, 3) a 
mechanism for controlling access to the advance such that persons 
will seldom gain access to the advance without paying for such 
access, and 4) a mechanism for transferring access payments from 
users of an advance to the inventors of the advance, either directly or 
through intermediate payment steps. With these four components, a 
system of access controls and associated access payments will tend to 
encourage the production of new advances in accordance with the 
value judgments and demands of potential users of the advances. 
Absent any one of these features, the link between enhanced user 
value and rewards to inventors will be broken and the invention 
incentivizing and resource allocation goals of the patent system will 
not be served. 
2. Minimum Features of Technologies Susceptible to 
Production Incentives Through Patent Rewards 
Given that the main purpose of the patent system is to set prices 
for access to patented technologies and to thereby encourage the 
production of patent-eligible advances at levels that meet public 
demand for such inventions (and at levels that minimize opportunity 
costs suffered by the public when such inventions are under-
produced), the patent system should apply to technologies and 
production settings where this access pricing is possible and likely to 
be effective in modulating invention production. Hence, a minimum 
feature of an invention constituting patentable subject matter should 
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be that the invention’s production can be encouraged through the 
types of access controls and access pricing encompassed by patent 
laws. This implies further that patentable subject matters should be 
limited to advances for which there are sustainable methods of 
exclusion from use and further means of providing selective access 
only upon payment of relevant access charges. 
There are several basic features that a technology must have in 
order to be susceptible to this type of production incentive system. 
Absent any one of these features, it seems unlikely that a system of 
invention access controls and related invention access pricing will 
produce rewards to innovators that will encourage invention 
production: 
1) Distinct Definition of Invention: In order to be the focus of 
user valuation assessments and related access payment 
arrangements, an invention will need to be separately 
identifiable. That is, the invention will need to be defined 
with sufficient particularity to be understood in its practical 
operation and to be separated from other similar items or 
processes. Distinctive definition will be a minimum feature of 
patentable subject matter for several reasons. 
 First, the definition of an invention should be sufficiently 
particularized and linked to practical results to give potential 
users means to analyze the results and their related utility. 
These utility assessments will be the basis for invention 
valuations by potential users and, therefore, the willingness of 
potential users to pay for access to the inventions. 
 Second, the definition of an invention constituting patentable 
subject matter should include concrete implementation 
details, such as workable descriptions of the invention’s 
structure (if any) and operation, so as to give potential users 
means to understand the steps and costs of making, using, and 
maintaining the advance. Often, the net utility to users of an 
advance will depend significantly on the costs of making the 
advance (or acquiring it) and using it, as well as the 
advantages of using it. The net advantages of use of a new 
advance can only be understood with information on all of the 
factors affecting these net advantages, including the means of 
use and the resources needed to support such use. Hence, 
concrete knowledge and description of the structure and 
operation of an advance are important minimum features of 
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patentable subject matter, needed to provide key 
informational inputs to user value determinations. These 
details must be both known (an issue of patentable subject 
matter) and described completely in a patent application (an 
issue of the sufficiency of invention disclosures and 
descriptions in the relevant patent specification).
207
 
 Third, the definition of an invention will need to be particular 
enough to permit viable access controls and access payment 
mechanisms to be implemented and administered consistently 
and without large fact-finding costs. Absent a detailed 
definition of an advance—including clear means to 
distinguish it from unrestricted items with similar structural 
features or usage results—attempts to control access to the 
advance as part of an access payment system may tend to be 
over- or under-inclusive, improperly sweeping up other non-
patented items within access controls or failing to control all 
instances of access to the patented advance and thereby 
allowing some users free access to the advance. 
 Two dimensions of distinctiveness in defining a patentable 
advance may be relevant here: distinctiveness as to structural 
elements of the advance and distinctiveness as to functional 
results achieved by using the advance. A complete description 
of a patentable advance should include sufficient practical 
details to both distinguish the patented item from similarly 
functioning items with different structural features and to 
distinguish the patented item from similarly structured items 
with different functions. A description lacking these sorts of 
distinctive details regarding the structures or results of a new 
invention will provide little means for invention-specific 
access controls of the sort needed in applying the patent 
system effectively to incentivize and modulate invention 
production. 
 Complete invention definitions, fully comparing an invention 
 
 207. Even where an advance constitutes patentable subject matter (and might therefore 
qualify for a patent under a complete description of the invention and upon meeting other patent 
law tests), an inventor may fail to gain a patent (or may obtain a patent that can later be voided) 
if the description of the invention provided in the inventor’s patent application (in the portion of 
the application commonly referred to as the invention “specification”) is not sufficient to inform 
average practitioners in the field of the invention how to make and use the invention. See 35 
U.S.C. § 112 (2006). 
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to prior designs and then clarifying the new features which 
distinguish the advance from its predecessors, may also aid 
potential users of the advance in assessing the incremental 
utility associated with the advance. The nature of items used 
previously for accomplishing the same ends—often 
unpatented items free for all to use without patent-related 
payments—should be apparent from the discussion in 
invention definitions of the predecessors. By limiting patents 
to advances that involve clearly articulated practical 
distinctions from prior item designs, potential users of the 
advances will be able to focus their attention on the new 
features of the advance that distinguish it from its 
predecessors and that potentially provide new utility to the 
users. This will, in turn, support the valuation of the new 
utility by potential users and the willingness of users to pay 
for access to the new advances. 
2) Regular Invention Operation: An invention constituting 
patentable subject matter should operate in a regular manner 
to achieve predictable utility if users are to have confidence in 
the future utility of the advance and to be willing to pay for 
access to that future utility. Absent this type of regular 
operation and functional results, potential users of an 
invention will not be able to project the value of future access 
to the invention (because they will lack confidence that 
presently achieved utility from the advance will correspond to 
future utility and value) and will be unwilling to set and pay a 
price for access to the invention. 
3) Manifest Utility Coextensive with Invention Definition: A 
patentable invention should produce identifiable results and 
manifest utility when used in accordance with its definition so 
that potential invention users can assess how much they wish 
to pay to gain access to the invention and the benefits it 
produces. Absent manifest utility (as evidenced through the 
results the invention presently produces or such further results 
as can be projected reasonably when the invention is brought 
to the public through patent disclosures), the type of access 
valuations and pricing that can be administered through the 
patent system will produce few if any rewards to inventors, 
making the costs of administering and enforcing patent rights 
simply wasted resources. 
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 The need for manifest utility to support invention valuation 
processes explains why advances that are defined only in 
highly abstract terms without important implementing details 
should not be seen as patentable subject matter. These 
advances lack the types of implementing details that 
correspond to immediately available utility in using the 
advances. Sufficient practical details should be present to 
dictate identifiable results from use of advances, such that the 
utility of these results and value from using the advances can 
be assessed. This will allow potential users of the advances to 
make valuation determinations and to arrive at access 
payment decisions. Lacking such bases for evaluation, 
advances should not be admitted to the type of access pricing 
system implemented through patent rights. 
4) Means to Limit Access: A patentable invention and the 
settings in which it is used should be such that there are 
means to prevent access to the invention (or at least use of the 
invention) by persons who do not pay for such access 
(through either license fees or patent-influenced purchase 
prices). Absent means to prevent access on this sort of 
conditional basis, the type of access pricing that the patent 
system can support will not be possible. If persons who do 
not pay are able to gain access on a similar basis to those who 
do, there will be little incentive to pay for such access. 
Indeed, those persons who pay for access and are then forced 
to compete with persons who gain access without paying will 
be disadvantaged since both groups will have access to the 
functionality of the invention in question, but only those who 
have paid will bear the costs of gaining access. Furthermore, 
absent clear means of preventing access to inventions without 
access payments, parties capable of producing new advances 
may see little way to gain returns on their innovation 
investments and may forego inventive efforts rather than 
effectively giving away their costly inventions in the absence 
of access controls. 
5) Payment Mechanisms: The manner and settings in which an 
invention is used must be amenable to pricing of access and 
transfers of access payments to invention originators. The 
intermediate steps through which this will occur may be 
complex and may imperfectly transfer the prices users pay for 
GRUNER  5/17/2012 10:10 AM 
600 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. [Vol. 28 
access to the parties who produce inventions. Nonetheless, 
some mechanisms for transferring most of these access 
charges to inventors (or the organizations that fund inventive 
efforts) are needed to encourage optimal levels of invention 
production. 
The more imperfectly these mechanisms work—that is, the more 
that the costs of administering payment systems filter out components 
of payments and cause only fractions of amounts that users pay for 
access to be passed on to invention originators—the less effectively 
the patent system will encourage and regulate invention production in 
accordance with user demands. 
Furthermore, the more that payment mechanisms work on 
categorical bases—for example, specifying a single price for a 
patented item that is sold to a group of users where each user in the 
group has a somewhat different value for use of the item—the more 
likely it is that some invention users will have unmet demands for 
additional inventions. This will tend to be the case because no user 
will be likely to pay more for invention access than that party feels 
such access is worth, but some potential invention users might be 
willing to pay more for additional inventions that are not produced at 
the access price that the relevant group of users is willing to pay.
208
 
These additional inventions will not be produced if access pricing 
mechanisms are not particularized to the individual level and the 
additional demands of those users at higher prices are not translated 
into additional demands seen by invention originators. 
This is another way of saying that the ideal form of the patent 
system would be one where there is perfect price discrimination of 
invention access across potential invention users—where each user 
pays what he or she actually thinks that use of the invention is worth. 
Such a system would present incentives to inventors that would 
encourage the creation of inventions filling the broadest range of user 
demands and minimizing opportunity costs due to the under-
production of inventions which would have cost less to produce than 
their values to users. 
However, such a system of perfect price discrimination for 
access pricing would be too costly to administer and we generally will 
make do with categorical assessments of access prices—that is, with a 
 
 208. This is a result of imperfect price discrimination of access pricing in a system where 
access to an invention is made available to a group of users at a single price. 
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system providing access to patented items across categories of users 
at prices that reflect the willingness of substantial number of users in 
each category to pay for access. Groupings of users in particular 
categories (and policing different pricing of invention access by 
category) will depend on the costs of identifying and separating 
different types of invention users and in charging each type a different 
price for use of an invention. Where these costs are high, efforts to 
distinguish between users will tend not to be made, meaning that the 
users involved will be lumped into one group and charged one price 
for invention access rather than being subject to price discrimination. 
6) Modest Transaction Costs in Administering Patent Rights: 
The types of invention access controls and use payment 
mechanisms described in the above criteria must be capable 
of implementation without large transaction costs if demands 
for new inventions are to be translated accurately into 
incentives for invention production. If transaction costs of 
implementing access controls and access payment 
mechanisms are large for a particular category of advance, 
then these costs may soak up amounts that users will pay for 
access, leaving little or no net rewards for invention users. 
Such a result would negate the production incentive function 
to be served by patent laws and rewards. Indeed, transaction 
costs that soak up even a substantial fraction of the amounts 
users are willing to pay for inventions may substantially skew 
the production of such inventions away from optimal levels. 
Such costs—even if they leave behind some net rewards for 
invention producers—will tend to make these rewards so low 
as to cause many potential inventors to see other uses of their 
resources as producing greater potential returns and to divert 
their efforts away from potential inventive efforts. 
Transaction costs in administering patent rights may arise from 
several features of innovations. High administrative costs due to any 
of the following factors may justify excluding advances from 
patentable subject matters. 
Feasibility of Access Controls: Generally prevailing costs of 
preventing access to inventions for persons refusing to pay for such 
access might justify excluding some types of advances from 
patentable subject matter. Such costs may be high where advances are 
not susceptible to physical access limitations or other similarly 
effective means for preventing unpaid access.  
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Advances involving new devices or compositions of matter 
should generally be amenable to effective access controls since access 
to units of the devices or compositions can be restricted through 
physical constraints and access limitations. Similarly, low cost access 
controls for processes that achieve physical transformations of items 
will often be feasible. This will be the case because these sorts of 
physical transformations will typically be realized by physical 
equipment and access to the relevant patented process can be 
controlled by limiting physical access to the corresponding 
equipment. 
Limiting access to method advances with no physical 
embodiments or transformations will sometimes raise more problems. 
Difficulties may arise for these sorts of inventions in implementing 
policeable systems for access controls (through which persons can be 
excluded from using an advance until they have paid for access) and 
payment remedies (through which persons gaining unpaid access can 
be detected and an appropriate remedy imposed that achieves the 
equivalent of the access payments that should have been made, plus a 
punitive payment where there is a need to deter knowing non-
payment of access fees). Where these sorts of access controls and 
payment mechanisms will typically be hard or impossible to 
implement, the reward system of patent laws will break down and no 
attempt should be made to save it. Rather, the associated type of 
advance should be deemed non-patentable subject matter and left to 
other means for encouragement, if any. 
Concern over ease of invention access and use and the inability 
of patent system processes to effectively stop such use suggests yet 
another reason (other than the lack of immediate utility) that pure 
ideas, as unapplied to practical tasks and used only in mental 
processes of individuals, should not fall within the patent system. The 
use of such ideas absent access payments would be hard, if not 
impossible to prevent. Both the means to stop the spread of ideas 
from one person to another, as well as the means for determining 
whether particular ideas have been used by additional parties would 
be highly difficult to implement. Application of the patent system to 
these sorts of abstract, unapplied ideas is properly withheld due in 
part to these difficulties. Of course, we also limit the application of 
the patent system regarding the spread and reuse of ideas in mental 
processes because the First Amendment protects the communication 
and intellectual understanding of ideas and the patent system must be 
interpreted and applied so as not to interfere with the dictates and 
GRUNER 5/17/2012 10:10 AM 
2012] FILLING THE BILSKI VOID 603 
ends of this fundamental constitutional protection. 
In sum, this analysis suggests two threshold inquiries that will 
bear on whether transactional costs or difficulties in administering 
access controls suggest that the patent system should not be applied at 
all. First, are physical controls (of the type normally exerted over 
personal property) sufficient to ensure access controls over either 
physical items embodying an invention or over physical equipment 
through which the invention is carried out such that physical controls 
will provide a low cost, reliable means to implement invention access 
controls and related payment mechanisms? Second, where an advance 
involves few if any physical features, will there be some other 
regularly successful and minimally expensive means of preventing 
access to the advance in order to ensure payment? If the answer to 
both of these questions is no, then a type of advance should probably 
be excluded from the patent system on transaction cost grounds. 
Note that this type of analysis may call into question the 
propriety of patenting many business methods that do not involve 
devices or physical transformations of an item. The use of these 
methods in business contexts may be particularly hard to detect and 
prevent absent access payments. Hence, the analysis presented here 
supplies grounds for excluding some but not all business methods 
from patentable subject matter. Whether or not a business method 
should be deemed patentable subject matter should turn on whether 
the method is of a type (and used in a context) that use of the method 
is excludable—that is, that access to the business method can be 
controlled and constrained absent access payments. 
Clarity of Use Determinations: Another type of transaction cost 
that may figure centrally in determining the outer boundaries of 
patentable subject matter relates to the distinctiveness of the 
boundaries between an advance and prior items or practices. This 
distinctiveness will influence the ease with which use or non-use of 
the new advance can be determined. If a new design is highly similar 
to an old one (or can easily be disguised as an old one), then 
identifying unauthorized and unpaid uses of the advance as part of an 
access control and payment system will be particularly difficult. In 
these settings, patentable subject matter might not be found because 
of the difficulties (and costs) of patent infringement determinations 
for the advances were they to be included in the patent system. 
The practical implications of this type of transaction cost 
analysis suggest limitations on the patenting of advances where, for 
example, subtle types of discretion must be exercised or 
GRUNER  5/17/2012 10:10 AM 
604 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. [Vol. 28 
determinations made as part of carrying out an advance and the 
necessary criteria for making these cannot be clearly defined in patent 
applications and claims. In these settings, patents should be withheld, 
in part because the patent infringement analyses that would be 
required to identify infringement and implement patent rewards 
would be time consuming and speculative.
209
 
Another related ground on which a given advance might be seen 
as falling outside patentable subject matter is that the advance is 
defined only in highly abstract terms, lacking practical 
implementation details from which the presence and use of the same 
advance might be measured as part of an access control system. Here, 
the abstract nature of the definition of an advance suggests a use 
measurement problem. Where only an abstract definition is given and 
a set of results would be consistent with (or at least similar to the 
results from) both use and non-use of the abstract advance, 
measurements of infringement from actual activities of asserted 
infringers may be highly uncertain and costly. Hence, the definition of 
an advance only in abstract terms may be proper grounds for 
exclusion of the advance from patentable subject matter because of 
difficulties in determining whether the advance is present and in 
implementing a related access control and payment system through 
patent rights. 
D. A Proposed New Standard for Recognizing Patentable 
Subject Matter 
Based on the considerations described in this article, the 
following patentable subject matter standard would be a valuable 
advance over present uncertainty in such standards and corresponding 
weakness in patent-mediated invention incentives: 
Patentable subject matter is present if an advance includes 1) a 
distinct definition of structure, operation, and use consequences 
such that potential users can recognize and evaluate the methods, 
costs, and results of using the advance, 2) sufficient presently 
apparent or immediately projectable utility in its defined form to 
permit users to evaluate the merit of the new advance and to 
 
 209. Another reason to withhold patents in these circumstances is that the persons 
providing the advances have not given the public enough information to use the advances 
effectively until they have provided clear definitions of the analysis or decision criteria 
sufficient for other parties to replicate the advances and to achieve utility from using the 
advances. 
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determine how much, if anything, they are willing to pay for 
access to it, 3) sufficient physical instantiation or other 
controllable inputs or results such that access to the advance can 
generally be limited to parties paying for such access, and 4) 
features and contexts for use such that uses of the advance can be 
identified and mechanisms for transferring access payments from 
users of the advance to the inventors of the advance, either 
directly or through intermediate payment steps, can be 
implemented without excessive costs. 
The proposed standard is consistent with (although more detailed 
than) the standard used by the Federal Circuit in Research 
Corporation.
210
 There, the court recognized patentable subject matter 
in an advance based on evidence of the functional ends served by the 
advance, the palpable components comprising the invention, the need 
in the relevant field for the functionality provided by the advance, and 
the likely commercial significance of the advance, as indicated by the 
existence in the marketplace of commercially successful items to 
which the advance was either applied or used as an improvement.
211
 
The proposed test focuses on similar factors, but relates the factors 
more clearly to invention access controls. 
The proposed standard, if applied across various present and 
future technologies, will insure that the patent system and its 
restrictions and costs are limited to advances that are workable targets 
of the types of access controls, payments to inventors, incentivizing of 
invention, and prioritization of resource allocations to inventive 
activities that the patent system was intended to achieve. 
The test proposed here is dictated by the nature of the patent 
system and its goals, not by the types of technologies and advances 
that the system is intended to foster. These standards will ensure that 
patent rights have their proper influence on the allocation of resources 
to inventive efforts in competition with other demands for the same 
resources. This will help to give patent rights their proper place as 
counterparts to personal and real property rights in the attraction and 
allocation of resources to the production of useful products of human 
ingenuity. Viewed as means to value and attract scarce resources to 
the production of patent-eligible advances, patent rights can be seen 
as one more component in the broader scheme of property rights. 
 
 210. See Research Corp. Technologies, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 627 F.3d 859 (Fed. Cir. 
2010). 
 211. Id. at 868-69. 
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Patent rights can encourage invention production in the same ways 
that other property rights have influenced production activities 
concerning real and personal property production for many years. 
The test for patentable subject matter proposed here represents a 
technology-neutral, historically unbound set of criteria for 
determining the scope and limits of the patent system. As such, the 
test is suitable to frame the promise of patent rewards for future 
inventors considering potentially difficult and expensive efforts to 
discover previously unknown types of technologies. To define the 
characteristics of patentable technologies in terms of technology 
criteria (or based on the technology-specific historical background of 
a technology, whether the technology emerged from industrial, liberal 
arts, or business sources, or whether the technology will be used in 
industrial, liberal arts, or business contexts) is probably fundamentally 
flawed. Our most useful discoveries of the greatest benefit to society 
in increased utility may come from and be applied in any of these 
areas. The patent system should back efforts to produce new, useful 
tools for societal use in whatever fields these tools can be produced 
and used. 
Hence, a set of criteria like those proposed here, which are not 
technologically limited or historically constrained, but rather framed 
in terms of the operation of the patent systems and its capabilities, 
offer the best hope of realizing the full potential of the patent system. 
These standards will ensure the maximum benefit from the patent 
system, applying that system where the system has strengths and a 
positive social role, and withholding the system where it is either 
ineffective or too costly and cannot serve its intended social function. 
VII. ADDITIONAL PATENT LAW IMPLICATIONS OF PATENT RIGHTS AS 
RESOURCE ALLOCATORS 
While the primary focus in the doctrinal analyses in this article 
has been on patentable subject matter standards, the interpretation 
developed in this article of the patent system as an invention 
production incentivizing and resource attracting system has further 
implications for the formulation and application of other patent law 
standards. Indeed, given that the encouragement and regulation of 
invention production are among the fundamental purposes of the 
patent system, it is hardly surprising that these goals should be kept in 
mind in shaping many aspects of the patent system. The full 
implications of these patent system goals in shaping patent law 
standards are worthy of considerable additional analyses. This section 
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concludes with some brief thoughts on how the view of the patent 
system as a means for incentivizing and regulating invention 
production may warrant reevaluation and reformulation of patent law 
doctrines beyond patentable subject matter standards. 
A. Utility Standards 
To qualify for a patent, a particular advance must realize at least 
a small amount of positive utility when used.
212
 Viewed as part of a 
system of access controls and rewards to invention producers, this 
utility requirement ensures that patent system controls and costs only 
apply to inventions with utility that users can assess and value. Absent 
some immediately apparent advantage in using the invention, the type 
of patent reward system outlined in this article will be useless and the 
costs of administering the patent system will be wasted. 
Furthermore, by insisting that patent applicants pursue, produce, 
and identify in their patent applications some clear utility for their 
advances, we ensure that inventors are encouraged to complete their 
efforts to perfect their inventive projects to the point of producing 
some manifest positive utility, not just hoped for results. This 
encouragement to complete their efforts and to bring forth at least 
some practical examples of how their invention can be used 
advantageously helps to ensure that patent restrictions and costs are 
only applied to inventions that have some value and a corresponding 
likelihood of generating access payments back to invention 
originators. Since these payments are at the heart of the invention 
production incentivizing that the patent system can promote, only 
inventions that have some meaningful present value and 
corresponding likelihood of generating these sorts of payments should 
fall within the patent system. 
B. Non-obviousness Standards 
One of the key purposes of the patent system as envisioned and 
described here is to attract and allocate scarce resources to inventive 
projects. Among the key types of resources that the patent system 
allocates is the time of a few highly skilled inventors. Patent rights are 
not presented to every party who produces a new advance with 
practical implications, but rather only to those parties who produce 
advances that are both new and non-obvious relative to prior 
 
 212. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
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knowledge in the same field of technology or endeavor.
213
 
The interpretation of non-obviousness standards should be 
shaped to ensure that patent rights and the incentives that such rights 
create are focused on attracting the attention and talents of highly 
skilled (and rare) individuals to inventive efforts. This can be 
accomplished by tailoring non-obviousness findings to permit 
patenting of an advance only where the information, analytic 
techniques, or inventive skills needed to produce the advance were 
not widely held at the time the advance was made. 
Where few, if any, parties other than the originator of an advance 
shared the same information, analytic abilities, and skills used in 
producing the advance, then the advance should be treated as non-
obvious in the field where it was produced. This will ensure that 
patent incentives are focused on parties with rare knowledge and 
abilities (which are key inputs needed to promote certain lines of 
technical innovation). At the same time, by withholding patent rights 
in cases of widely shared information, analytic abilities, and research 
skills sufficient to support research projects, this type of non-
obviousness standard will avoid incurring the costs and limitations of 
patent rights in settings where numerous parties are potentially 
successful innovators and the talents and knowledge of a few 
especially capable (and scarce) innovators need not be attracted 
through the special incentives of the patent system. 
By limiting patents to situations where key researchers and 
supporting resources are scarce inputs to innovation, non-obviousness 
standards can tailor the impacts and costs of the patent system to the 
invention under-production and resource allocation problems that the 
patent system was designed to address. 
C. Infringement Standards 
1. Direct Infringement 
A party is deemed to directly infringe a patent—and to be liable 
to the patent owner—where the party makes, uses, sells, or imports a 
patented invention without the consent of the patent owner.
214
 
Whether or not the item made, used, sold, or imported by an asserted 
 
 213. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(a), 103 (2006). 
 214. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006). Several additional less common types of patent 
infringement are recognized for conduct that aids or encourages the types of patent infringement 
mentioned in the text. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(b)-(g) (2006). 
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infringer (termed the “accused item” in patent analyses) was the same 
as the patented invention is determined by a one-to-one comparison 
between the elements of the patent claims and the features of the item 
of the asserted infringer.
215
 Where there is a complete match, direct 
infringement is found.
216
 
This sort of direct infringement analysis should be conducted as 
part of the policing of a system of patent-mediated invention access 
controls of the sort discussed in this article. What constitutes an 
element of a patented invention, and whether the same element is 
present in an accused item, should be determined and understood as 
persons analyzing the invention and considering the scope of related 
access controls and licensing would have approached the same 
questions. If an item asserted to be infringing would have been seen 
by most parties in the same field as one controlled by the patent under 
analysis and only properly produced or used with a license or under 
other consent of the patent holder, then the same item should be found 
to be directly infringing when made without such consent. In this 
way, direct infringement findings will be, in effect, findings that the 
infringers were abusers of the access controls and payment 
requirements imposed by the patent system. Direct infringers, under 
these standards, will be persons who have disregarded the access 
limitations imposed on inventions by the patent system, despite clear 
opportunities (from reading the relevant patents and the understanding 
of those patents that would have prevailed in their field) to appreciate 
that they were undertaking activities and gaining access to patented 
inventions without paying the access fees demanded by the patent 
system. 
2. Doctrine of Equivalent Infringement 
Access controls provided by the patent system can also be 
abused where parties gain unpaid access to the functionality of a new 
invention without implementing precisely the same design as the new 
invention. Under these circumstances, a party may infringe a patent 
on the new invention under the doctrine of equivalents.
217
 
Viewing the patent system as a means to encourage and regulate 
 
 215. See Southwall Technologies, Inc. v. Cardinal IG Co., 54 F.3d 1570, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 
1995). 
 216. Id. 
 217. See Graver Tank & Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Linde Air Products Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608-09 
(1950). 
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invention production offers some guidance about the proper scope of 
the doctrine of equivalents. This doctrine, as interpreted by the 
Supreme Court, provides that an item which is not identical to a 
patented invention nonetheless infringes the patent on that invention 
if the item operates through the same means, serves the same 
function, and achieves the same result as the patented invention.
218
 An 
item that has this trio of similarities to a patented invention—that is, 
the same means, function, and result—is viewed as the equivalent of 
the patented invention.
219
 The Supreme Court has further indicated 
that the equivalency of an item to a patented invention should be 
assessed element by element, meaning that an item must have an 
identical or equivalent element to every element of a patented 
invention before infringement under the doctrine of equivalents can 
be found.
220
 
The doctrine of equivalents can serve a valuable function in a 
patent-implemented invention access control system by preventing 
parties from gaining unpaid access to the functionality of patented 
advances by making cosmetic or functionally unimportant changes in 
those advances. By viewing the purpose of the doctrine of equivalents 
as being to prevent unpaid access to the functional advantages of a 
patented invention, the nature of equivalent advances that should be 
deemed infringing under the doctrine of equivalents becomes clearer. 
Any advance that achieves functional results that are similar to those 
of a patented advance and that incorporates components and operating 
sequences that are similar to those of a patented advance should be 
deemed infringing.
221
 Persons using these types of similar advances 
 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. 
 220. Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 40 (1997). 
 221. Under this approach, whether or not a similar advance was directly derived from a 
patented advance by modifying the latter will not matter for purposes of assessing infringement 
under the doctrine of equivalents. The salient issues are similarity of the structure and operation 
of the two items and whether these similarities account for the functionality of the item that is 
similar to the patented advance. If so, the value of the patented advance is being captured in the 
similar item and a user of the latter should pay the same charges for access to this functionality 
as a user of the patented advance. 
 While the derivation of a modified advance from a patented item is not strictly indicative 
of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents, the process by which derivation occurred may 
have some bearing on whether infringement should be found under the doctrine. For example, it 
will often be relevant to consider whether, in making changes to the patented item, designers 
sought to incorporate meaningful functional differences in the modified item (perhaps because 
the modifications were part of a designing around process aimed at avoiding patent 
infringement). Where significant functional differences were targeted and pursued in good faith, 
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are gaining access to the practical advantages of the patented 
invention and should only be able to do so by paying for access. 
A system that lets uncompensated use of these sorts of 
equivalent items slip by without infringement findings and remedies 
will not reward inventors for the full range of increased utility that 
their advances have brought to society. This will undervalue their 
inventive efforts and tend to encourage future inventors in similar 
circumstances to make choices to pursue other types of activities, 
resulting in the under-production of valuable inventions relative to 
public demand. Toleration of this type of uncompensated use will also 
encourage parties to create more and more functionally equivalent 
items that work like patented advances but that do not incur patent-
related charges when used. These sorts of imitators (who are 
effectively free riders on the inventive success of the producers of 
patented advances) will tend to prevail in their own fields of 
competition over those parties who pay for access to patented 
advances. Imitators will tend to prevail in these settings since the 
imitators of patented advances will not suffer the costs of patent-
related access payments that their competitors will bear. Over time, 
this sort of industry change under competitive pressures will 
advantage clever users of equivalent items that gain the advantages of 
patented items without incurring the costs of producing the patented 
 
it makes it more probable that meaningfully different functional attributes were attained in the 
modified device. This, in turn, would provide some circumstantial evidence that the modified 
item is not similar to the patented one in structural, operational, and functional details and, 
accordingly, that the second advance should not be deemed an infringing item under the doctrine 
of equivalents. 
 Under this approach, persons seeking to modify patented designs to create new 
functionality are treated like designers generally, meaning that they are able to realize 
commercial gains from their designs free from patent enforcement threats from holders of 
patents on the unmodified items. Furthermore, if their new designs have features meeting patent 
standards, the designers of the modified items can seek patents of their own for the new features. 
Interpreting the doctrine of equivalents as allowing this sort of modification of patented items to 
achieve new functionality (where that new functionality does not depend on the protected 
functional mechanisms of the patented item) furthers the technology diversification goals of the 
patent system by bringing more technological alternatives into public access and use. 
 In contrast, attempts to make trivial (that is, functionally unimportant) changes in a 
patented advance in order to avoid findings of patent infringement are particularly injurious to 
the ends of the patent system. These efforts to “camouflage” infringement will just make 
instances of infringement harder to find and compensate, thereby undercutting the type of 
reward function that the patent system was intended to implement. Intentional efforts to conceal 
infringement in this way deserve strong condemnation and deterrence. One way to achieve this 
is to treat efforts aimed just at creating superficial differences between patented and similar 
items as instances of willful infringement, with the potential for punitive damages as a remedy. 
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items. 
To avoid this result—and the resulting gutting of patent-related 
payments and rewards as innovation incentives—findings of 
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents should be robustly 
made and enforced to police the boundaries of use of the functional 
results of patented advances. Such functionally-driven findings of 
infringement are needed to ensure that the parties who gain access to 
those results—as evidenced by use of items with features that produce 
the same functional results as those of a patented advance with 
substantially similar components and operational characteristics—are 
forced to pay for access to this functionality in the same manner as 
users of the patented advance itself. 
D. Damages 
By treating the patent system—including the relief afforded in 
patent suits when the normal access controls imposed by the patent 
system are not observed and a party makes unauthorized use of a 
patented invention—as a scheme for matching user demand with 
invention incentives, the proper scope of patent damages can be 
clarified. Patent damages are a substitute for the amount that a user 
would be willing to pay for access to a patented advance over the 
amount that they would pay for the next best substitute for performing 
the same task. Where there are active markets for the patented item 
and the next best substitute, the difference between these market 
prices should generally determine the per item patent damages that 
can be recovered.
222
 Where there is no such market, an estimate of the 
utility gains and value to the infringer of access to one unit of the 
patented item (less the cost of producing the unit and providing this 
access) should define the per unit damages that should be recoverable 
for infringement. This will equal the amount that the infringer would 
reasonably have been willing to pay for the type of access to the 
patented advance that the party utilized. The object of damage awards 
of this sort is to approximate the amounts that would have flowed to 
the patent holder were the patent system to have successfully 
controlled access to the patented invention and the infringer to have 
gained access to the invention via legitimate (that is, non-infringing) 
 
 222. Where the production costs of the patented item and its second best substitute are 
about equal, the patent damages (equal to lost profits) per item will be equal to the difference in 
the prices of the two items. Where one item is more or less costly to produce than the other, the 
per unit lost profit figure needs to be adjusted to reflect this difference. 
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channels and business processes. 
Additional punitive damages may be needed to discourage 
choices by potential infringers not to seek patented advances from 
legitimate sources—that is, to discourage choices to engage in 
infringement knowing that access to an advance was constrained by 
patent rights. Without punitive damages for choices to forgo access 
controls and patent-influenced payments to patent holders, potential 
infringers, confronted with knowledge of patent controls and 
invention use limitations, will have little reason to respect and adhere 
to the access controls of the patent system. They will instead be 
encouraged to choose to infringe by accessing patented advances 
without payments of patent-influenced prices with the hope that they 
will not be detected or, in the alternative, with the hope that, upon 
detection, the worst that will happen is that they will have to pay 
patent damages roughly equal to the amounts that they would have 
had to pay for access through legitimate channels of access sanctioned 
by the patent owner. 
To avoid this decision calculus favoring decisions to infringe, 
knowing infringers must face heightened damages that, even in light 
of the chance that their infringement will not be detected at all, create 
a perception of net projected costs in choosing to infringe and a net 
projected advantage in seeking access to a patented advance through 
means consented to by the patent holder. 
E. Injunctions 
Injunction standards crafted in accordance with the view of 
patent law described here would focus on the need to prevent 
uncompensated access to patented inventions. Where a patent 
holder’s past practices have established a generally available access 
payment scheme for an invention—perhaps because the patent holder 
has a well-established and non-exclusive licensing scheme specifying 
a price for access to a patented technology—injunction relief for 
infringement may not be needed at all, so long as an infringer pays 
damages equal to the access fee (that is, licensing fee) the infringer 
would have paid under the patent holder’s access pricing scheme. In 
this context, damages are a sufficient substitute for privately imposed 
access charges and further injunctive relief is not needed.
223
 
 
 223. This criterion for determining whether an injunction is appropriate in a patent case is 
equivalent to a key component of the standard adopted by the Supreme Court in the eBay case. 
See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 391-94 (2006). 
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Injunctions to counteract patent infringement will be needed 
primarily where damages are not easily available substitutes for 
privately-imposed access charges. Injunctions will help force 
potential users of patented advances to deal with access controls and 
to bargain with patent holders as the parties controlling access if the 
potential users are to have further access to the patented inventions at 
all. In this respect, injunctions serve as a means to police and preserve 
the access control system that sets up mechanisms of payments and 
rewards back to inventors, with the amount of the actual payments 
and rewards determined through bargaining between patent holders 
and infringers after injunctions have issued. 
Where there is no established price for additional access 
(perhaps because the patent holder intends to be the sole producer of a 
technology or intends to grant an exclusive license to only one party), 
the reward function of the patent system will generally be best served 
by protecting the patent holder’s control over access to a patented 
invention through the issuance of an injunction barring unauthorized 
use of the invention. This will ensure that any subsequent access of 
the infringer will be at a price that the patent holder has bargained for 
and consented to. The patent holder will have incentives to determine 
the incremental utility seen in the invention by the infringer and to set 
the price for access at but not above this point (since a higher price 
will not be paid by a rational licensee or user of the patented 
invention). A patent holder will tend to cap their access price at this 
point since a price—that is, licensing royalty—too high will just 
cause the potential user to turn away from a license and to use the 
second best item or practice to achieve the same functionality as the 
patented item would have provided. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Patent rights exist to serve societal ends. They encourage 
talented inventors and the resource managers who back these 
inventors to devote scarce time and resources to the search for new 
man-made tools for societal use. In encouraging more—but not too 
much more—attention to the development of these tools, the patent 
system serves a function like no other legal regime in encouraging 
and regulating socially desirable inventive efforts. Patent rights 
encourage and regulate the production of patent-eligible advances 
with characteristics that match public demands for new advances. 
A lot is at stake in determining the proper scope and means for 
operation of the patent system. The parties and resources influenced 
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by this system are among our most talented and most valuable. The 
inventions that patents promote—ranging from life saving drugs to 
society transforming communications devices—work tremendous 
changes in our daily activities and offer the best chance for new 
efficiencies and effectiveness in our economies, our societies, and our 
lives. 
We need a strong patent system because we need the useful tools 
it generates and the better world they enable. We need a patent system 
when—but only when—it can encourage the creation of socially 
valuable tools and can regulate the allocation of scarce resources to 
the important tasks of creating these tools. While it comes at a price, 
our patent system aims at promoting the production of our best 
innovations, propagating the use of these advances, and topping these 
advances with further innovation. The strength with which we back 
these innovative processes has much to do with the pace of progress 
in our society and with the strength of the United States economy as 
one of the primary sources of valuable innovation in the world. 
Ultimately, the patent system is a case in point of “you get what 
you pay for.” We need a patent system because we need what it 
produces. Valuing these ends, we should be willing, without 
carelessness and waste, to enforce patent rights strongly and to pay 
related fees for access to functionally valuable advances produced by 
talented innovators and risk-taking resource investors. This is the 
patent bargain—a good exchange enabled by patent rights and carried 
out through a costly, but worthwhile, patent-mediated system for 
inducing and regulating invention production. 
 
